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What makes scientific knowledge possible? The philosopher Immanuel Kant 
in his magnum opus, the Critique of Pure Reason, had a fascinating and 
puzzling answer to this question. Scientific knowledge, for Kant, is made 
possible by the faculty of reason and its demand for systematic unity (or, 
‘systematicity’). In other words, cognition about empirical objects can aspire 
to be scientific only if it is rationally embedded within or transformed into a 
system. But how can such system form once we take into account the 
perspectival nature of knowledge, i.e., its being situated in individual human 
cognitive faculties?  
My PhD thesis has a two-pronged objective: (i.) to reconstruct the 
complexity of the notion of systematicity in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason; 
and (ii.) to defend its plausibility in contemporary debates on the unity or 
plurality of scientific knowledge. As far as (i.) is concerned, Kant’s position is 
far from being clearly understood in the literature. Despite a renewed interest 
in Kant’s notion of systematicity in recent decades, existing contributions fail 
to offer a satisfactory account of it. The aim of my thesis is to provide a 
unified reading of reason’s systematicity as an essential feature of Kant’s 
analysis of the sources of cognition. In particular, I defend a novel account of 
theoretical reason the aims to support the following claims: (a.) systematicity 
is grounded in a legitimate use of reason’s ideas as prescriptive rules for 
empirical investigation; (b.) it is necessary to make empirical cognition 
possible and generate scientific hypotheses; and (c.) it gives us fundamental 
insights into Kant’s ‘empirical realism’ and his understanding of the role of 
metaphysics in science. With regard to (ii.), I show that Kant’s account of 
theoretical reason has much more to offer than generally acknowledged. In 
particular, I present it as providing a reconciling solution to the conflict 
between unity and pluralism in contemporary philosophy of science. Drawing 
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inspiration from Kant’s ‘perspectivism,’ I argue that unity and pluralism are to 







































This thesis reconstructs the complexity of the notion of systematicity in 
Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1st edition 1781, 2nd edition 
1787) and defends its plausibility in contemporary debates in philosophy of 
science. For Kant, the demand for systematicity fundamentally characterizes 
human reason. If we want to know something, we are not satisfied with a 
chaotic aggregate of particular cognitions. We demand that such cognitions 
are systematized, i.e., transformed into or embedded within a system. As a 
result, Kant takes systematicity as the ultimate mark of a science, although 
its precise role and overall significance for human cognition remain puzzling 
aspects of his philosophical project.  
Despite a renewed interest in Kant’s notion of systematicity in recent 
decades, existing interpretations fail to offer a satisfactory account of its 
cognitive function. This doctoral thesis aims to fill this gap. First, I argue that 
systematicity is grounded in a purposive and legitimate use of human reason. 
Second, I show that reason’s systematicity is not merely an afterthought or 
desideratum of our cognition, but rather a crucial feature of Kant’s analysis of 
the sources of cognition: it fundamentally complements the faculties of our 
mind in a variety of tasks concerning empirical cognition, such as the 
unification of cognition, the formation of empirical concepts, and the 
approximation to empirical truth. Third, I contend that these combined 
insights reveal an overarching framework that helps us understand Kant’s 
mature conception of realism (what he calls ‘empirical realism’) and his 
appraisal of the role of metaphysics in science. However, the goal is not 
solely historical. The dissertation also aims to defend the plausibility of Kant’s 
systematicity in contemporary debates about whether we should aim to unify 
our scientific theories or rather promote their diversity and multiplicity. In 
particular, I argue that Kant’s ‘perspectivism’ about reason’s systematicity 
can be used to rethink unity and pluralism as mutually inclusive principles of 
 vii 
scientific cognition and thereby solve the apparent conflict between them in 
contemporary philosophy of science. 
The thesis consists of five chapters divided into two parts. Part I 
reconstructs the legitimate use of the systematicity of reason within the 
framework of Kant’s mature philosophy and discusses one example of such 
use (the legitimate use of the theological idea). Part II explains why the 
systematicity of reason has a necessary role in empirical and scientific 
cognition (in particular, with respect to the unity of science, empirical truth, 
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Figure 1. Illustration of the VIII Axiom, from Newton's Opticks (4th edition, 
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This thesis explores the notion of the systematicity of reason in Immanuel 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1st edition 1781, 2nd edition 1787). 
Systematicity is a puzzling aspect of Kant’s theoretical philosophy. Although 
presented as a key component of his critical system, Kant’s treatment of 
systematicity in the First Critique is considerably underdeveloped if 
compared to other parts of his philosophy. In the Prolegomena, Kant 
describes it as an important “scholium” to his system whose details, however, 
have been only sketched in the Critique and should be further developed 
(Prolegomena, 4:364). After being neglected for a long time, this scholium 
has attracted ever more attention in the last decades and it is now discussed 
in a number of papers and publications from eminent scholars (Guyer 1990, 
Grier 2001, Geiger 2003, Allison 2004, Massimi and Breitenbach 2017, 
Willaschek 2018).  
Despite such renewed interest, existing interpretations fail to offer a 
satisfactory account of Kant’s notion of systematicity. Most commentators 
focus on particular aspects of it or discuss it in relation to more general 
problems. Other contributions look at the development of this notion in the 
Critique of the Power of Judgment to offer a more substantial view. For 
historical and interpretative reasons, I resist these impulses. The aim of my 
thesis is instead to provide a unified account of the systematicity of reason in 
direct continuity with main themes of the Critique of Pure Reason. This 
integrated approach within the First Critique will allow me to address different 
problems left unanswered in the literature (concerning unity of cognition, 
empirical truth, necessity of the laws of nature, transcendent metaphysics 
and empirical realism) as well as to fully evaluate the significance of 
systematicity in Kant’s philosophical project. 
I argue that reason’s systematicity is not merely an afterthought or 
desideratum of our cognition, but rather a crucial feature of Kant’s 
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philosophical project: it fundamentally complements the faculties of our mind 
in a variety of cognitive tasks. In particular, I defend the following claims: (a.) 
systematicity is grounded in a purposive and legitimate use of reason; (b.) it 
is necessary to make empirical cognition (i.e., cognition about sensible 
objects) possible and generate scientific hypothesis; and (c.) it gives us 
fundamental insights to understand key aspects of Kant’s mature 
philosophical position, namely his ‘empirical realism’ and his understanding 
of metaphysics. In the course of the thesis, I not only reconstruct Kant’s 
position on systematicity but also canvas ways in which it can apply more 
broadly to contemporary debates in philosophy of science. More specifically, 
I present it as a promising ‘perspectival’ (that is, epistemically situated) notion 
in the contemporary debate over unity and pluralism of scientific knowledge. 
My thesis consists of five chapters divided into two parts. Part I 
reconstructs the legitimate use of the systematicity of reason within the 
framework of Kant’s critical project. The aim of Chapter 1, “A rule-based 
account of the regulative use of reason,” is to outline the general features 
of the regulative use of reason in Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic, from its 
Introduction to the Appendix. Kant uses the term ‘regulative’ to refer to the 
critical and positive use of theoretical reason. Reason, for Kant, leads us to 
all sorts of unwarranted metaphysical claims about objects such as God, the 
soul, first causes, etc. If used regulatively, however, it has a fully legitimate 
place in cognition and is indeed necessary for investigating nature. The 
problem is that what Kant means by ‘regulative’ use of reason, why it is 
legitimate, and indeed necessary, are all extremely controversial questions. 
This chapter aims to shed light on these questions by proposing a rule-based 
account of reason and the use of its concepts (ideas). I contend that recent 
interpretations of reason do not sufficiently distinguish reason’s regulative 
use from the use of reason that leads us to transcendent metaphysics, thus 
failing both to vindicate a fully legitimate use of it and to explain its 
compatibility with a necessary role in cognition. I advance a radical reading 
according to which Kant has not just dismissed or weakened the rational 
principles that lead us to transcendent metaphysics but given a new meaning 
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to them—as immanent (by no means empiricist) prescriptive rules. Such 
emphasis on the prescriptivity of theoretical reason allows us to clearly 
isolate its legitimate use and lay the groundwork for understanding its key 
role in Kant’s view of scientific knowledge. 
In Chapter 2, “The idea of God and the empirical investigation of 
nature,” I analyse in detail the positive use of a particular idea of reason: the 
theological idea. In the Ideal of Pure Reason, Kant reconstructs the steps 
that lead human reason to postulate the idea of God—the most real being, or 
the ens realissimum. This idea plays a central role in Kant’s negative critique 
of rationalist theology as the concept underlying the fallacious arguments for 
God’s existence. This is not, however, the end of the story. Kant insists that 
the idea of God has also a positive role to play as a necessary regulative 
principle for the systematisation of empirical cognition. It is far from clear, 
however, whether Kant is thereby rehabilitating some aspects of the ens 
realissimum and, if this is the case, how this rehabilitation can be critically 
legitimate. I argue that that it is only by looking at the transcendental 
deduction of the ideas of reason (which Kant provides in the second part of 
the Appendix) that a fully legitimate positive use of the idea of God can be 
vindicated. In particular, I argue (i.) that ideas must be postulated as 
schemata rather than concepts of objects; and that (ii.) the content of ideas 
must be understood in analogical rather than descriptive terms. The 
proposed reading of the deduction provides us with a template for 
understanding the positive characterizations of the idea of God, including 
(but not limited to) its fundamental characterization as the ens realissimum. 
Part II explains why the systematicity of reason has a necessary role 
in empirical and scientific cognition. Chapter 3 “Kant’s space of reason and 
science: A perspectival reading” shows how Kant’s account of theoretical 
reason have implications for the contemporary debate over unity and 
pluralism of science. Although the unity of science thesis has been severely 
criticized in recent decades, I argue that pluralism as the sole epistemic 
principle guiding science is both too strong and too weak a principle. It is too 
strong because it does not account for the process of theory unification in 
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science (Newton’s theory of motion, Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetism, 
Einstein’s special theory of relativity are all clear examples of brilliant 
unificatory achievements). It is too weak because it does not answer the 
question of how science ought to be done. I then look at a promising 
perspectival approach to the problem Kant presents in the Appendix. I argue 
that the logical principles of systematicity (homogeneity, specification, and 
continuity) form a ‘perspectival space’ within which scientists can pursue both 
unity and disunity of cognition. I explain how Kant’s perspectivism can inform 
the current debate. I suggest that the conflict between pluralism and unity 
ultimately resides in a metaphysical characterization of unity that does not 
correctly capture its epistemic significance in science. Looking at Kant’s 
perspectivism not only allows us to resolve this apparent antinomy, but also 
rethink unity and pluralism as mutually inclusive regulative principles. 
In Chapter 4, “The systematic unity of reason and empirical truth,” 
I attempt a reconstruction of reason’s contribution to empirical truth in close 
connection with Kant’s definition of truth as the agreement of cognition with 
its object. I argue that Kant’s treatment of truth in the Transcendental Analytic 
is incomplete and gets completed by Kant himself in the Appendix to the 
Transcendental Dialectic with an often neglected but compelling argument 
(what I shall call the ‘Variety Argument’). The latter argument postulates such 
a variety in the appearances that are given to us as to undermine any 
attempt at formulating empirical truths. Crucially, I argue that such variety 
does not depict an extreme-case scenario, but our own epistemic situation 
given the perspectival constraints of our knowledge. The systematicity of 
reason completes Kant’s theory of truth as a necessary condition for the 
tenability of this theory at the empirical level. In particular, I show that the 
transcendental principles of reason Kant presents in the Appendix 
complement the understanding by providing two essential prerequisites of 
empirical truth: (i.) the possibility of formulating empirical concepts; and (ii.) 
the possibility of approximating to the agreement of empirical cognitions with 
objects. Such transcendental completion remarkably dovetails with the 
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empiricist account of concept formation and the other criteria of truth that can 
be found in Kant’s corpus. 
In Chapter 5, “Empirical laws of nature and the role of reason,” I 
integrate a positive account of the role of reason and its ideas into the 
controversial debate regarding the necessity of empirical laws in Kant’s 
philosophy of nature. After clarifying the modal problems involved in the 
transition from the transcendental to the empirical laws of nature, I critically 
discuss the three main interpretations of empirical laws of nature, namely 
‘Best system’ interpretations, Friedman’s account and the ‘essentialist’ 
account. I argue that none of these interpretations meets the requirement of 
assuring both the necessity of empirical laws and the possibility of acquiring 
insightful cognition of them. I therefore propose to complete the ‘essentialist’ 
account—what I take to be the best candidate for explaining the 
metaphysical grounding of the necessity of empirical laws—with Kant’s 
doctrine of reason’s systematicity and ideas. In particular, I show, first, that 
thinking real essences as ideas of reason provide us with epistemic access 
to ‘comparatively inner’ properties, i.e., properties that have ontological and 
epistemic priority over mere regularities. And second, that we can make 
sense of empirical progress in science only if we conceive of essences as 
unreachable totalities of empirical conditions rather than unknowable things 
in themselves. As a result, the proposed interpretation reconciles the 
epistemological and metaphysical side of empirical laws of nature and 













































The regulative use of reason has long attracted interest as a fascinating part 
of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Twentieth century philosophy was 
influenced by it and contemporary philosophers of science have been 
increasingly looking at it as a source of inspiration.1 There’s no denying, 
however, that this is also one of the most obscure parts of Kant’s critical 
project and scholars disagree on many crucial aspects of it. 
In the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant seems to use the term 
‘regulative’ to refer to any critical and positive use of theoretical reason. His 
general point can be roughly summarized as follows. Reason leads us to all 
sorts of unwarranted metaphysical claims about objects such as God, the 
soul, first causes, etc. If it is used regulatively, however, reason has a fully 
legitimate place in cognition and is indeed necessary for investigating nature. 
Getting clear on such use therefore amounts to no less than understanding 
the critical fate of reason’s drive towards metaphysics. The problem is that 
what Kant means by ‘regulative use of reason,’ why it is legitimate, and 
indeed necessary, are all extremely controversial questions. 
This chapter aims to shed light on these questions by proposing a 
rule-based account of reason, its concepts (i.e., ideas) and the principles 
containing them. I contend that recent interpretations of reason do not 
sufficiently distinguish reason’s regulative use from the use of reason that 
leads us to transcendent metaphysics, thus failing both to vindicate a fully 
legitimate use of it and to explain its necessary role in cognition. I will 
advance a radical reading according to which Kant has not just weakened 
the rational principles that lead us to transcendent metaphysics but given a 
 
1 For an analysis of the influence of the regulative use of reason on twentieth century 
philosophy, see French 1967. Among the several contributions inspired by the regulative use 
of reason in the philosophy of science literature, see Kitcher 1981, 1999; Morrison 2000, 
2008; Breitenbach and Choi 2017; and Massimi 2017a, 2018, forthcoming. 
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new meaning to them—as immanent (by no means empiricist) prescriptive 
rules. Such emphasis on the prescriptivity of theoretical reason will allow to 
clearly isolate its legitimate use and lay the groundwork for understanding its 
key role in Kant’s view of scientific knowledge. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. I will first introduce the 
terminology of the Dialectic, by focusing in particular on the meaning of 
‘unconditioned’ and ‘transcendental illusion’ (Section 2). I will analyse the 
shortcomings of two influential accounts of the regulative use of reason 
(Sections 3 and 4) and identify their common problem (Section 5). I will then 
advance my rule-based account of reason by clarifying how Kant transforms 
reason’s transcendent inclinations into immanent rules of inquiry (Section 6). 
Finally, I will explain why such interpretation of reason is metaphysically 
innocent (Section 7) and why it is a promising approach in order to vindicate 
reason’s necessary role in science (Section 8).  
 
2. Reason’s transcendental illusion  
Kant’s main concern in the Dialectic is to curb the metaphysical pretensions 
of reason rather than isolate its positive use. For this reason, it is often 
assumed that Kant relegates such use to the Appendix as a mere 
afterthought to his Critique.2 In this chapter, I will show that this assumption is 
wrong, and that Kant develops a coherent story from the first pages of the 
Dialectic to the second part of the Appendix. It is true, however, that this 
story is deeply embedded in Kant’s critique of reason as the source of 
transcendent metaphysics. I therefore need to clarify some key aspects of 
such critique before moving on to the explanation of the regulative use of 
reason. 
In Kant’s system, reason is the higher faculty of cognition that 
demands the “unconditioned” for whatever “conditioned” it encounters (Bxx). 
Unfortunately, Kant does not precisely define the relation between a 
conditioned and its condition in the Critique of Pure Reason.3 Much 
 
2 See, e.g., Kemp Smith 1962, Hortsmann 1989, Guyer 1990. 
3 The term ‘unconditioned’ appears in both prefaces (Axx, Bxx) and then in a few key 
passages of the Dialectic. Kant seems to take its meaning for granted. 
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interpretative work has been done to clarify its exact meaning.4 I cannot 
survey the complexities of that literature here, but some clarifications are in 
order. By ‘conditioning relation’ Kant seems to refer to a wide range of 
relations between objects. Causality is a typical example of conditioning 
relations (a cause ‘conditions’ its effect), but also relations between 
substance and attributes, parts and whole, necessary and contingent, among 
several others, qualify as conditioning relations (see, e.g., Willaschek 2018, 
74). We can regard them as objective relations of dependence or grounding 
(although it is debated whether they can be seen as species of a generic 
relation of metaphysical dependence, or rather they should be grouped into 
three classes according to the categories of relation).5 
What does it mean that reason demands the ‘unconditioned’ then? 
Suppose we encounter something conditioned, for instance, something that 
is caused (an effect). We will look for its cause, but if we find the cause and it 
is still conditioned, reason will not rest content with it. It will demand to seek a 
further cause, and so forth, up to the ‘unconditioned’: a condition that is not 
itself conditioned (a first cause, for instance). In the Critique of Pure Reason, 
Kant often equates the demand for the ‘unconditioned’ with the demand for 
the ‘totality of conditions.’ This equation makes sense: when we look for the 
unconditioned, we look for everything that conditions a particular. In some 
cases, such totality corresponds to an unconditioned object that lies outside 
the empirical series of conditions (when, for example, we postulate a simple 
soul or a divine being; what Kant calls psychological and theological ideas). 
In the case of ideas that have to do only with appearances (cosmological 
ideas and, most clearly, what he calls “mathematical” cosmological ideas; 
A529/B557), however, the unconditioned corresponds to nothing but the 
totality of empirical conditions (the ideas of the totality of spatial parts or of 
past moments of the world, for instance).6 In Kant’s words, all reason 
 
4 See, in particular, Watkins 2016, 2019a; and Willaschek 2018, chapter 3. 
5 See Watkins 2016, 2019a for the first position; and Willaschek 2018, chapter 3 for the 
second one. 
6 See Allison 2004, 359–60. Although Kant applies this claim to all cosmological ideas, his 
later distinction between mathematical and dynamical cosmological ideas of reason makes 
an interpretation more difficult. In fact, the latter do involve non-sensible objects (A528–
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demands is that the series of conditions is “complete” (e.g., A416/B444). This 
distinction will be helpful later on in our investigation but in the meantime, it 
suffices to point out that talk of the ‘totality of conditions’ allows Kant to 
extend the demand of reason to cases in which we are not apparently 
postulating any transcendent object.7 
In the Dialectic, Kant argues that such demand of reason is bound to 
remain unsatisfied. It drives us beyond the boundaries of possible cognition, 
thus laying claims to unconditioned objects we cannot know (see Bxx). In 
spite of this, reason is ceaselessly misled into the illusion that the 
unconditioned can indeed be known by us. Kant calls this phenomenon 
‘transcendental illusion.’ In the Introduction to the Dialectic, it is presented in 
the following terms: 
In our reason (considered subjectively as a human faculty of cognition) there lie 
fundamental rules and maxims for its use, which look entirely like objective 
principles, and through them it comes about that the subjective necessity of a certain 
connection of our concepts on behalf of the understanding is taken for an objective 
necessity, the determination of things in themselves. (A297/B353) 
A transcendental illusion consists in taking “subjective principles” of our 
reason for an objective “determination of things in themselves.” For Kant, this 
is not a mere mistake of reason or an “artificial illusion” we can simply avoid. 
Instead, it is a “natural and unavoidable illusion,” that “cannot be avoided at 
all” and that “irremediably attaches to human reason” (A297–8/B353–4). Kant 
draws an interesting analogy with the case of the astronomer: the 
astronomer, he says, cannot “prevent the rising moon from appearing larger 
to him, even when he is not deceived by this illusion” (ibid.). Similarly, reason 
cannot avoid the illusion that its principles are passed off as determinations 
of how things really are.  
 
32/B556–60). It is not clear to me whether Kant thinks that all cosmological ideas can be 
seen as concerning totality of empirical conditions or whether only mathematical ideas are to 
be seen as such. A detailed analysis of this problem goes beyond the scope of this work. 
7 In the Progress essay (1793), Kant may have changed his mind on this distinction and 
denied that a complete series of conditions is unconditioned (see Progress, 20:287). For 
analysis of such difficulties (which do not concern us here), see Willaschek 2018, 88–98. 
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It is important to note, as the example of the astronomer makes clear, 
that one is not necessarily deceived by the illusion. What is natural and 
unavoidable is the fact that rational subjective principles appear as objective, 
not our actual taking them as such.8 In other words, for Kant, we have an 
inevitable tendency to make metaphysical claims about things in themselves 
on the basis of subjective rational principles, but we are not inevitably led to 
make those claims. Much of the Dialectic will be devoted exactly to this 
purpose: preventing the dialectical errors that lead reason to make 
unwarranted metaphysical claims. But Kant’s treatment of reason does not 
stop with making reason’s illusion harmless, so to speak. He goes on to 
argue that the very demand of reason that misleads us into all sorts of 
metaphysical fallacies and contradictions can be turned into a positive 
function. In Kant’s words, a perfectly legitimate “immanent” use of reason is 
to be found (A643/B671): once prevented from deceiving, concepts of reason 
(ideas) have “an excellent and indispensably necessary regulative use” 
(A644/B672).  
But what is the relation between transcendental illusion and the 
regulative use of reason? And how shall we interpret such positive use? I will 
present two influential proposals (what I shall call the illusory and the 
hypothetical accounts) and assess whether they successfully vindicate a use 
of reason that is legitimate and necessary to our empirical cognition. Despite 
their several merits, I will argue that they both fail to do so. 
 
3. The illusory account of reason 
The illusory account has been introduced by Michelle Grier and later followed 
by Henry Allison and several other interpreters.9 Although divisive, it has 
gained the status of a quasi-standard reading of the positive use of reason in 
the Dialectic.10 The main strategy of this account consists in vindicating 
transcendental illusion as itself legitimate and necessary to promote 
empirical cognition. Grier identifies transcendental illusion with the transition 
 
8 See, e.g., Grier 2001, 116. 
9 Grier 2001 and Allison 2004. See also Boehm 2012 and Walden 2019. 
10 For a critical view, see, e.g., McLaughlin 2014. 
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between a merely subjective law (reason’s “logical maxim”—what she calls 
P1): 
Logical Maxim (P1): “Find the unconditioned for conditioned cognitions of the 
understanding, with which its unity will be completed.” (A307/B364) 
and an objective principle (reason’s “supreme principle”—P2): 
Supreme Principle (P2): “When the conditioned is given, then so is the whole series 
of conditions subordinated to one another, which is itself unconditioned, also given 
(i.e., contained in the object and its connection).” (A308/B364)11  
Note that these two principles differ not only with respect to their field of 
application (cognitions in P1 vs. objects in P2), but also in terms of their 
status. The Logical Maxim requires us to find unconditioned cognitions and is 
therefore a prescriptive principle. The Supreme Principle states that an 
unconditioned object is given and so is descriptive of a state of affairs. 
According to this reading, although the Supreme Principle is illusory in the 
sense that it involves a claim that goes beyond possible cognition, it remains 
a necessary assumption in our investigation of nature. As Grier puts it, the 
reason is that P2 is an “application condition” of P1, without which the 
prescription of reason would be a merely logical requirement with no real use 
(Grier 2001, 126).12 Of course, the illusory reading does not license the 
Supreme Principle as the basis for metaphysical claims. P2 is an illusion that, 
although presented as objective, has no objective force in itself—it is only, as 
it were, an ideal of inquiry (see ibid., 285).  
I find this account subtle and elegant. Is it, however, sufficient to avoid 
the metaphysical implications of transcendent metaphysics or, in Kant’s 
words, prevent transcendental illusion from deceiving us? I do not believe 
this is the case for two reasons. First, because I think that it is questionable 
 
11 Passages quoted in Grier 2001, 119–25. 
12 Similarly, Allison 2004 argues that “according to Kant, P1 becomes itself a principle of 
reason precisely by assuming P2 which, as we have seen, he regards as obviously 
synthetic. This suggests that P2 serves as the application condition for P1 or, alternatively, 
that P1 and stand in a relation that is analogous to that between a category and its schema 
and in that sense are reciprocals” (330). In Boehm’s words, P2 is “a necessary working 
assumption for everybody engaging in theoretical philosophy” (Boehm 2012, 314). 
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that a prescription based on an illusory metaphysical assumption is less 
metaphysically committed than one based on a genuine transcendent claim. 
Suppose that we can unify the inner appearances of our mind only by 
presupposing that something like a ‘soul’ (one of Kant’s official unconditioned 
objects) is given. When taken in isolation, we can easily distinguish this 
illusory presupposition (P2) from the outright claim that the soul exists. 
However, the same distinction does not apply to the prescription resulting 
from presupposing P2. For such prescription (‘unite inner appearances!’) 
seems to be valid only if we take P2 as true of objects—in this case, if we 
presuppose that the soul is indeed given. But if this is correct, it is difficult to 
distinguish such commitment to P2 from the error of the transcendent 
metaphysician who takes claims that go beyond possible cognition to be 
truths about the world.13  
One can here object that we do not necessarily need to take the 
illusory P2 as true in order for P1 to work as a prescription: the mere 
possibility that the unconditioned is given may suffice to ground the 
prescription to look for it. But even granting this, it is doubtful how such 
prescription can be, following Kraus, “binding at all” for us (Kraus 2020, 191). 
Since the illusory postulation of P2 can be blatantly false, it is unclear 
precisely why we ought to follow it in empirical investigation.14  
Second, I do not think this account sufficiently recognizes the role of 
the distinction between appearances and things in themselves in Kant’s 
Dialectic. While the prescriptive P1 is applied to objects given to us 
(appearances), the illusory P2 is formulated as a claim about things in 
themselves. This has the unfortunate implication that, when we base 
reason’s prescriptions on P2, we are also treating appearances as things in 
 
13 See, for example, Grier 2001, 275: “this position, it seems to me, is tantamount to claiming 
that the regulative function of the principle of systematic unity is itself parasitic upon the 
transcendental and illusory postulation that nature, as an object of our knowledge, is already 
given as a complete whole”; see also ibid., 280. I am sympathetic with Willaschek’s critique 
of what he calls the “identification reading” (between transcendental and constitutive 
principles of reason), although I offer a different explanation of such identification (cf. 
Willaschek 2018, 110–2).  
14 In other words, the illusory postulation of P2 fails to give us a reliable source of 
prescriptive rules; see also Kraus 2020, 190–3. 
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themselves.15 Kant would be saying that in order to promote the empirical 
investigation of nature we need to commit ourselves to the illusory 
identification of appearances with things in themselves—an identification 
Kant famously rejects as transcendental realism (see, e.g., A491/B519). Not 
only does Kant not gesture towards such an illusory identification throughout 
the Dialectic, but he repeatedly argues, as we will see in detail, that 
distinguishing between appearances and things in themselves is crucial to 
understanding the correct use of reason.16 
Such implicit metaphysical commitments can be further seen if we 
take a brief look at the role of reason in science resulting from this account. 
According to Grier, this role consists in the illusory “postulation of a non-
sensible ground” of appearances (see Grier 2001, 300–1).17 But using ideas 
as non-sensible grounds of appearances seems incompatible with Kant’s 
repeated claims that ideas cannot be directly related to objects (see, e.g., 
A643/B671). When speaking about the correct interpretation of the ideal 
properties of the soul, Kant says: 
That simplicity of substance, etc., ought to be only the schema for this regulative 
principle, and it is not presupposed as if it were the real ground of properties of the 
soul. For these properties could rest on entirely different grounds, with which we are 
not acquainted at all, just as we might not really be able to cognize the soul at all 
through these assumed predicates even if we let them hold of it absolutely, since 
they constitute a mere idea that cannot be represented in concreto at all. 
(A683/B711; my emphases) 
 
15 See, e.g., Grier 2001, 277: “[P2] holds unconditionally of appearances as if they were 
things in themselves.” From the fact that a principle is (hypothetically) true of things in 
themselves, it does not follow that it can be applied to appearances; see my discussion of 
the Supreme Principle of reason in Section 6. 
16 The fact that Kant in the Appendix says that “where reason itself is considered as the 
determining cause (in the case of freedom) […] we should proceed as if we did not have 
before us an object of sense but one of pure understanding” (A685/B713) is not evidence 
against my objection. For one thing, it is unclear how this ‘as if’ procedure could be extended 
to all other ideas that do not have the peculiar status of the idea of freedom. Second, Kant 
specifies that this procedure concerns “the case of practical principles” (ibid.) and, therefore, 
does not strictly belong in Kant’s positive reading of speculative reason. 
17 Therefore, as things in themselves. See also McNulty 2015 for an interpretation of 
reason’s ideas as the postulation of unconditioned grounds in chemistry. 
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I will clarify what Kant means by “schema” in this context later (see Sections 
7 and 8). For the time being, I only want to point out that Kant clearly 
excludes that ideas (like “simplicity of substance”) should be presupposed as 
if they were the real, transcendent grounds of properties of the soul.18 To use 
ideas in such a way—whether “absolutely” or as an illusory “as if”—would 
mean to rely on them as some sort of representations of unknowable objects. 
On the contrary, ideas cannot be “represented in concreto at all”: as we will 
see, the correct interpretation of the necessary role of reason in science 
requires a different approach to reason and its concepts.19 
 
4. The hypothetical account of reason 
The hypothetical account has been recently proposed by Marcus Willaschek 
(Willaschek 2018). This reading challenges the basic tenet of the illusory 
account, namely that there is something illusory about the regulative use of 
reason. According to this reading, no illusion is involved in positively using 
the principles of reason—these are mere hypotheses that do not commit us 
to any metaphysical claims. While the illusory reading assumes that the 
Supreme Principle is a necessary presupposition of reason, Willaschek 
distinguishes between a regulative and a constitutive use of the principle. 
The transition from the Logical Maxim to the Supreme Principle proceeds in 
two steps. The first step goes from the Logical Maxim to the regulative use of 
the Supreme Principle; the second step from the regulative use to the 
constitutive use of the Supreme Principle. Even though reason presumes 
that both steps are legitimate, only the first step is, whereas the second 
results from transcendental illusion. 
What do these uses of the Supreme Principle consist in? The 
constitutive use of reason consists in taking the Supreme Principle as true of 
objects (see Willaschek 2018, 114). When used regulatively instead, the 
Supreme Principle is only hypothetically descriptive of objects: we 
 
18 See also A681/B709: “one mistakes the significance of the idea right away if one takes it 
to be the assertion, or even only the presupposition, of an actual thing” (my emphasis). 
19 For a different, but (I think) compatible objection, see Massimi 2017a, 67–71. Massimi 
argues that the role of reason in science resulting from this account “might at best be useful, 
instrumental, desirable; but not indispensable” (70). 
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“hypothetically employ [reason’s principles] in order to generate hypotheses 
about objects of nature” (ibid., 116). Note the difference with the illusory 
account. According to the hypothetical reading, no commitment to the illusion 
that reason’s principles determine things in themselves is necessary.20 
Principles of reason are, instead, merely neutral hypothetical claims. For 
instance, from the hypothetical assumption that there is homogeneity in 
nature, and the empirical findings that there are gold and silver, we can 
deduce the particular hypothesis that there is a genus encompassing them 
(i.e., noble metals; see ibid., 114). 
I find many aspects of this reading convincing. It isolates a use of 
reason that is not dependent on illusory representations of things in 
themselves and, therefore, seems legitimate. Further, it dispenses from the 
need to read ‘transcendental illusion’ in a positive way—a term which has a 
clear negative connotation throughout the Dialectic (see, e.g., A504–5/B532–
3; A695/B723).21 Unfortunately, however, this reading also faces some 
textual and philosophical problems. In particular, Kant explicitly rejects the 
claim that concepts of reason can be used as hypotheses. In the Doctrine of 
Method, Kant defines hypotheses as opinions that, in order not to be 
“groundless,” “must be connected as a ground of explanation with that which 
is actually given and consequently certain” (A770/B798). Concepts of reason 
cannot fall into this category for they “have no object in any sort of 
experience, but also do not on that account designate objects that are 
invented and at the same time assumed to be possible” (A771/B799). In 
short, since ideas are not connected with actual appearances nor can we 
demonstrate their possibility, to use them to explain “things in nature […] 
would be no explanation at all” (A772/B800). 
But Kant’s conception of hypotheses is perhaps too specific as it 
seems to presuppose that a hypothesis must be a direct explanation of 
appearances. After all, what the hypothetical account wants to say is that 
 
20 According to Willaschek 2018, this illusion is, instead, the starting point of any dialectical 
use of reason. 
21 There is only one passage in the entire Dialectic in which the term illusion (‘Illusion’) is 
given a clear positive meaning (A644/B672). But, as I will argue below, this hapax 
legomenon, as it were, can be explained without being identified with transcendental illusion. 
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principles of reason are neutral descriptive claims from which it is possible to 
derive particular explanations (e.g., that there is a genus that encompasses 
gold and silver). However, this response may still be insufficient to license a 
metaphysically innocent use of reason. For although we do not have to 
commit ourselves to the truth of such hypothetical principles, we would still 
be using them as descriptions that can be true of objects of experience. But 
how can we be warranted to do so? It is prima facie implausible that the 
unconditioned (a perfect homogeneity, a first cause, a simple soul, etc.) can 
ever be given to us in experience. Indeed, as we will see, Kant denies that 
the Supreme Principle can be applied to objects of experience at all.  
One might further reply by distinguishing between the hypothetical 
truth-value of the principles of reason and what makes them true in 
experience. In other words, we may hypothetically assume principles of 
reason independently of the way we experience them. However, I do not find 
this reply entirely convincing since it implies that principles of reason concern 
nature as it is in itself, or things in themselves. As such, it would face similar 
challenges as the illusory account discussed above. How can we ground 
hypotheses about appearances in unverifiable principles that concern things 
in themselves? And since such principles can be blatantly false, how can 
they be prescriptively binding for us at all? 
The outcome of this reading with respect to the “excellent use” of 
reason is quite different from that of the illusory reading, but similarly 
unsatisfactory. For given the commitment to the descriptivity of reason, a 
hypothetical reader needs to disregard all passages in the Appendix in which 
Kant claims that reason is not just a useful tool to formulate some additional 
hypotheses but is rather necessary for empirical cognition as such (e.g., 
A647/B675, A650–4/B678–82). Willaschek, for example, reads those 
passages as exemplary of transcendental realism (Willaschek 2018, 130, 
146). But it would be peculiar that in key passages of a section called ‘On the 
Regulative Use of the Ideas of Pure Reason,’ Kant is impersonating the 
metaphysician rather than qualifying his own reading. Perhaps at the risk of 
simplifying too much, while the illusory account gives too strong a 
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rehabilitation of speculative reason, the one resulting from the hypothetical 
account comes out as too weak. 
  
5. Preventing transcendental illusion from deceiving us 
Despite the respective merits of the illusory and hypothetical accounts, there 
remains something unsatisfactory about these proposals. Neither account 
avoids being somewhat metaphysically committed nor fully vindicates the 
“excellent use” of reason. I think the problem they have in common lies in 
their commitment to the descriptivity of reason’s principles. In this section, I 
will argue that as long as we rely on a descriptive relation to objects in order 
to positively use the ideas of reason, we cannot really prevent transcendental 
illusion from deceiving us. 
If we want to prevent transcendental illusion from deceiving us, we 
need to correctly identify and remove the source of deception. On the illusory 
reading, it consists in avoiding metaphysical claims while taking advantage of 
the natural illusion of reason. On the hypothetical reading, it means 
suspending our judgment on the truth-value of reason’s principles. Both 
strategies, however, do not meet Kant’s more radical standard of reason’s 
metaphysical innocence. For such innocence consists not just in qualifying 
the relation ideas have with objects—it consists in removing all direct 
reference to objects from our use of ideas. 
That ideas cannot be legitimately taken to refer to any object is argued 
in several places of the Dialectic. Kant often repeats that ideas have no use 
in concreto, which just means that no object can ever correspond to them in 
experience (see, e.g., A323/B380, A327/B384). But without possible 
experience, “every concept is only an idea, without truth and reference to an 
object” (A489/B517; my emphasis) and any question about such possible 
reference is “entirely nugatory and empty” (A479/B507). Kant’s reasoning is 
that since the unconditioned or totality of conditions thought in our ideas (a 
simple substance, the most real being, a perfect homogeneity, etc.) can 
never be given to us in possible experience, any attempt to regard them as 
more than ideas (namely, as concepts of objects) is improper and 
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misleading.22 I will say more about Kant’s argument for the claim that the 
unconditioned cannot be given to us in the next section. For the time being, it 
suffices to note that Kant clearly identifies such unwarranted relation 
between ideas and objects with the deception of transcendental illusion. At 
the beginning of the Appendix, Kant says: 
Everything grounded in the nature of our powers must be purposive and consistent 
with their correct use, if only we can guard against a certain misunderstanding and 
find out their proper direction. Thus (i.) the transcendental ideas too will presumably 
have a good and consequently immanent use, even though, (ii.) if their significance 
is misunderstood and they are taken for concepts of real things, they can be 
transcendent in their application and for that very reason deceptive. For in regard to 
the whole of possible experience, it is not the idea itself but only its use that can be 
either extravagant (transcendent) or indigenous (immanent), according to whether 
one directs them straightway to a supposed object corresponding to them, (iii.) or 
only to the use of the understanding in general regarding the objects with which it 
has to do. (A642–3/B670–1; my emphases) 
I can isolate three main claims in this dense passage: (i.) that ideas are 
purposive and legitimate if correctly used; (ii.) that they are deceptive when 
directed to a supposed object corresponding to them; (iii.) that their 
immanent use consists in regulating the understanding. These three claims 
are very closely related, but for the moment let’s focus our attention on the 
first two. Ideas are deceptive when taken as concepts of things because that 
would correspond to a misunderstanding of their “proper direction.” If the 
relation to objects is the source of the deception, reason should be used in a 
way that does not rely on it. In other words, we do not just need to diagnose 
the deception, we also need to remove its source and use ideas in a radically 
different way. This is confirmed in the famous passage of ideas as foci 
imaginarii (vanishing points) that is generally taken to support the standard 
illusory interpretation. There Kant says that ideas have the indispensably 
necessary use of “directing the understanding to a certain goal” and make its 
concepts “converge at one point” (A644/B672). He continues: 
 
22 On this point, see also Willaschek 2018, chapter 9. 
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Now of course it is from this that there arises the deception, as if these lines of direc-
tion were shot out from an object lying outside the field of possible empirical 
cognition (just as objects are seen behind the surface of a mirror); yet this illusion 
(which can be prevented from deceiving) is nevertheless indispensably necessary if 
besides the objects before our eyes we want to see those that lie far in the 
background, i.e., when, in our case, the understanding wants to go beyond every 
given experience (beyond this part of the whole of possible experience), and hence 
wants to take the measure of its greatest possible and uttermost extension. (Ibid.; 
my emphases) 
From this passage, one may conclude that transcendental illusion is as such 
“indispensably necessary” to empirical investigation. But Kant’s position is 
more subtle than this. He first confirms that metaphysical deception consists 
in relating an idea to an object and then refers to an illusion that is deprived 
of that very deception. As a result, the illusion Kant is referring to in this 
passage is, as it were, no longer illusory or deceitful—it consists instead in 
using ideas according to their proper use (what Kant generally calls the 
regulative use of reason).23 In other places, Kant expresses the same point in 
a much clearer way. For example, Kant says that if we stick to the validity of 
the principle of reason as an immanent rule for the understanding, “the 
conflict of reason with itself will also be entirely at an end, since not only will 
the illusion that put reason at odds with itself have been done away with 
through its critical dissolution, but in place of it, that sense will have been 
uncovered in which reason agrees with itself, and whose misinterpretation 
was the sole cause of the conflict” (A516/B544; my emphases). Crucially, as 
this passage clarifies, the regulative use of reason does not merely rely on 
transcendental illusion but replaces it as a use of reason that fits the nature 
of its concepts. 
 
 
23 Strictly speaking, this is not an ‘illusion’ according to Kant’s own definition: “one can place 
all illusion in the taking of a subjective condition of thinking for the cognition of an object” 
(A396; my emphasis). That the regulative use of reason is here called an “illusion” may be 
due to the fact that ideas act as ‘vanishing points’ for the understanding. Kant seems, 
therefore, to be using ‘illusion’ as a synonym for other expressions that appear in the 
Appendix, such as ‘projection’ or ‘asymptote’ (A647/B675; A663/B691). See my discussion 
of ideas as vanishing points in Chapter 3. 
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6. A rule-based account of the regulative use of reason 
Preventing transcendental illusion from deceiving us does not simply consist 
in weakening the relation ideas have to objects—it consists in removing such 
relation from the proper use of reason, or any descriptivity attached to the 
regulative use of ideas. We still need to determine, however, what a non-
descriptive use of reason amounts to. In what follows, I will advance a rule-
based account of the regulative use of reason.  
That ideas of reason are to be used as rules is not news in Kant’s 
scholarship. Both Grier and Willaschek, for example, do maintain that reason 
has prescriptive force. But what is often overlooked is that Kant insists that 
ideas can only be valid as rules and that they can only prescribe the right 
direction to the understanding. Bennett calls a purely prescriptive account of 
ideas the “official doctrine about regulativeness” (Bennett 1974, 142). In his 
reconstruction, this doctrine is ultimately flawed and Kant himself fails to 
respect his own account (ibid., e.g., 143). The challenge for the reading I am 
proposing is therefore not so much to find textual evidence for it (which is 
overwhelming) but to show that Kant develops a coherent story. Taking my 
cue from other contributions that have emphasized the prescriptive role of 
reason (Massimi 2017a, forthcoming; Kraus 2018; and Walden 2019), I will 
present a unified account that will hopefully explain why the regulative use of 
reason is legitimate and why it has an excellent use in science.24 
In particular, I submit that not enough attention has been given so far 
to a crucial aspect of the prescriptive role of reason: the fact that reason’s 
prescriptions are not to be applied to things in themselves or appearances 
but to the empirical use of the understanding. By applying to such empirical 
use, as we will see, ideas can only be (indirectly) related to appearances. 
The limitation to appearances is a defining aspect of the positive use of 
reason that often goes unnoticed in the attempts to reconstruct this use. It is 
 
24 The “I-Rule” interpretation of ideas presented in Massimi 2017a, forthcoming, is a 
fascinating alternative to traditional accounts of transcendental illusion. Walden 2019 
provides an interesting explanation of why the regulative use of reason is metaphysically 
innocent. However, they both rely on a positive reading of transcendental illusion. Kraus’s 
‘prescriptive’ analysis is limited to the case of the idea of the soul in psychology. My account 
greatly benefits from all these contributions. 
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no surprise that such reconstructions are often deemed as too 
‘metaphysical.’ That such limitation is essential to vindicate a positive role for 
ideas is confirmed by the way Kant reformulates the Supreme Principle of 
reason in prescriptive terms in the Antinomies and subsequently deduces the 
peculiar objective validity of ideas in the Appendix. 
 
6.1 The empirical synthesis requirement 
Kant’s most articulated discussion of how we should think the Supreme 
Principle of reason in prescriptive terms is found in section seven of the 
Antinomies chapter. Kant first clarifies why the Supreme Principle does not 
apply to appearances and then formulates its regulative version. 
Kant starts the section with a variation on the Logical Maxim 
presented in the Introduction.25 He confirms the prescriptive nature of this 
principle: if the conditioned is given, then “the regress in the series of all 
conditions for it is given to us as a problem (uns…aufgegeben sei)” 
(A498/B526). Kant adds that, since the concept of conditioned implies that 
something is related to a condition, this principle is “analytic and beyond any 
fear of a transcendental criticism” (ibid.). Things, however, are different when 
the principle is applied to objects. In this case, a distinction between things in 
themselves and appearances is in order. In the case of things in themselves, 
when the conditioned is given, the unconditioned is given as well. The reason 
being, roughly, that the understanding would represent things as they really 
are, so that our rational principles immediately apply to them.26 The 
legitimate use of the understanding is, however, limited to appearances, to 
which the principle does not apply: 
For the appearances, in their apprehension, are themselves nothing other than an 
empirical synthesis (in space and time) and thus are given only in this synthesis. 
Now it does not follow at all that if the conditioned (in appearance) is given, then the 
synthesis constituting its empirical condition is thereby also given too and 
 
25 Here Kant calls it a “logical postulate of reason” (A498/B526). 
26 Kant’s reasoning is clearly hypothetical: if we could know things in themselves (which we 
cannot), the Supreme Principle would be valid for them. For a detailed analysis, see 
Willaschek 2018, 152–4. 
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presupposed; on the contrary, this synthesis takes place for the first time in the 
regress, and never without it. (A499/B527) 
The inference to the unconditioned is blocked by the fact that appearances 
can only be given in the synthesis that happens in space and time. Let’s call 
this condition the ‘empirical synthesis requirement.’ Given this requirement, “I 
can by no means infer the absolute totality of the series of conditions” (ibid.). 
But why is this the case? It is not clear whether Kant is denying the inference 
(i.) from the conditioned to its condition; or (ii.) from the conditioned to the 
totality of conditions. Both options are problematic, for they seem to commit 
Kant to some form of extreme idealism.  
As concerns (i.) above, one may take Kant to be saying, in a Berkelian 
fashion, that a condition does not exist unless it is actually perceived. This 
would go against what Kant himself argues in other parts of the Critique, 
namely that the existence of something only requires a connection to actual 
perception (A225–6/B272–3).27 But it is plausible to think that all Kant wants 
to say is that without an empirical synthesis, we are not entitled to judge that 
a condition is given. In other words, he is merely rehashing his view that a 
judgment about experience is synthetic. Note that such synthesis needs not 
be an actual perception. In several passages of the Dialectic, Kant admits a 
variety of indirect ways to carry the synthesis and assure a connection with 
actual perceptions (e.g., “the guiding thread of history, or the chain of effects 
and their causes” (A521–2/B549–50; see also A527/B555). 
If this is correct, what Kant is plausibly denying is the inference from a 
given conditioned to the totality of its conditions (ii.). Given the empirical 
synthesis requirement, no inference to the totality of conditions is possible. 
He elaborates on this point multiple times by arguing that appearances and 
the totality of conditions are contradictory with each other. Our experience is 
always conditioned in space and time so that “you always remain caught up 
among conditions […] and you never get to the unconditioned” (A483/B511). 
 
27 See Willaschek 2018, 155. 
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But here again, commentators have noticed a threat of “extreme idealism.”28 
The problem would be the following: from the fact that we cannot experience 
the totality of conditions, it does not follow that such totality does not exist.29 
It is important to note, first, that such objection would only apply to a 
specific type of ideas. With respect to ideas that postulate transcendent 
objects (e.g., psychological and theological ideas), Kant’s claim is much 
more modest. As we have seen, he argues that the Supreme Principle is 
false of appearances, but not of things in themselves. In several places, Kant 
points out that, although the objects of such ideas remain completely 
unknown to us, it would be presumptuous of us to deny their possibility “on 
the basis of any supposedly better insight” (A772/B800; see also 
A478/B506).  
The objection may instead apply where the totality of conditions 
corresponds to nothing more that the complete series of empirical conditions 
(for example, the cosmological ideas of complete composition, partition, etc.). 
In this case, it seems prima facie less plausible to deny the ‘existence’ of a 
complete series because we cannot experience it. Although I cannot here 
analyse the difficulties of the Antinomies, I think Kant’s position coherently 
follows from his commitment to the distinction between appearances and 
things in themselves (key to his transcendental idealism) rather than from 
some form of ‘extreme idealism.’ In the case of ideas that concern complete 
series of conditions, we are only dealing with conditions that can be given in 
space and time, namely appearances (see A479/B507). But, for Kant, series 
of appearances cannot exist in themselves but only in the synthesis through 
which we experience them: “they exist only in the dynamical regress” 
(A506/B534). To say that series of appearances exist, or may exist, 
independently of such synthesis would be to take them as things in 
 
28 This objection goes back to Bennett 1974, 126, and Guyer 1987, 404–6; it has been 
recently raised again by Willaschek 2018, 155. 
29 Guyer, for instance, argues that Kant makes an illicit “transition” from an epistemological 
to an ontological argument (Guyer 1987, 404–5). At one place, according to Guyer, Kant 
would even “sound like Schopenhauer” by claiming that “our object is in our brain” (ibid.). 
Note, however, that the object Kant is referring to there is not the empirical object but the 
object in the idea (cf. A484/B512)! 
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themselves. In other words, Kant is merely denying the existence in itself of a 
series of empirical conditions. And he is allowed to do so on the basis of the 
key distinction of transcendental idealism, namely the distinction between 
appearances and things in themselves. As a result, I believe that Kant’s 
argument does not commit him to any ‘more extreme’ version of idealism 
than his transcendental idealism.30 
 
6.2 A new meaning for the Supreme Principle of Reason 
The outcome of Kant’s critique of speculative reason, however, is not just 
denying the validity of the Supreme Principle for appearances. Rather, Kant 
devises a new meaning for it—he elaborates a regulative version of the 
Supreme Principle (what I shall call the Regulative Supreme Principle). This 
version says that: “a regress to the conditions, i.e., a continued empirical 
synthesis on this side is demanded or given as a problem (aufgegeben), and 
that there could not fail to be conditions given through this regress” 
(A499/B527). Perhaps even more clearly, Kant says a few pages later:  
Regulative Supreme Principle (RSP): “The principle of pure reason we are thinking 
of retains its genuine validity only in a corrected significance (Bedeutung): not indeed 
as an axiom for thinking the totality in the object as real, but as a problem (Problem) 
for the understanding, thus for the subject in initiating and continuing, in accordance 
with the completeness of the idea, the regress in the series of conditions for a given 
conditioned.” (A508/B536; my emphasis) 
The “significance” of the principle has now been “corrected.” For the 
metaphysician, the totality of conditions is given as an object. For the critical 
philosopher, such totality is only given as a “problem for the understanding.” 
The difference between these two meanings of ‘given’ is often 
underappreciated. Kant is not saying that the totality of conditions is now 
given as an illusion or a mere hypothesis. Much more radically, the Supreme 
Principle is now turned into a prescriptive demand that regulates nothing but 
 
30 Of course, one may further argue that Kant’s transcendental idealism is a form of ‘extreme 





our own empirical synthesis. Namely, reason demands the subject to “initiate 
and continue” the empirical synthesis in accordance with her ideas.  
Let’s specify the status of this principle before giving more details on 
Kant’s account of the regulative use of reason. First, one may be tempted to 
equate this principle with the equally prescriptive Logical Maxim and regard it 
as an analytic principle. Note, however, that RSP does not apply to abstract 
concepts, but to the empirical use of the understanding (the use of the 
concepts of the understanding in relation to objects of experience). Since it 
requires of us new acts of synthesis, this principle cannot be analytic, but 
synthetic (see A663/B691). Second, although it applies to the empirical use 
of the understanding, RSP cannot be a posteriori, for it demands a complete 
synthesis independently of and prior to any empirical content. It is rather an a 
priori principle according to which we “initiate and continue” the synthesis of 
any empirical content (see, e.g., ibid. and A527/B555). 
Despite its being synthetic and a priori, one may still question the 
utility of RSP. Bennett, for example, has argued that reason is not really 
playing any role here and that Kant is just playing what he calls a “futurizing 
move” (namely, projecting the empirical synthesis into the future; Bennett 
1974, 124–6). Such projection can be explained with no help from reason. 
Bennett’s reading, however, neglects the significance of the prescriptive 
nature of the principle of reason. It is true that reason does not ask the 
understanding to do anything more than what it can ‘normally’ do—this, as 
we will see, is precisely the reason why such use of reason is fully legitimate. 
But reason prescribes that something we do (the empirical synthesis of the 
understanding) ought to be done.31 By contrast with the understanding, which 
is only concerned with given conditions, reason (and only reason) demands 
the unconditioned totality. Early on in the Dialectic, Kant calls this function 
the “unity of reason”: 
If the understanding may be a faculty of unity of appearances by means of rules, 
then reason is the faculty of the unity of the rules of understanding under principles. 
Thus it never applies directly to experience or to any object, but instead applies to 
 
31 I here concur with Guyer 1990, 21. 
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the understanding, in order to give unity a priori through concepts to the 
understanding’s manifold cognitions, which may be called ‘the unity of reason,’ and 
is of an altogether different kind than any unity that can be achieved by the 
understanding. (A302/B359; my emphases) 
Reason never applies to any object, but only gives a priori unity of the 
understanding—a unity the understanding could not by itself achieve. This 
makes sense. We do not normally look for the totality of conditions. We rest 
content with immediate empirical conditioning relations (cause and effect, 
parts and whole, subject and predicates, etc.), but any attempt to cognize 
such empirical relations requires something more of us—namely, “a rule, 
prescribing a regress in the series of conditions for given appearances, in 
which regress it is never allowed to stop with an absolutely unconditioned” 
(A508–9/B536–7).  
This rule-based interpretation of the principle of reason (and its 
concepts) is echoed throughout the Dialectic. In the first book of the Dialectic, 
Kant repeatedly calls ideas “problems”: 
Hence the pure rational concepts of the totality in a synthesis of conditions are 
necessary at least as problems of extending the unity of the understanding, if 
possible, to the unconditioned, and they are grounded in the nature of human 
reason, even if these transcendental concepts lack a suitable use in concreto and 
have no other utility than to point the understanding in the right direction so that it 
may be thoroughly consistent with itself when it extends itself to its uttermost 
extremes. (A323/B380; my emphases) 
Note that the only function of the concepts of reason as problems is “to point 
the understanding in the right direction.” These concepts do not just ground 
hypotheses that may be true of nature—they are radically problematic, or 
problems with no possible solution. As Kant points out, the “absolute whole 
of appearances is only an idea, since, because we can never project it in an 
image, it remains a problem (Problem) without any solution” (A328/B385). 
The fact that they are only ideas, however, by no means undermines their 
significance. Not only have they a fundamental role in grounding practical 
philosophy, but they are also central in speculative philosophy: 
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Although we have to say of the transcendental concepts of reason: They are only 
ideas, we will by no means regard them as superfluous and nugatory. For even if no 
object can be determined through them, they can still, in a fundamental and 
unnoticed way, serve the understanding as a canon for its extended and self-
consistent use, through which it cognizes no more objects than it would cognize 
through its concepts, yet in this cognition it will be guided better and further. 
(A329/B387; my emphasis). 
In the next sections, I will try to determine such “fundamental and unnoticed 
way” more thoroughly. Before turning to that, let me highlight the importance 
the empirical synthesis requirement has to RSP. It has been recently argued 
that the reason why we cannot attain a complete totality of conditions is the 
unbound nature of reason (cf. Walden 2019). Namely, the fact that every act 
of completion requires a further act of reflection, so that reason engages 
itself in an indefinite work (see ibid., 584). While unboundedness is definitely 
a crucial characteristic of reason, I think it explains why we come up with the 
idea of the unconditioned (namely, by asking for ever more remote 
conditions) rather than why such unconditioned cannot be attained. The 
cause behind this impossibility is, instead, that our theoretical reason is 
limited in its cognition. The point is not that reason is unbound or iterative, 
which it is, but that it is limited no matter how many times it is iterated. Such 
iteration always occurs in space and in time, so that we can never exhibit an 
absolute object or whole of conditions. To say that a totality of conditions can 
be given to us, as transcendent metaphysicians do, would mean to depart 
from the boundedness of the human perspective.32 But this very limitation to 
the realm of sense is also what transforms a metaphysical doctrine into a 
necessary rule that expands the limits of our inquiry beyond what is 
immediately given to us. 
 
7. Orienting the empirical use of the understanding  
As introduced in the previous section, ideas must be conceived as rules for 
the understanding. Inasmuch as a rule-based account of reason does not 
 
32 For an exploration of this thought and an interpretation of the Dialectic as an ‘experiment’ 
to exit the human perspective, see Zuckert 2020. 
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attribute ‘corresponding objects’ to ideas, it is able to avoid the transcendent 
commitments of descriptive interpretations of reason’s regulative use. It is 
still not entirely clear, however, what rules of reason amount to. Clarifying 
this point is of the utmost importance in order to get a sense of why Kant 
deems the regulative use of reason legitimate and metaphysically innocent. 
For the fact that theoretical reason is fundamentally prescriptive rather than 
descriptive is not by itself a guarantee that it is not metaphysically committed. 
If reason prescribed a despotic or arbitrary rule, for instance, we would not 
be better off following it. Therefore, we need to determine more precisely 
what kind of rule it prescribes and how it avoids the threat of being committed 
to transcendent metaphysics. 
The threat of transcendent metaphysics comes in two forms. The first 
stems from the object to which the prescription applies. The second from the 
content of the prescription. Let’s start with the first one. If the object of the 
prescription were nature itself, reason would unilaterally impose its rules to it. 
For example, reason would prescribe that nature is perfectly homogeneous, 
or that it is systematically organized. Now, we have seen at length that the 
object of reason’s rules is not nature, but the understanding. Is this, however, 
sufficient to avoid an arbitrary kind of prescriptivity? After all, according to 
Kant, the understanding does prescribe its laws to nature, so why would 
reason’s rules not impose anything on nature via the understanding?33  
To answer this question, we need to clarify in what sense the 
understanding is the object of the rules of reason. A rule of reason, as Kant 
says, only “postulates what should be effected by us in the regress but does 
not anticipate what is given in itself in the object prior to the regress” 
(A509/B537). Similarly, the rule “cannot say what the object is, but only how 
the empirical regress is to be instituted so as to attain to the complete 
concept of the object” (A510/B538). I take Kant to mean that rules of reason 
do not impose a particular image of nature for the understanding to realize. 
Rather, their only function is to guide and assess the empirical use of the 
 
33 See Massimi 2014 and Watkins 2019b for analyses of Kant’s governing conception of 
laws of nature. 
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understanding itself. In other words, we should think about reason’s ideas as 
meta-rules of empirical investigation.  
Kant fleshes out this thought in the first part of the Appendix. Since the 
understanding is the proper object of reason, Kant says, its business is 
nothing but “to make systematic the unity of all possible empirical actions of 
the understanding” (A664/B692; my emphasis). A rule of reason 
accomplishes this task by acting as an “analogue of a schema” (A665/B693). 
As schemata of sensibility allow the understanding to unify appearances, 
ideas systematize the actions of the understanding by demanding the 
“maximum of division and unification of the understanding’s cognition in one 
principle” (A665/B693). They are second-order schemata, or meta-rules, 
whose only function is to maximize the unity and extension of our empirical 
inquiry.34 In fact, ideas as schemata are very different from those of 
sensibility. In that case, the application of the categories to their schemata 
results in a cognition of the object. To use one famous Kantian example, the 
concept of ‘dog’ is connected to a general schema of a four-footed animal 
that we can recognize in several concrete representations (A141/B180). But 
in the case of ideas, no representation can ever correspond to them—e.g., I 
can never say ‘this is a simple soul,’ or ‘this is a perfect homogeneity.’ Ideas 
are schemata only inasmuch as they guide our investigations—for example, 
by telling us to maximize our empirical regress with respect to the unity of 
inner appearances or to the homogeneity of nature. 
The second-order validity of rules of reason is still insufficient to 
address our second worry, namely the one concerning the content of the 
prescription. For even granting that prescriptive rules are to be conceived as 
meta-rules of inquiry, they could still prescribe determinate kinds of empirical 
regress or synthesis. Kant opposes this thought in several places by 
highlighting that rules of reason have only indeterminate value (e.g., 
 
34 I therefore disagree with Guyer’s stark distinction between a “quantitative” and “qualitative” 
version of regulativeness (Guyer 1990, 20–3). Both versions can be regarded as ways to 
maximize our empirical research (and ways to proceed to more remote ‘conditions,’ see 
section 2). Indeed, ideas perform the same task differently: psychological and theological 
ideas promote forms of maximal unity of our investigation, whereas cosmological ideas 
promote forms of maximal extension. 
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A518/B546, A693/B721). Consider a rule that tells us to continue our 
empirical regress in a certain kind of appearances. Kant offers the following 
examples: “that from a living human being one must always ascend in the 
series of his ancestors without ever expecting a first pair, or in a series of 
bodies in the world without admitting an outermost sun” (A522/B550). 
Although these rules apply to our synthesis and seem therefore legitimate, 
they are not entirely metaphysically uncommitted. For they still demand us to 
always expect something particular in our regress (“new ancestors” or “series 
of bodies”), thus predetermining our empirical findings. What a rule of reason 
prescribes, instead, is “only the progress from appearances to appearances, 
even if they should yield no actual perception” (ibid.; my emphasis). In other 
words, a rational rule gives us no clue as to what kind of appearances we will 
encounter in our empirical synthesis. This is because the content of ideas 
provides us with specific instructions on how we ought to unify the cognitions 
of the understanding, but it does not tell us how such unity will be realized 
(see A661/B689).35 The latter is precisely the task of the empirical 
investigation—reason initiates and regulates such investigation, but never 
predetermines it. 
To summarize these points, rules of reason are to be regarded as 
meta-rules of bottom-up empirical research. They are legitimate because 
they do not impose a top-down approach to nature but set the limits and 
conditions within which empirical research ought to be carried out. In 
particular, they do not promote a particular image of nature nor they 
predetermine the kind of regress we are going to find in it. Rather, they tell us 
to always proceed from a conditioned to its condition and never take the 
empirical synthesis as complete. In other words, their function is to guide the 
way we direct our investigation in the world. As Kant often emphasizes, the 
function of reason is essentially orientational. Ideas are defined as foci 
imaginarii (vanishing points) that direct the understanding (A644/B672), they 
 
35 According to Walden 2019, the reason why regulative principles are metaphysically 
innocent is that the content of ideas is inherently indeterminate. I think, instead, that we need 
to distinguish between the content of ideas as objects and their prescriptive content as rules. 
As objects, ideas are indeed completely indeterminate. As rules, however, their content can 
be “determinately kept in mind” as specific maxims of investigation (see A665/B693). 
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give us a “general indication (allgemeine Anzeige)” of inquiry (A661/B689), 
they “point the understanding in the right direction (in die Richtung zu 
bringen)” (A323/B380), and they “only point the way toward systematic unity 
(zur systematischen Einheit den Weg vorzuzeichnen)” (A668/B696). This 
function of reason closely ties in with our being finite cognitive agents. Since 
our cognition is limited by the bounds of sense, reason cannot satisfy its 
demand. When limited by the bounds of sense, however, such demand does 
not merely ‘disappear’—it disposes of its groundless cognitive pretensions 
and becomes, to use a term Kant elsewhere uses, a “drive for cognition” that 
allows the subject to advance in its empirical investigations (WOT, 8:140; my 
emphasis).36 
 
8. The excellent use of reason: toward systematic unity 
As I have argued in Sections 3 and 4, descriptive interpretations of reason 
have the unfortunate result of not properly vindicating the regulative use of 
reason in science as “excellent” and “indispensably necessary.” Does a rule-
based account of reason fare better than previous reappraisals of reason? 
One may suspect that a purely prescriptive interpretation, while being 
metaphysically innocent, runs the risk of leaving us empty-handed. I will 
argue that this is not the case and that a purely prescriptive reason does the 
work required to orient the understanding with respect to appearances. 
The main problem of a prescriptive account of reason is that it does 
not seem able to account for the objectivity that Kant attaches to ideas of 
reason. Kant insists that the principles of reason have some kind of “indirect” 
and “indeterminate objective validity” (A665–6/B693–4; A669–70/B697–8).37 
How can we explain such validity from a prescriptive point of view? The only 
proper object of reason is the understanding. This limitation, however, does 
 
36 Kant elaborates on such orientational connotations of reason in What Does it Mean to 
Orient Oneself in Thinking? (1786). For a more detailed analysis, see Ypi 2017. 
37 Cf. O’Shea 1997 and Watkins 2019b. Watkins, for example, takes the fact that ideas have 
some objective validity as an indication that they are “ontological principles” that do not 
“determine the world” (218). But note, following Gava (forthcoming), that by qualifying an 
ontological principle as ‘indeterminate’ (by saying, for example, that the world is a systematic 




not preclude reason from having some indirect reference to objects. As we 
have seen, ideas are second-order schemata that apply to the understanding 
a priori. But Kant also adds: 
Now since every principle that establishes for the understanding a thoroughgoing 
unity of its use a priori is also valid, albeit only indirectly, for the object of experience, 
the principles of pure reason will also have objective reality in regard to this object, 
yet not so as to determine something in it, but only to indicate the procedure in 
accordance with which the empirical and determinate use of the understanding in 
experience can be brought into thoroughgoing agreement with itself, by bringing it as 
far as possible into connection with the principle of thoroughgoing unity; and from 
that it is derived. (A665–6/B693–4) 
The objective reality Kant attaches to ideas is spelled out in prescriptive 
terms. Ideas do not determine objects, nor do they do so fictionally or 
hypothetically. What they do is indicate the “procedure” according to which 
the empirical use of the understanding is made consistent with itself. That is 
how ideas are granted some form of “reality.” But what does this mean? Kant 
further elaborates on the meaning of such procedure in the second part of 
the Appendix, where he gives the ‘official’ deduction of the ideas of reason. 
He says: 
It makes a big difference whether something is given to my reason as an object 
absolutely or is given only as an object in the idea. In the first case my concepts go 
as far as determining the object; but in the second, there is really only a schema for 
which no object is given, not even hypothetically, but which serves only to represent 
other objects to us, in accordance with their systematic unity, by means of the 
relation to this idea, hence to represent these objects indirectly. (A670/B698) 
In this dense passage, Kant explains that ideas do not have reality inasmuch 
as they directly represent actual or hypothetical objects. Rather, their reality 
consists in the function they afford. In particular, they allow the progressive 
systematization of objects of experience. They do so precisely as rules for 
the empirical use of the understanding—as Kant puts it, they show how “we 
ought to seek after the constitution and connection of objects of experience 
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in general” (A671/B699).38 Think about the idea of the soul. It might be 
tempting to interpret the regulative use of such an idea as the presupposition 
of a transcendent ground of appearances (cf. the illusory account in section 
3). But that would be a mistake for we are not warranted to introduce “mere 
thought-entities” just for our own benefit (A673/B701). The concept of the 
soul (namely, of a simple, unchangeable, intelligent substance) is rather a 
rational rule or, as Kant also puts it, a “standard” that tells us how we ought 
to investigate inner appearances (A675/B703)—for instance, that we ought to 
regard all powers of our mind as derived from one fundamental power, or all 
changes as belonging to a substance (A682–3/B710–11).39 
But if we are not allowed to use concepts that go beyond experience 
to determine objects, why can we still use them to guide experience? Kant’s 
answer is that concepts of reason, if used as mere rules, are not really 
transcendent concepts. They “should be grounded only as analogues of real 
things, but not as things in themselves” (A674/B702). Ideas as rules are 
therefore what Kant more generally calls “philosophical analogies”: 
In philosophy, however, analogy is not the identity of two quantitative but of two 
qualitative relations, where from three given members I can cognize and give a priori 
only the relation to a fourth member but not this fourth member itself. (A180–
1/B222–3) 
As philosophical analogies, ideas only give us a “relation” to something that 
remains completely unknown to us (or simply unattainable, in the case of 
complete series of empirical conditions)—a relation that is, however, 
necessary in order to systematize appearances. Take again the concept of 
soul. By means of experience, we cannot systematize the appearances of 
inner sense for we only encounter a manifold of particular and unrelated 
representations (see Kraus 2018, 81–2). Reason thus introduces the concept 
of the soul in order to think the relation between inner appearances and their 
 
38 I discuss in detail the deduction of the ideas of reason in Chapter 2. 
39 For a detailed analysis of the role of the idea of the soul, see Kraus 2018. According to 
Kraus, the idea of the soul has two essential functions: it delineates the domain of 
psychology and allows the systematization of its laws. 
 
36 
unknown ground as systematic. By thinking such relation as systematic, 
however, reason does not attempt to describe a transcendent object (what 
the soul really or hypothetically is) but prescribes the understanding to look 
for more remote empirical conditions for the given conditioned inner 
appearances. In other words, substantial unity, fundamental powers, 
unchangeability are the rules that allow us to “initiate and continue” the 
empirical regress with respect to inner appearances, thus delineating the 
domain of psychology (A508/B536). Kant’s point is again that reason’s only 
validity and function is to regulate the empirical use of the understanding. 
If this is correct, there is really no contradiction between the rule-
based account I have proposed and the objectivity of the rules of reason. 
Rather, such “indirect” and “indeterminate” objectivity immediately attaches 
to any prescriptive rule reason gives us. Without determining anything, 
reason guides the way the understanding relates to the world. This, I submit, 
is the “fundamental and unnoticed way” in which speculative reason, as Kant 
says in the first book of the Dialectic, serves the understanding 
(A329/B387).40 Reason does not merely help the understanding formulate 
additional hypotheses that complete a system of cognitions already given to 
us (cf. the hypothetical account in section 4). Much more radically, it makes 
possible any coherent use of the understanding that goes beyond a mere 
production of given experience. In other words, reason is a necessary 
ingredient of any empirical cognition that is not a mere aggregate of 
particular and unrelated cognitions. 
Kant identifies the necessary contribution of reason to empirical 
cognition with systematic unity. As Kant puts it in the Appendix, “the 
systematic in cognition” is “what reason quite uniquely prescribes and seeks 
to bring about” (A645/B673) and similarly that “the unity of reason is the unity 
of a system” (A680/B708). Such unity, that, as we have seen, reason 
attempts to realize through ideas as rules, is of great significance for any 
scientific consideration of the world. In the Architectonic of Pure Reason, 
 
40 See Massimi 2017a, forthcoming, for an interpretation of the coherent use of the 
understanding that emphasizes the role of ideas in making what she calls “inter-
conversational agreement” possible. 
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Kant says that “systematic unity is that which first makes ordinary cognition 
into science, i.e., makes a system out of a mere aggregate of it” 
(A832/B860). It follows that science is made possible by the faculty of reason 
and its demand for systematic unity (or, ‘systematicity’). In other words, 
empirical cognition can aspire to be scientific only if it is rationally 
transformed into a system. To unpack what ‘systematicity’ amounts to would 
require considerable interpretative work that cannot be undertaken in this 
chapter. However, I believe that vindicating reason’s prescriptive role is the 
necessary preliminary groundwork of any promising investigation into the 
relation between reason and scientific knowledge.   
 
9. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have advanced a rule-based account of the regulative use of 
reason that helps us understand why Kant deems such use critically 
legitimate and necessary for promoting empirical cognition. If my reading is 
correct, in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant does not merely qualify the 
metaphysical inclinations of reason that characterize transcendent 
metaphysics. Rather, he deeply rethinks the rational sources of our mind in 
prescriptive terms. The critical fate of transcendent metaphysics consists in 
its radical transformation into an immanent endeavour to systematize the 
empirical world. Such endeavour is not just an additional desideratum of 
cognition, but fundamentally orients the understanding within the world and 
beyond what is partially and chaotically given to us in experience. Finally, 
although Kant’s story clearly relies on several assumptions of his philosophy, 
it does not necessarily commit us to an extreme form of idealism and teaches 











In Section Two of the Ideal of Pure Reason (The Transcendental Ideal), Kant 
reconstructs the steps that lead human reason to postulate the idea of the 
most real being, or the ens realissimum. This idea plays a central role in 
Kant’s negative critique of rationalist theology. For Kant, the ens realissimum 
is the philosophical basis of the idea of God and the concept underlying the 
traditional arguments for God’s existence.1 As is well known, Kant argues 
that the Ontological, Cosmological, and Physico-theological arguments are 
fallacious and that we cannot theoretically demonstrate the existence of God. 
This is not, however, the end of the story. Kant insists that the idea of God 
has also a positive role to play, not only in the practical, but also in the 
theoretical realm. In particular, the idea of God is presented as a necessary 
regulative principle for the systematization of empirical cognition. Indeed, as 
Kant argues in the second part of the Appendix to the Transcendental 
Dialectic, we “must presuppose” this idea “in relation to the systematic and 
purposive order of the world’s structure (in Beziehung auf die systematische 
und zweckmäßige Ordnung des Weltbaues)” (A698/B726). 
It is far from clear, however, whether Kant is thereby rehabilitating 
some aspects of the ens realissimum and, if this is the case, how this 
rehabilitation can be critically legitimate. The literature has been divided on 
this issue. As noted by Wood, the rationalist background of the arguments 
Kant presents in the Transcendental Ideal has made it not particularly 
appreciated among his readers, particularly his English-speaking ones 
(Wood 1978, 27). Kemp Smith, Strawson, and Bennett, for example, all 
consider Kant’s derivation of the ens realissimum at odds with the critical 
 
1 See, e.g., Allison 2004, 396. 
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project.2 After Wood’s ground-breaking study (Wood 1978), however, several 
attempts at critically interpreting the ideal in positive terms have been made 
(for example, Grier 2001, Allison 2004, Longuenesse 2005). In this chapter, I 
will argue that such attempts are promising and grounded in the text, but they 
all miss what I take to be the essential element that explains the critical 
legitimacy of the ens realissimum. This element is the transcendental 
deduction of the idea of reason Kant provides in the second part of the 
Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic. 
The transcendental deduction of the ideas has not been particularly 
studied in the literature—nor has it been discussed in relation to the 
transcendental ideal.3 This is an unfortunate gap in the literature since the 
deduction is supposed to explain how the ideas of reason, including the idea 
of God, can obtain objective validity and become critically legitimate with 
respect to the systematization of empirical cognition. In this chapter, I will 
show that the second part of the Appendix gives us precise instructions on 
how to critically understand the postulation of the idea of God and its role in 
the investigation of nature. In particular, I will argue (i.) that ideas must be 
postulated as schemata rather than concepts of objects; and that (ii.) the 
content of ideas must be understood in analogical rather than descriptive 
terms. The proposed reading of the deduction will provide a template for 
understanding the positive characterizations of the idea of God, including 
(but not limited to) its fundamental characterization as the ens realissimum. 
The plan of the chapter is as follows. I will first reconstruct Kant’s 
derivation of the transcendental ideal in the Ideal of Pure Reason and 
discuss its critical legitimacy (Section 2). I will then take a close look at the 
transcendental deduction of ideas in the second part of the Appendix 
(Section 3). In Section 4, I will apply the deduction to the derivation of the 
ideal of pure reason and derive its critical version. Finally, I will conclude by 
 
2 See Kemp Smith 1918, 522; Strawson 1966, 222; Bennett 1974, 282. 
3 Even discussants of the positive role of reason tend to focus primarily on the first part of the 




briefly discussing other positive characterizations of the idea of God (Section 
5). 
 
2. The transcendental ideal: the argument and its critical 
legitimacy  
 
2.1 Reconstruction of the argument 
In the first section of the Ideal of Pure Reason (The Ideal in general), Kant 
introduces the general notion of ideal and distinguishes it from both 
categories and ideas on the basis of their ‘distances,’ as it were, from 
“objective reality.” Objective reality, according to Kant, is a property that 
representations have when they are “related to an object” and “have 
significance and sense (“Bedeutung und Sinn”) in that object” (A155/B194).4 
Categories are mere forms of thought, but they can obtain objective reality 
when related to appearances through transcendental schemata. Ideas are 
“more remote” from objective reality because no empirical representations 
can be found that correspond to them (A567/B595). Indeed, ideas are 
presented as “transcendent concepts”: concepts that go beyond possible 
experience (see A320/B377 and A327/B384). Since, for Kant, knowledge of 
objects is limited to possible experience, it seems to follow that ideas cannot 
obtain objective reality from a theoretical point of view.5 They still maintain 
some validity and an indispensable function though: namely, that of serving 
as “rules” for the systematic unity of cognition (A568/B596). 
An ideal seems even “further removed” from objective reality than an 
idea. Kant uses the term ideal in the specific sense of indicating an idea “in 
individuo, i.e., an individual thing which is determinable, or even determined, 
through the idea alone” (ibid.). Whilst a mere idea is a general concept, the 
ideal is a fully determinable, or determined, representation of an individual 
being. To this specific definition corresponds a particular function. If ideas 
give us general “rules” for the systematic unity of empirical cognition, the 
 
4 See “objektive Realität” in the Kant-Lexikon (Willaschek et al. 2015). 
5 In this chapter, I am interested in the objective validity of ideas with respect to speculative 
cognition. I am not therefore discussing whether ideas can obtain objective validity from a 
practical point of view. 
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ideal provides “the original image for the thoroughgoing determination of the 
copy” (A569/B597).  
They provide an indispensable standard for reason, which needs the concept of that 
which is entirely complete in its kind, in order to assess and measure the degree and 
the defects of what is incomplete. (A569–70/B597–8)  
The definition of ideal here introduced is highly general and sketchily 
anticipates arguments that will be fully—yet puzzlingly, as several 
commentators have noted—developed in the course of the chapter. Let me, 
however, already highlight the point that will represent the main concern of 
the present chapter. Note that Kant places great emphasis on the problem of 
objective reality of the ideal and ideas more generally understood. Note also 
that the use of this term is ambiguous. Although Kant talks of different 
‘distances’ from objective reality, it would seem that ideas and ideals, given 
their transcendent status, are simply unable to become objectively real. But if 
ideas and the ideal cannot have objective reality, how can it be possible for 
them to maintain some validity in relation to cognition? Indeed, it may seem 
illegitimate to use representations that go beyond possible experience and 
have no relation to objects as “rules” and “standards” for systematizing 
empirical cognition. In this chapter, I will try to shed light on these 
ambiguities. In particular, I contend that Kant is here employing a particular 
understanding of “objective reality” (or “objective validity”)6 that will be fully 
clarified only in the second part of the Appendix to the Transcendental 
Dialectic with the transcendental deduction of the ideas. This deduction, 
although not particularly investigated in the literature, will be key to 
understanding the positive use of the idea of God. 
After introducing ideals in general and using particular examples as 
that of the Stoic sage, Kant’s subsequent discussion focuses on the concept 
of ens realissimum. This is not a matter of choice. The concept of ens 
 
6 It may be tempting to apply the distinction between ‘objective reality’ (objektive Realität) 
and ‘objective validity’ (objektive Gültigkeit) (see, e.g., Bunch 2010) to the present case (for 
example, arguing that ideas are objectively valid without possessing objective reality). 
However, there is lack of textual evidence for drawing such a distinction here (see, e.g., 
A670/B698). I therefore prefer to treat these terms as synonyms (see Wagner 1967). 
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realissimum corresponds to the “transcendental ideal”: an ideal which is 
necessarily required by the use of our reason (see A576/B604). Accordingly, 
what follows in Section Two of the chapter is the much debated and highly 
complicated derivation of the transcendental ideal from the rational sources 
of our mind. The function of the argument Kant presents in this section as 
well as its reconstruction constitute interpretative problems themselves. For 
the purposes of this chapter, I will follow the widely accepted assumption that 
this section is part of a long and uninterrupted story regarding the rational 
origin of the idea of God.7 I will give only a rough sketch of the main line of 
argument presented.  
Several reconstructions of Kant’s derivation of the transcendental 
ideal have been proposed. Allison proposes a three steps argument, Grier 
has four steps in her reconstruction, and finally Willaschek has recently 
proposed a five-step derivation.8 I will follow the latter one for it includes all 
the elements of the principal line of reasoning. The argument starts with a 
contrast between two principles: a logical principle and a transcendental 
principle which in turn contains a transcendental presupposition. These 
represent the first three steps (1, 2, and 3) of the argument. The first principle 
is the “principle of determinability” (PD) which applies to concepts only. The 
principle says that: 
 
1) PD: “of every two contradictorily opposed predicates only one can apply to it.” 
(A571/B599) 
 
This is a merely logical principle for, as Kant explains, it rests on the principle 
of contradiction and abstracts from the “content of cognition” (A571/B599). It 
says that for every concept and any predicate P, if P is added to the concept 
then non-P cannot also be added to its content. Suppose that the concept 
‘human being’ is indeterminate as to whether a human being is ‘mortal.’ I can 
only add the predicate ‘mortal’ (P) or ‘non-mortal’ (non-P) to it. 
 
7 See, e.g., Grier 2001, 233, and Willaschek 2018, 219. Strawson argues that Kant offers 
two different accounts of the origin of the ideal: one in Section Two and one in Section 
Three; see Strawson 1966, 221 fn. 
8 See Grier 2001, Allison 2004, and Willaschek 2018. 
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The second, transcendental principle is “the principle of thoroughgoing 
determination (“durchgängige Bestimmung”) (PTD) and specifically applies to 
objects. It says:  
 
2) PTD: “among all possible predicates of things, insofar as they are compared with 
their opposites, one must apply to it.” (A571–2/B599–600) 
 
This principle goes beyond logic for “it deals with the content and not merely 
the logical form” (A572/B600). In other words, it is a synthetic principle that 
provides us not merely with the analytic determination of a concept through 
given predicates, but with “the complete concept a thing” (ibid.). It tells us 
that for every object and every possible predicate P, either P or non-P must 
apply to it. Here Kant seems to rehash the Leibnizian idea that only a 
‘complete concept’—that is, a concept determined with respect to all pairs of 
possible predicates—allows us to represent one individual thing.9  
This principle, in turn, contains a transcendental presupposition. By 
contrast with PD, PTD does not simply consider a thing in relation to two 
opposite predicates. The complete concept of a thing requires instead the 
comparison of the thing with the “sum total of all predicates in general” 
(“Inbegriff aller möglichen Prädikate überhaupt”; A573/B601). PTD therefore 
presupposes the following: 
 
3) SUM: “the material of all possibility, which is supposed to contain a priori the data 
for the particular possibility of everything.” (A573/B601) 
 
The presupposition of this material—the “storehouse,” as it were, “from which 
all possible predicates of things can be taken” (A575/B603)—is of the utmost 
importance for it constitutes the transcendental basis for the derivation of the 
rationalist idea of God. 
Before turning to the remaining two steps of the argument, let’s briefly 
pause on these three steps which already pose a number of interpretative 
 




riddles. Firstly, Kant does not really explain the move from PD to PTD. It is 
plausible to think, however, that PD presupposes PTD when applied to 
objects.10 The general thought seems to be that in order for us to 
conceptually determine a single object we need to presuppose—at least 
hypothetically—that the object is completely determined. This reading, 
however, does not settle whether it is legitimate for us to make such a 
presupposition. Is this move transcendentally valid? Or is it a deceiving 
illusion affecting the dialectician? 
From a critical point of view, the second step, that is, the very attempt 
at completely determining objects through concepts—therefore 
independently from sensibility—seems prima facie illegitimate: the dialectical 
residue of Leibnizian ‘intellectualism’ (see A275–6/B331–2), rather than a 
positive part of the critical system. In Kant’s transcendental philosophy, 
objects are never conceptually given, but always given to us under the 
conditions of sensibility as appearances.11  
The third step poses additional problems. Again, from a critical point of 
view, possibility is the agreement with the formal conditions of the 
understanding (see, e.g., A218/B265), not the “storehouse” of data that 
provides the content of objects. Leech convincingly argues that the 
presupposition of a sum total of possibility completes the formal conditions 
provided by the understanding as regards the content of phenomena (Leech 
2017). But even granted such a completion, the sum total remains an idea—
something “which has its seat solely in reason” (A573/B601). How could we 
meaningfully apply this idea to objects? This would again require some kind 
of objective validity attached to our ideas.  
To make things worse, the last two steps of the argument seem even 
less plausible. The sum total of all possibility, Kant says, is still an 
indeterminate concept: “on closer investigation,” however, we find that this 
idea “excludes a multiplicity of predicates, which, as derived through others, 
are already given, or cannot coexist with one another” (A573–4/B601–2). 
 
10 Following Willaschek 2018, 221–4. 
11 For a similar point, see also Grier 2001, 269. 
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Simply put, we do not need to include in the presupposed sum total more 
than it is strictly necessary for the reality of beings. A negation is not properly 
a reality, but a mere lack thereof (A574/B602). Properly speaking, therefore, 
the presupposed sum total contains only primitive, positive predicates (an “All 
of reality,” omnitudo realitatis). The fourth step is therefore: 
 
4) OMNITUDO: the transcendental substratum of determination is “nothing other 
than the idea of an All of reality (omnitudo realitatis),” of which “all true negations are 
nothing other but limits.” (A575–6/B603-4) 
 
The complete determination of this idea itself (the properly called ideal) is 
finally obtained only through the final step. The idea of an “All of reality” is 
itself a concept of an individual being (the ens realissimum) for the simple 
reason that we can completely determine it with the idea of reality: as a being 
which is only positively determined and therefore possesses all positive 
realities. The final step therefore amounts to: 
 
5) ENS: the transcendental ideal is “the one single genuine ideal” that is “thoroughly 
determined through itself.” (A576/B604) 
 
This last part of the derivation has attracted considerable criticism for at least 
two reasons. First, it seems to ignore the possibility of “real Repugnanz” 
among positive predicates, thus failing to show that the ens realissimum is 
really possible.12 In his pre-critical essays The Only Possible Argument and 
Negative Magnitudes, Kant explains that really repugnant predicates are 
predicates whose effects cancel each other out (e.g., OPA, 2:85; NM, 2:290). 
Now, the most real being cannot contain really repugnant predicates, for 
otherwise he would be characterized by “a deprivation or a lack” (the 
cancelled-out effects of repugnant predicates) and that would not be 
compatible with its positive nature (see OPA, 2:86). Following Wood 1978 
and Willaschek 2018, however, I think that this does not pose a serious 
 
12 See Wood 1978, 56 fn., Klimmek 2005, and Chignell 2009. 
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threat to the idea of ens realissimum.13 First, in the Ideal chapter Kant does 
not seem to discuss real repugnance in any significant way. Second, the 
most real being is only a rationally presupposed idea. As such, we are not 
required to prove its real possibility as an object. Indeed, as I will further 
argue in this chapter, the validity of such an idea will not be based on any 
determination of objects at all. 
More problematically, the hypostatization in an individual being seems 
to blatantly presuppose the possibility of conceptually determining a being 
without appealing to sensibility. Indeed, Kant himself seems to dismiss this 
step as one “overstepping the boundaries of the vocation and permissibility” 
of the transcendental ideal (A580/B608). Reason, Kant explains, grounds the 
complete determination of things only on the idea of all reality, “without 
demanding that this reality should be given objectively, and itself constitute a 
thing” (ibid.). This step—specifically understood as the positing of a real 
thing—seems therefore to be unwarranted in the natural progression of 
reason. 
  
2.2 The critical legitimacy of the ideal 
As should already be evident from the above reconstruction, the question of 
the legitimacy of the rational progression that leads to the transcendental 
ideal is a thorny issue to disentangle. On the one hand, as several 
commentators suggest, Kant seems to merely reconstruct the fallacious 
reasoning of the metaphysician. Indeed, the principle of complete 
determination together with its presupposition of the material of all possibility 
seems at odds with the critical framework. On the other hand, Kant clearly 
admits some permissibility of the ideal as a mere idea “in order to cognize a 
thing completely” and for prescribing to the understanding the “rule of its 
complete use” (A573/B601). It is, however, highly difficult to understand, 
firstly, how an idea can be applied to our concepts of objects, and secondly, 
 
13 See Willaschek 2018, 227 fn., and Wood 1978, 59. According to Wood, Kant’s critical 
philosophy allows him to remain agnostic as to whether God (as a noumenal reality) is really 
possible or not. 
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where exactly to draw a line between a legitimate and an illegitimate use of 
reason. 
Following the clues Kant offers, several interpreters have tried to 
propose a critical reading of this section. In fact, after Wood’s ground-
breaking study (Wood 1978), there have been much work on the positive 
interpretation of the ideal: most notably, Longuenesse 1995, 2005; Grier 
2001; Allison 2004; and Leech 2017. In the rest of this chapter, I will contend 
that such attempts are promising and grounded in the text. However, they all 
miss an essential element, without which the rehabilitation of the ideal cannot 
be made fully compatible with the positive use Kant attributes to the idea of 
God. This element is the crucial question of the objective validity of ideas that 
Kant clarifies only in the second part of the Appendix to the Transcendental 
Dialectic.14 For clarity and convenience, I will build my analysis on 
Longuenesse’s account of the transcendental ideal, which has generally 
been taken as a landmark in the recent literature.15 It is particularly helpful to 
discuss her position for, although I share the same purpose of critically 
interpreting the Ideal chapter, my reading will substantially diverge from her 
proposal and hopefully solve the problems connected with it. 
Longuenesse has argued that there is a “perfectly legitimate, critical 
reading for the move from the principle of complete determination to the 
 
14 A notable exception is Willaschek 2018. Willaschek does recognize that ideas have some 
kind of objective validity (e.g., 126) and briefly argues that the transcendental ideal itself can 
be positively used as a regulative principle of reason (223 fn.). However, he does not 
discuss how Kant substantiates these claims in the second part of the Appendix nor he 
explains the relevance the ideal has to the empirical investigation of nature. My contribution 
is meant to expand and further develop his approach.  
15 Leech 2017 substantially follows Longuenesse’s account and highlights interesting modal 
features attached to the ideal (see, e.g., 10). Willaschek 2018 refers to Longuenesse’s 
reading and interprets it in regulative terms (222). Grier 2001 criticizes at length 
Longuenesse’s position. I will use some of her criticism to refine my reading of the ideal and 
I will agree with her on several points regarding the vindication of the ens realissimum as 
such (242 fn.). However, my reading will diverge significantly from hers: she addresses the 
problem of the objective validity of the ideal by relying on her general account of 
transcendental illusion (which I criticize in Chapter 1). She does not focus on the 
transcendental deduction of the ideas—in which, on my view, the problem is finally 
addressed—and the relation to the systematic unity of nature on the basis of which the 
deduction is conducted. Accordingly, she maintains that PTD relates to things in general, not 
merely to empirical objects (239 fn.). On this crucial point, my reading is closer to 
Longunesse’s account. Finally, Allison 2004 follows Grier’s interpretation, although his 
analysis contains brief, insightful remarks on the relation between the ideal and the 
deduction (438, 441). 
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supposition of a sum total of all possibilities” (Longuenesse 2005, 220). On 
her reading, the principle of thoroughgoing determination (PTD) is a critical 
principle if restricted in its application to the objects of sense, or phenomena, 
only. Crucially, she operates such a restriction by reading the principle as 
following from the epistemology of the Transcendental Analytic. From the 
standpoint of the Analytic, she argues, the principle of complete 
determination is not even a new principle. Instead, “it is a principle that Kant 
could have given as a corollary of the principle of all synthetic judgments: ‘the 
conditions of the possibility of experience are the conditions of the possibility 
of the objects of experience’ (A111; A158/B197)” (ibid. 219). 
In particular, she interprets PTD as the principle that merely follows 
from the comparability of any singular object of experience to every other 
possible object of experience, by virtue of belonging in the same concept of 
object of experience (ibid., 218).16 As a result, the principle does presuppose 
a sum total of reality, but this sum total of reality is now understood as the 
sum total of empirical predicates, or of the realities given to us in space and 
time. Moreover, she notes that, according to the Analytic, a possible 
predicate is a predicate that “agrees with the formal conditions of experience” 
(A218/B265). Therefore, to compare the predicate of a singular thing with the 
sum total of possible predicates is to compare them with all empirical 
predicates (see Longuenesse 2005, 219 fn.). Finally, she concludes, nothing 
prevents the refinement of this sum total into the omnitudo realitatis of only 
positive predicates (ibid., 220). 
This reading finds textual support in the last paragraphs of the section. 
Kant says that beside describing the natural progression of reason, we also 
need to discover the source of the illusion that drives our reasoning. He 
indeed locates the answer to this genealogical problem in the Analytic. The 
possibility of objects of sense, says Kant, is only the formal relation with our 
 
16 More specifically, she takes PTD as following “from [the principle of the possibility of 
experience] once it is understood that the latter includes the role of infinite and disjunctive 
judgment in reflecting objects under concepts and thus coming up with representations of 
individuated objects for our intuitions” (219). I skip interesting details of her account since 
they are not strictly required to understand the main point of her argument and the relevant 
criticism. For a more detailed analysis, see Verburgt 2011. 
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thought. Their material—“the reality in appearances (corresponding to 
sensation)”—, however, must be given (A581/B609). Without such an 
empirical material, “no possibility could be represented” (ibid.). As I 
understand Longuenesse’s account, Kant goes on to formulate the empirical 
version of PTD (that is, limited in its application to appearances) which in turn 
presupposes an empirical SUM, namely: 
 
PTDe: “an object of sense can be completely determined only if it is compared with 
all the predicates of appearance and is represented through them either affirmatively 
or negatively.” (A581/B609) 
 
SUMe: “nothing is an object for us unless it presupposes the sum total of all empirical 
reality (“Inbegriff aller empirischen Realität”) as condition of its possibility.” 
(A582/B610) 
If PTDe, SUMe, and presumably also OMNITUDOe are legitimate steps (since 
they follow from the Analytic), where does the dialectical error come from? 
According to Longuenesse, the error would consist in transforming a unity of 
the understanding into a unity of reason. The textual evidence for this 
reading would be contained in the last paragraph of the section: 
That we subsequently hypostatize this idea of the sum total of all reality, however, 
comes about because we dialectically transform the distributive unity of the use of 
the understanding in experience, into the collective unity of a whole of experience; 
and from this whole of appearance we think up an individual thing containing in itself 
all empirical reality, which then—by means of the transcendental subreption we have 
already thought—is confused with the concept of a thing that stands at the summit of 
the possibility of all things, providing the real conditions for their thoroughgoing 
determination. (A582–3/B610–1) 
The dialectical transformation, on her reading, is the transformation of the 
distributive unity of the understanding (that is, the logical unity that results 
from comparing an object of sense with all possible predicates) into the 
collective unity of a “whole of experience” (the unity of the totality of empirical 
reality), which is then hypostatized. Therefore, Longuenesse argues for the 
legitimacy of SUMe and OMNITUDOe only as principles generated by the 
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logical use of the understanding. It is true, Longuenesse concedes, that 
some collective unity is presupposed “as given as a whole in space and 
time,” but this is only an “experientially presupposed whole of reality,” and 
must be distinguished from the critical “discursively thought whole of realities 
or determinations” (Longuenesse 2005, 220–1).17 The hypostatization into an 
individual being, which is grounded on the collective whole, turns out to be an 
illegitimate move. Her reading does not thereby license a positive use of the 
ens realissimum, but only of the result of the previous step: the ‘All of 
empirical reality’ (OMNITUDOe). 
While this may seem convincing at first glance, there are a number of 
discrepancies between the text and the offered reading that undermine the 
plausibility of the overall picture. Let’s focus on the crux of her argument. 
First, as noted by Verburgt, it is surprising that Longuenesse reads the 
principle of thoroughgoing determination as a principle of the 
understanding—whereas Kant is clear that such a principle “is grounded on 
an idea which has its seat solely in reason, which prescribes to the 
understanding the rule of its complete use” (A573/B601; see Verburgt 2011, 
252). As a result, she reads the transition from distributive unity to collective 
unity as an illegitimate move. But this clearly fails to consider that collective 
unity (the unity of the totality of empirical reality) can have a positive meaning 
from the standpoint of reason—when it is legitimately used for the sake of the 
thoroughgoing determination of concepts of empirical objects.  
There is no lack of evidence for this more plausible reading. First, in 
the passage quoted above the transformation of the distributive unity into the 
collective unity of reason is only the first step and, as it were, a pre-condition 
of the dialectical hypostatization.18 The dialectical hypostatization only 
happens with what Kant calls “transcendental subreption”: the mistaking of 
an empirical principle for a principle that applies to things in general 
 
17 I take Longuenesse to mean that presupposing a whole of appearances, although 
subjectively necessary, is ultimately erroneous. As noted by Grier 2001, 239, and Verburgt 
2011, 251, this distinction is more confusing than helpful. 
18 This is duly noted by Allison 2004, 407. 
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(A583/B661).19 We should therefore carefully distinguish between the 
transformation into the collective unity of reason and the hypostatization, 
which is a misuse of reason when combined with the subreption. In the 
important footnote to this paragraph, Kant identifies the former with the step 
of ‘realization,’ that is, of transformation of a representation into an object,20 
and the latter with a separate, second step: 
This ideal of the supremely real being, even though it is a mere representation, is 
first realized, i.e., made into an object, then hypostatized. (A583/B611) 
That Kant leaves room for a positive meaning of collective unity and 
realization is then confirmed in a number of passages throughout the corpus. 
Most importantly, it is confirmed at the beginning of the Appendix, where 
Kant clearly recognizes a positive, regulative meaning of reason and its 
collective unity.21 
Thus reason really has as object only the understanding and its purposive 
application, and just as the understanding unites the manifold into an object through 
concepts, so reason on its side unites the manifold of concepts through ideas by 
positing a certain collective unity as the goal of the understanding’s actions, which 
are otherwise concerned only with distributive unity. (A643–4/B671–2) 
As we will see, the second part of the Appendix not only openly admits a 
positive use of the collective unity of reason, but it also explains how exactly 
we are critically allowed—indeed, we must—use it. This explanation will 
provide an important missing element for fully vindicating PTD as a 
transcendental principle of reason. This is particularly important for if PTD is 
recognized as a principle of reason—not of the understanding as suggested 
by Longuenesse—its objective validity becomes in itself a problem. How can 
we legitimately realize the ideal and apply it to objects of sense? The 
question of legitimacy amounts, as we will see in detail, to the problem of 
 
19 Kant also defines transcendental subreptions as the “the ascription of objective reality to 
an idea that merely serves as a rule” (A509/B537). 
20 Literally speaking, it makes little sense to transform a representation into an object. What 
Kant has in mind, however, is the attribution of an ‘object’ to a representation. 
21 Noted by Verburgt 2011, 250, and previously by Heimsoeth 1969. 
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distinguishing between a dialectical and a non-dialectical realization of the 
ideal. This distinction will be key to understanding the positive use of the 
ideal. 
The second major problem with Longuenesse’s account is more 
evident and points towards the same direction of inquiry. According to her 
reading, the natural progression of reason is legitimate up until the ‘All of 
empirical reality.’ But if this is the case, why does Kant insist so much that 
the ideal itself—the ens realissimum—has a necessary and indispensable 
use? Longuenesse asks herself this question and answers that this move is 
only motivated by the need to maintain a role for God in the realm of practical 
philosophy (Longuenesse 2005, 228). As noted by many, this cannot be a 
satisfactory answer.22 Kant not only advocates for a regulative use of the 
idea of God, he also explicitly specifies that the idea of God is necessary 
from a purely speculative point of view. To quote the phrase with which I 
opened the chapter: “we must presuppose” the idea of God in the 
investigation of nature. From which it is clear that the idea of God (and not 
merely the omnitudo realitatis) has a theoretical, not only practical function.  
 
3. The transcendental deduction of the ideas 
 
3.1 Why a transcendental deduction of ideas? 
In the previous section we saw that the legitimacy of the transcendental ideal 
hinges upon its “realization,” namely its transformation into some kind of 
‘object.’ The correct understanding of this move is still highly unclear at the 
end of Section Two of the Ideal of Pure Reason. It is true that Kant states 
that the transcendental ideal can be legitimate as a necessary idea for the 
thoroughgoing determination of concepts (see, e.g., A573/B601), but no clear 
explanation is offered of how an idea can be critically realized. Indeed, one 
might be tempted to simply equate this realization with the illegitimate step of 
treating a mere idea as a thing given objectively. As already suggested, a 
way out from this dialectical quagmire is only given in the second part of the 
 
22 See, e.g., Grier 2001, 242, and Verburgt 2011, 246. 
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Appendix where Kant presents the much-neglected transcendental deduction 
of ideas. In this section, I contend that the transcendental deduction of ideas 
reveals a positive, critically legitimate way of realizing an idea of reason from 
the theoretical perspective. 
It is important to briefly clarify, first, why a deduction of the ideas of 
reason is required. We saw in Section One of the Ideal that ideal 
representations are remote from objective reality, and yet Kant maintains that 
they have some legitimate and necessary application to objects of 
experience. In the second part of the Appendix, Kant finally clarifies this 
ambiguity. He says that if ideas “are to have the least objective validity […] 
and are not to represent merely empty thought-entities […], then a deduction 
of them must definitely be possible” (A670/B698). This deduction which, as 
Kant specifies, diverges quite far from that of the categories, is “the 
completion (“die Vollendung”) of the critical business of pure reason” (ibid.). 
Despite such resounding statement, this deduction has not been 
particularly studied in the secondary literature. One reason behind this 
interpretative dismissal is that the deduction does not fit well with a common 
reading of the ideas of reason. According to this interpretation (which we may 
call ‘methodological interpretation’),23 ideas are methodological tools or 
useful guidelines that we may use in order to extend the system of our 
cognitions.24 Since ideas have a merely logical function, it is not necessary to 
show that they have a legitimate application to objects. As a result, the 
transcendental deduction of the ideas is a negligible if not misleading part of 
the Dialectic. This reading, however, cannot be textually satisfactory. Kant 
simply does offer a highly sophisticated transcendental deduction of the 
ideas of reason. And such deduction is meant to show that ideas are not just 
useful methodological guidelines, but “indispensably necessary” principles 
that guide the understanding and assure its complete use (A644/B672).  
There is, however, a second, more subtle reason why the deduction 
has not attracted particular attention. It presents a notion of objective validity 
 
23 Following Abela 2002 and Geiger 2003. 
24 See, e.g., Horstmann 1989 and Guyer 1990. 
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(and of realization of the idea) that is not fully compatible even with more 
charitable readings of the objectivity of ideas (what we may call the 
‘descriptive interpretation’). This interpretation makes the following plausible 
distinction. Ideas of reason seem to describe objects that go beyond the 
possibility of experience—noumenal objects or things in themselves. Since 
our knowledge is limited to the field of experience, we cannot know whether 
our ideas actually correspond to those objects. For example, we cannot know 
whether there is an existing being the corresponds to our idea of God. 
However, we can still grant our ideas of reason a weaker epistemic status 
than knowledge. Since, as Kant says, ideas are necessary to regulate the 
understanding and promote the investigation of nature, we are required to 
merely assume that they determine things in themselves.25 Various ways 
have been proposed to understand such weak assumptions (for example, as 
hypotheses or as necessary illusions).26 Although I cannot here discuss 
these proposals in detail, let me point out that they all agree that ideas are 
objective inasmuch as they potentially describe objects. Importantly, this 
reading seems to find support in a form of theoretical belief Kant briefly 
introduces in the Canon of Pure Reason—the so-called “doctrinal belief” (see 
A825/B853–A827/B855). 
Taking my cue from a recent normative approach to the ideas of 
reason (Massimi 2017a, forthcoming; and Kraus 2018, 2020), I will argue that 
Kant’s view on the objectivity of ideas is more radical than generally 
assumed by the descriptive reading. The objectivity of the ideas does not 
consist in their actual or potential characterization of noumenal objects. 
Rather, their objectivity consists in the relational function they afford. As we 
will see, ideas are legitimately realized as “objects in the idea.” An object in 
the idea is not an object in any common understanding of the term. It is 
rather a “schema” that allows us to progressively systematize objects of 
sense. Crucially, Kant does not simply deduce ideas as schemata, he also 
specifies how we should understand the content of ideas in non-descriptive 
 
25 See, e.g., Grier 2001, 276–7, Allison 2004, 330, and Pickering 2011. 
26 See Willaschek 2018 for the first proposal, and Grier 2001 and Allison 2004 for the second 
one. I discuss these interpretations in detail in Chapter 1. 
 
55 
terms, namely as analogies. In the next section, I will elucidate these points 
by looking at the text more closely. I will first reconstruct the two steps of the 
deduction and the analogical nature of ideas. Finally, I will explain what this 
entails for the idea of God. 
 
3.2 The realization of the idea 
Ideas are deduced in two steps. The first step revolves around the distinction 
between presupposing an “object absolutely” (Gegenstand schlechthin) and 
an “object in the idea” (Gegenstand in der Idee; A670/B698). Kant is finally 
spelling out how to critically realize an idea (transform it into an object)—a 
realization that was only dialectically presented in the Ideal chapter. An 
object given absolutely is an object that can be determined through concepts. 
Objects of sense are of this kind: I can use the concepts of the understanding 
(causality, reality, etc.) to determine them regardless of whether they exist or 
not. On the other hand, an object in the idea is an object only in highly 
specific sense of the term. As Kant says, an object in the idea is, strictly 
speaking, a “schema”: 
 
[An object in the idea] is only a schema for which no object is given, not even 
hypothetically, but which serves only to represent other objects to us, in accordance 
with their systematic unity, by means of the relation to this idea, hence to represent 
these objects indirectly. (A670/B698) 
 
Let’s try to unpack this brief but dense passage. First, an object in the idea is 
not a hypothetical object that might or might not exist. An object in the idea is 
rather a “schema” or an “imagined object” (“eingebildeter Gegenstand”; ibid.) 
that is not meant to represent anything ‘out there’—instead, its function is to 
indirectly represent “other objects to us.” As Kant continues, if we relate an 
idea “straightway to an object,” we simply “would not be able to justify its 
objective validity” (ibid.). But why is this the case? After all, some of our ideas 
are free of logical contradictions and can be used to think entities that 
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transcend our experience.27 Kant, however, argues that logical consistency is 
not a sufficient condition for assuming ideas as objectively valid 
representations. As Kant puts it:  
 
Nevertheless, in order to assume something it is not enough that there is no positive 
hindrance to doing so, and we cannot be allowed to introduce mere thought entities 
that transcend all our concepts, though they contradict none of them, as real and 
determinate objects merely on credit, just so that speculative reason can complete 
its business as it likes. (A673–4/B701–2) 
 
I take Kant to mean that, although it is possible to use ideas to think entities 
that transcend our experience, this is not how ideas obtain objective validity. 
The objective validity of ideas cannot rest, as it were, on a mere wishful 
assumption of reason. Since we cannot know whether the object of the idea 
is more than a merely logically possible “thought entity,” we also do not know 
whether the idea is objectively valid. This is an important insight for it casts 
serious doubts on those interpretations that read the objectivity of ideas of 
reason in terms of descriptive assumptions about noumenal objects. As Kant 
makes clear: 
 
One mistakes the significance of this idea right away if one takes it to be the 
assertion, or even only the presupposition, of an actual thing to which one would 
think of ascribing the ground for the systematic constitution of the world. 
(A681/B709) 
 
Ideas should not be taken even as mere presuppositions of objects. As such, 
taking them as descriptive of objects and granting them weaker epistemic 
status than knowledge cannot explain their objectivity. This point, I contend, 
can be extended to doctrinal belief. According to Kant, belief is an epistemic 
state that only requires subjective grounds for its legitimate formulation (see 
A823/B851). In particular, “doctrinal belief” is presented as a kind of 
 
27 For Kant, the psychological and theological ideas are free of logical contradictions, 
whereas the cosmological ideas inevitably lead us to antinomies if we assume them as 
objective; see A673/B701.  
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theoretical belief (A825/B853). The fact that the idea of God is logically 
consistent and subjectively useful for the investigation of nature, for example, 
may be sufficient in order to believe in its existence from a theoretical point of 
view. The status of doctrinal belief is problematic and has been assessed in 
very different ways by commentators.28 A careful analysis of this particular 
type of belief and its relation to the transcendental deduction of ideas would 
therefore require a separate discussion. Let me, however, point out that 
doctrinal belief is unsuited to explain the objective validity of ideas. For 
doctrinal belief does not rule out the possibility that the objects of ideas are 
not really existing.29 As a result, it can only ground the belief that an idea is 
objectively valid, but it fails to show that an idea is objectively valid. Let me 
also suggest that from this it does not necessarily follow that the 
transcendental deduction of ideas and doctrinal belief are incompatible. Kant 
could maintain that while ideas must be strictly deduced in non-descriptive 
terms, it may still be subjectively possible or useful to believe in God’s 
existence from a theoretical point of view.30 
Now, if objects in the ideas are not object in any standard meaning of 
the word, what are they? Kant’s use of the word “schema” should help us 
understand its meaning. In the Analytic, a schema is a third thing that links 
pure concepts with objects of sense (A138/B177). Here, objects in the ideas 
seem to play a different, yet similarly relational role. They are “imagined 
objects” that act as the “ground or cause” (“Grund oder Ursache”) from which 
we can derive objects of sense (A670/B698). They do not represent the 
actual or potential grounds of the objects of experience. Rather, they are 
mental images that allow us to progressively represent those objects as 
systematically organized. As a schema, therefore, the object in the idea is a 
third thing which neither coincides with the objects of experience nor with 
their systematic unity31—it is instead the relational object that mediates 
 
28 For a detailed analysis, see Pasternack 2010.  
29 A similar suggestion can be found in Kraus 2020. 
30 Cf. Pasternack 2010, 214–5, who argues that doctrinal belief is the product of deception 
and is incompatible with the legitimate use of reason.  
31 See schemata in the Transcendental Analytic, in particular A138/B177. 
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between the two and allows our empirical investigation to converge towards 
systematic unity.  
Accordingly, ideas are not, as Kant says, “ostensive” concepts that 
show us how a noumenal object is or might be constituted (A671/B699). 
They are rather rules that tell us how we ought to systematize objects of 
experience. As Kant puts it, they “should not be assumed in themselves,” but 
“their reality should hold only as that of a schema of the regulative principle 
for the systematic unity of all cognitions of nature” (A674/B702). To sum up, 
the objective validity of ideas does not consist in an actual or potential 
relation to objects, but in the relational function they afford. This function 
consists in the progressive systematization of objects of experience they 
make possible. 
The second, final step of the transcendental deduction of ideas 
consists in arguing that if the three kinds of transcendental ideas 
(psychological, cosmological, and theological) meet the above illustrated 
requirements and are realized as relational objects in the idea that lead to 
systematic unity without “going contrary to experience,” then it is a 
“necessary maxim of reason to proceed in accordance with such ideas” 
(A671/B699). This is how ideas are transcendentally deduced. As anticipated 
by Kant, this indirect and relational objective validity is quite different from 
that of the categories, but this does not mean that ideas are not properly 
transcendental. It only means, as Kant clearly says, that the deduction 
proves ideas as regulative, non-constitutive principles (see A671/B699). 
They do not constitute experience, but they are necessary principles for 
attaining systematic unity of empirical cognition in general. 
This step, however, still leaves us with the question of why these and 
only these three ideas are capable of functioning as such.32 I think that this 
follows quite straightforwardly from (i.) the realization of ideas as “schemata”; 
and (ii.) the domains Kant attaches to each idea. Starting from the latter 
point, Kant distinguishes the sphere of applicability of each idea as follows: 
the first psychological idea, the idea of the soul, connects the phenomena of 
 
32 See also Allison’s instructive analysis of this problem (Allison 2004, 439).  
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our mind; the cosmological idea, the idea of the world, connects 
appearances of nature; and finally, the theological idea, the idea of God, 
connects everything that belongs to possible experience (see A672/B700). 
Now, since ideas are the schemata through which we attempt to systematize 
empirical cognition, to systematize the domain of the mind necessarily 
requires the schema of the idea of the soul, to systematize the world 
necessarily requires the schema of the idea of the world, etc.33 This also 
explains why the idea of God has a privileged treatment in the Appendix: by 
unifying possible experience in general, it simply has the broadest 
application. This ultimately results in the close relation between God and 
“systematic complete unity” (that is, systematic unity unrestricted to any 
particular domain; A677/B705).  
 
3.3 Analogies, not descriptions 
The above relational reading of the deduction of the ideas should have partly 
clarified the meaning of the “realization” of an idea into an object. There is, 
however, an important aspect of the idea that we still need to specify. If ideas 
are mere schemata that do not correspond to any objects out there, how can 
we still positively characterize their content? In the Appendix, Kant not only 
deduces the objective validity of ideas as schemata, but he also specifies 
how we are allowed to qualify the content of an idea in non-descriptive terms. 
Recall that the object in the idea acts as the imaginary “ground or 
cause” of sensible objects. In order to think these imaginary grounds or 
causes we cannot but rely on concepts of the understanding. These 
concepts lose descriptive power when not applied to objects of sense so that, 
as Kant frequently remarks, objects in the idea should not be assumed “in 
themselves” or as “things in themselves” (A674/B702). The noumenal ground 
of sensible objects remains beyond our conceptual determination. Objects in 
the idea should be assumed, instead, as “analogues of real things” (“Analoga 
von wirklichen Dingen”; ibid.). ‘Analogy’ is a technical term for Kant that fits 
particularly well with the relational reading of ideas suggested in this chapter. 
 
33 Allison 2004, 441, has a similar suggestion. 
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As Kant explains in the Analytic, philosophical analogies do not give 
us the “identity of two quantitative but of two qualitative relations” (A180–
1/B222–3). In the Prolegomena, Kant specifies that analogical thinking “does 
not signify, as the word is usually taken, an imperfect similarity between two 
things, but rather a perfect similarity between two relations in wholly 
dissimilar things” (Prolegomena, 4:357–8). I take Kant to mean that, in 
philosophy, analogies do not give us real or tentative descriptions of a to-be-
determined object, but rather qualify the relation to an object that remains 
unknown to us. For example, a philosophical analogy of the form ‘a : x = b : 
c,’ where only a, b, and c are known to us, does not allow us to attempt a 
derivation of x, but only establishes a relation between a and x.34 
This understanding of analogies finds confirmation in the Appendix. By 
acting as the imaginary ground of the systematic unity of objects of sense, 
the object in the idea does not in any way attempt to establish a similarity 
with (or a ‘description of’) the noumenal ground of appearances (the 
unknown ‘x’). Rather, as Kant says: 
 
We are thinking of a Something about which we have no concept at all of how it is in 
itself, but about which we think a relation to the sum total of appearances, which is 
analogous to the relation that appearances have to one another. (A674/B702) 
 
The object in the idea is a mere “Something” (Etwas) that leaves the ground 
of appearances completely undetermined with respect to its attributes—“how 
it is in itself,” or its “inner property” (A675/B703). Thinking such something 
qualifies, instead, the relation between appearances and their unknown 
ground (a : x). This relation can be thought as analogous to the relations 
existing among appearances, namely as an empirical relation (b : c). In other 
words, we can use concepts of the understanding (that have their proper use 
only within the world of sense) to positively characterize the type of relation 
an unknown ground has to objects of sense. This positive characterization is 
 
34 For a critical analysis of philosophical analogies, see Callanan 2017. 
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legitimate because it avoids establishing a similarity between our ideas and 
noumenal objects.35 
These points can be made clearer if we take a closer look at the 
specific idea which concerns us in this chapter: the idea of God. In 
accordance with the general account given above, the idea of God is “the 
idea of something on which all empirical reality grounds its highest and 
necessary unity” (ibid.). If we assume such an idea, we do not attempt a 
description of the inner properties of the noumenal ground of empirical 
reality, but, as Kant says, we “deal satisfactorily with all other questions 
concerning the contingent” and “consider the objects in one complete whole” 
(A676/B704). As Kant puts it, we are presupposing a ground “relatively,” not 
“absolutely” (ibid.). The subtle thought is the following. To assume God as 
the ground of the empirical reality absolutely would mean to apply the 
concepts of the understanding to something outside the world of sense as 
their real or potential determinations: 
 
The concepts of reality, substance, causality, even that of necessity in existence 
have, beyond their use in making possible the empirical cognition of an object, no 
significance at all which might determine the object. (A677/B705) 
 
These concepts only make sense within the empirical world—for explaining 
the possibility of objects of sense. We can, however, still assume the same 
unknown being relatively to the world of sense—as an object in the idea or a 
schema.36 Indeed, since this idea is “unavoidably necessary for 
approximating to the highest possible degree of empirical unity” (A677/B705), 
we must presuppose and realize this idea: 
 
I am not only warranted, but even compelled to realize this idea, i.e., to posit for it an 
actual object, but only as a Something in general with which I am not acquainted at 
all and to which, as a ground of that systematic unity and in relation to that, I give 
 
35 The same points can be found in the Prolegomena: Kant explains that analogical thinking 
allows us to avoid transposing anthropomorphic properties to the highest being, which 
remains “unknown to us”; see Prolegomena, 4:358–9. 
36 See also Prolegomena, 4:359. 
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such properties as are analogous to the concepts of the understanding in its 
empirical use. (A677–8/B705–6) 
 
Here the realization of the idea is strictly conducted for the sake of the 
“greatest possible empirical use of my reason” (ibid.). Since this use is 
necessarily based on the idea of “complete systematic unity,” then I can and 
indeed must posit something that grounds such complete systematic unity—
namely, the idea of God. I can thereby apply concepts of the understanding 
to this something and think it “according to the analogy of realities in the 
world, of substances, causality, and necessity”; A678/B706): as a “being that 
possesses all of these in their highest perfection” (ibid.). This in turn allows 
me to investigate nature as systematically organized in terms of realities, 
substances, causal connections, etc. 
As I showed in this section, Kant does provide a transcendental 
deduction of ideas that licences their objective reality and indirect application 
to objects of sense in the second part of the Appendix. In particular, I showed 
that Kant illustrates a realization of ideas as schemata that is not dialectical, 
but rather legitimate and necessary for the greatest possible empirical use of 
reason. The idea of God is the particular schema that allows the complete 
systematic unity of the world as a whole. We can think this schema only by 
analogically applying our concepts, including that of reality, to it. Now, to 
think God as the being that specifically possesses reality in the highest 
perfection is to think God as the most real being. But what does it mean to 
analogically think God as the ens realissimum? 
 
4. The analogical Ens Realissimum 
In Section 2, I reconstructed the natural progression of reason according to 
which the transcendental principle of thoroughgoing determination 
presupposes the material of all possibility, as the sum total of all predicates 
of things in general. This whole of possibility is then refined to its subset of 





PD → PTD → SUM → OMNITUDO → ENS 
 
Kant is there reconstructing the dialectical steps that lead the metaphysician 
astray. But, as we saw, he also gives important clues on how to critically 
interpret this transcendental principle and its presupposition. Most notably, 
Kant suggests that, with the latter, we are only presupposing an idea which 
can prescribe to the understanding the rule of its complete use. In the final 
paragraphs of the section, he also suggests that the principle could be 
legitimately applied if restricted to the objects of sense. At the same time, 
Kant gives also opposite indications: it seems that the hypostatization itself is 
an illegitimate move and that the whole process can be classified as 
dialectical. These ambiguities have led to interpretative difficulties. There was 
in fact an important element missing and that only the completion of the 
critical business finally provides: the transcendental deduction of the ideas, 
and particularly of the idea of God. Without this element, it is indeed highly 
dubious how an idea can regulate concepts and be transcendental in the 
sense of applying to objects of sense at all. In this section, I contend that the 
transcendental deduction finally warrants a positive use of the ens 
realissimum as it is described at the end of Section Two of the Ideal. 
As I argued, the key step in the natural progression of reason consists 
in the ‘realization’ of the idea: that is, in transforming the idea of the sum total 
of all possibility presupposed by the transcendental principle of complete 
determination into a kind of ‘object,’ which is then hypostatized. We now 
know how to distinguish the dialectical from the correct realization of the 
idea. In the former case, the idea is transformed into the concept of an object 
and the ideal is confused with a condition of possibility of things in general. 
This is the ‘transcendental subreption’ Kant talks about at the end of Section 
Two of the Ideal chapter. By realizing the idea in this way, we illegitimately 
end up using PTD in constitutive terms. But the second kind of realization 
licences instead a perfectly legitimate, regulative use of the same idea and of 
the resulting principle. This realization consists in transforming the idea of the 
sum total (the basis of the ideal) into an object in the idea (or schema): that 
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is, a something which in itself remains unknown to us, and yet we can 
analogically think in accordance with the concepts of our understanding, in 
particular with the concept of reality. We are allowed to do this not in order to 
determine the idea as an object, but in order to ground the complete 
empirical use of the understanding—here specifically understood as the 
complete determination of our concepts of objects of sense. 
One might here object that descriptive readings of the ideas of reason 
already successfully explain the distinction between regulative and 
constitutive uses of the ideas of reason without interpreting ideas as 
analogically thought schemata. As we saw, descriptive readings of ideas 
distinguish between taking ideas as determinations of things in themselves 
(constitutive use of reason) and merely assuming them as such (regulative 
use). Since these assumptions are not claimed to be true of objects, it seems 
that descriptive interpretations avoid transforming ideas into concepts of 
objects. However, I do not find this interpretative strategy entirely successful. 
For even if descriptive readings may avoid taking ideas as concepts of actual 
objects, they still interpret them as potentially descriptive representations. As 
we saw, however, we cannot grant these representations objective validity 
“merely on credit”—consequently, they are just “thought entities” with no valid 
application to objects (see 3.2). But if this is correct, it also follows that we 
cannot use them as regulative principles that necessarily guide our 
investigation of objects of sense. In other words, even if descriptive readings 
may avoid taking ideas in constitutive terms, they still fail to justify their 
regulative use with respect to objects of experience.37 
The relational, analogical reading of ideas finally allows us to 
understand the positive remarks included in the reconstruction of the 
dialectical illusion that make the interpretation of the ideal so difficult to 
discern. At the end of the derivation, Kant says:  
 
 
37 More strongly, Willaschek suggests that interpretations of the ideas of reason as illusory 
presuppositions tacitly rely on the identification of the idea’s objectivity with its being 
constitutive; see Willaschek 2018, 112. 
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It is self-evident that with this aim—namely, solely that of representing the necessary 
thoroughgoing determination of things—reason does not presuppose the existence 
of a being conforming to the ideal, but only the idea of such a being, in order to 
derive from an unconditioned totality of thoroughgoing determination the conditioned 
totality, i.e., that of the limited. (A577–8/B605–6) 
 
The thought here clearly anticipates the deduction given only later in the 
second part of the Appendix. For the idea has objective reality only inasmuch 
as it grounds the thoroughgoing determination of the “conditioned.” 
“Conditioned,” however, is still an ambiguous term: it may refer both to 
empirical and to non-empirical objects. Kant restricts the application to 
empirical objects at the end of the section, where he provides us with the 
source of the natural illusion of PTD. Since we can now separate the 
dialectical from the proper use of reason, we can also positively interpret this 
genealogy without implausibly reading PTD as a principle of the 
understanding. 
As we saw, the illusion is said to result from the insufficiency of the 
formal conditions of possibility of experience. The empirical content of 
appearance has to be given to sensation and represents the condition of 
material possibility of objects of sense. Kant goes on to spell out the new 
version of PTD: 
 
PTD*: “now an object of sense can be thoroughly determined only if it is compared 
with all the predicates of appearance, and is represented through them either 
affirmatively or negatively.” (A581/B609; emphases added) 
 
The principle now states that for every empirical object and every possible 
empirical predicate P, either P or non-P must apply to it. With this restriction 
Kant gives the Leibnizian ideal of complete determination a critical twist. As 
noted by Wood, Kant does maintain the Leibnizian ideal of knowledge of 
objects as complete determination, but the latter is not grounded in 
conceptual analysis anymore. It is now a regulative task of synthesis which is 
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grounded on an idea of reason.38 PTD* is not, therefore, as argued by 
Longuenesse, a principle of the understanding (PTDe). It is instead a 
principle of reason for the complete use of the understanding. The idea on 
which the regulative task of synthesis is grounded is that of a sum total of 
realities in appearance. 
 
SUM*: “nothing is an object for us unless it presupposes the sum total of all empirical 
reality as condition of its possibility.” (A582/B660) 
 
This idea can be critically realized as an object in the idea—that is, as a 
schema for the complete determination of empirical objects. As we saw in the 
previous section, we are compelled to think the relation between objects of 
sense and the ground of their systematic unity in analogical terms. In this 
case, we analogically think what grounds the complete determination of 
objects of sense as the sum total of empirical reality.39 From this SUM*, we 
can further derive an analogical OMNITUDO* as the subset of positive 
empirical reality. Do we need to stop here in the derivation as suggested by 
Longuenesse? Or can we also proceed with a non-dialectical 
hypostatization? I contend that if grounded in a critical, legitimate realization, 
the omnitudo realitatis can also be further hypostatized as an individual ideal 
being, namely as an analogically thought ens realissimum (ENS*): as Kant 
puts it, “an individual thing containing in itself all empirical reality” 
(A582/B610). By doing this, we are not determining an individual being, but 
only thinking it as a schema for the complete use of the understanding. This 
is not only compatible with the admission of a regulative function of the idea 
of God in the theoretical realm, but also specifically confirmed by passages in 
which Kant explicitly assumes the ideal itself as a regulative principle. Kant, 
for instance, says that “the ideal of the highest being is, according to these 
considerations, nothing other than a regulative principle of reason” and that 
“systematic unity of nature cannot be set up as a principle of the empirical 
 
38 See Wood 1978, 41. See also Refl. 6256, 18:533, and Refl. 6290, 18:559. For a non-
regulative reading, cf. Rohs 1978. 
39 It is worth noting that Kant specifies that, strictly speaking, the sum total is to be conceived 
as a ground (A579/B607). 
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use of reason except on the basis of the idea of a most real being as the 
supreme cause” (A619/B647).  
To sum up, the non-dialectical derivation of the ens realissimum 
amounts to: 
 
PD → PTD* → SUM* → OMNITUDO* → ENS* 
 
We start from a merely logical principle of determinability that applies to 
concepts (PD). We then apply PD to empirical objects, thus following PTD*. 
By doing so, we presuppose the regulative idea of a sum total of empirical 
realities (SUM*), which reason further refines into its positive subset 
OMNITUDO* and finally hypostatizes as an ideal individual ENS*. That we 
end up with the illegitimate sequence is due to the fact that we mistake an 
object in the idea (SUM*) for the concept of an object (SUM), and thereby we 
transform a regulative, empirical principle (PTD*) into a constitutive principle 
that determines things in general (PTD).40 From this principle, we then derive 
the entire dialectical, metaphysical progression we saw in Section 2. 
  
5. Other ‘divine’ sources of systematicity  
In the previous section, I suggested that the analogical conception of the ens 
realissimum finally licenses a positive use of the ideal and that such a 
conception is an important component for thinking the whole of empirical 
nature as systematic. I did not suggest, however, that this is the only source 
that explains the relation between the idea of God and systematicity. Against 
readings that explain systematicity exclusively in terms of God as the “wise 
author” (Pasternack 2011) or in terms of “the most real being” (Hoffer 2019), I 
will argue that this relation is multifaceted and complex. Although Kant 
sometimes attempts a unitary presentation of the regulative use of the idea of 
God, I will suggest that this hides several sources and a gradual conception 
of systematicity with different degrees of perfection. As we saw in Section 3, 
 
40 Note that PTD and SUM (as well as their versions*) are simultaneous (when we follow 
PTD, we also presuppose SUM). 
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the concept of reality is only one of the concepts that can be analogically 
applied to the idea of God in order to promote the systematic unity of our 
empirical cognition. Kant elaborates on two other analogical applications of 
concepts as sources of systematicity. 
First, in Section Three of the Ideal chapter, Kant explains that the 
merely speculative origin of the ens realissimum is too evident for reason to 
be persuaded that it is in fact an existing being (see A583–4/B611–2). There 
is, however, another source that urges reason to posit an existing being: the 
demand for an absolutely necessary being. Reason identifies such being with 
the ens realissimum, as the most suitable concept for such a notion of 
existence. Reason does so illegitimately through a not fully justifiable 
abductive inference. Notoriously, Kant goes on to reject the two 
transcendental proofs of the existence of God (the Ontological and 
Cosmological proofs). After this rejection, he purports to show the origin of 
the “dialectical but natural illusion” that leads us to “realize and hypostatize” 
the concepts of necessity and highest reality (A615/B643). 
It is worth noting that the pattern Kant follows in this explanation is the 
same we find at the end of Section Two of the Ideal. Again, there is a natural 
illusion that leads us to metaphysical errors—with the difference that here 
Kant specifically deals with the idea of necessary existence and, 
subsequently, with the combination of necessary existence and reality (see 
A619–20/B647–8). The non-dialectical, critical reading of the argument reads 
as follows: “in going back to the conditions of existing I can never complete 
the existing without assuming a necessary being, but I can never begin with 
this being” (A616/B644). 
Kant is here spelling out the regulative function of the idea of God in 
accordance with the concept of ‘necessity in existence.’ On the one hand, 
one should investigate nature under the presupposition of an “imagined first 
ground” with respect to everything that exists (ibid.). On the other, this is only 
an analogical application of the empirical concept ‘necessity’ to the 
unknowable ground of existing appearances. The analogy does not attempt 
to determine this ground but only allows us to pursue systematic unity in the 
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investigation of nature. In particular, such an assumption has a fundamental 
twofold function: by positing an ideal necessary being, (i.) it urges the further 
derivations of empirical relations among contingent objects. But since such a 
ground is only an idea that cannot be related to any object, (ii.) it also 
impedes any kind of transcendent explanations in science. In other words, 
the analogical application of the concept ‘necessity’ to the idea of God 
promotes the empirical investigation of nature without, however, succumbing 
to any form of “empirical complacency”: 41 the idea that empirical 
explanations are complete and need no further derivation. 
Second, as anticipated, systematicity ‘comes in degree’ for Kant and 
the concepts of reality and necessary existence do not exhaust its meaning. 
Kant in the second part of the Appendix talks about “the greatest systematic 
unity” (A694/B722) and the “highest formal unity” (A686/B714), which is 
generally equated with the “purposive” (“zweckmäßig”) order of nature 
(A694/B723). This degree of systematicity corresponds to the transition from 
a mere classificatory order of things to a teleological ordering thereof—the 
one that represents the starting point for the third, equally fallacious, proof of 
the existence of God: the Physico-theological proof. Such an order would 
presuppose what Kant calls the “highest intelligence” of reason or intellectus 
archetypus (A695/B723). The closest Kant gets to explaining the relation 
between systematicity and purposiveness in the First Critique is the 
important footnote at the end of the Ideal. After being realized and 
hypostatized:  
 
[The ideal of God] through a natural progress of reason in the completion of unity, it 
is even personified; for the regulative unity of experience rests not on appearances 
themselves (of sensibility alone), but on the connection of its manifold by 
understanding (in one apperception); hence the unity of the highest reality and the 
thoroughgoing determinability (possibility) of all things seems to lie in a highest 
understanding, hence in an intelligence. (A697/B725) 
 
 
41 To borrow Zuckert’s expression (Zuckert 2017, 105). 
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The regulative unity of experience requires not just a unity of appearances, 
but their connection under intellectual rules. The unity of the highest reality is 
thereby thought as lying in an analogical highest understanding, or 
intelligence. Is this characterization permissible somehow in the critical 
framework? Kant is aware that this might be a thorny issue and explicitly 
asks himself the question: 
 
Can we nevertheless assume a unique wise and all-powerful world author? Without 
any doubt; and not only that, but we must presuppose such a being. (A697/B725) 
 
Kant’s explanation of the answer is again modelled upon the transcendental 
deduction of ideas. By personifying the idea of God, we are not overstepping 
the boundaries of experience. As Kant says, this idea is “by no means 
related directly to a being different from the world,” but it is employed as a 
schema for the “world’s systematic unity” (A697/B725). Again, we are only 
presupposing a ‘something’ that remains in itself unknown to us—something 
that, however, must be presupposed in relation to the systematic unity of 
nature and analogically thought in accordance with the “empirical concept” of 
intelligence (ibid.). By doing this, we are not determining an object outside of 
the world, but we are only thinking “a being in the idea” (“ein Wesen in der 
Idee”; A698/B726).42 
This final step of the progression of reason is particularly important for 
it permits us to fully exploit the analogical resources of our reason for the 
benefit of the “greatest systematic unity.” This greatest systematic unity, Kant 
says, is “the school and even the ground of the possibility of the greatest use 
of human reason” and therefore this idea is “legislative for us” (ibid. and 
A695/B723). Indeed, when Kant exposes the regulative use of reason, he 
often refers just to this characterization. It has thereby been claimed that the 
personification of the “wise author” is the fundamental characterization in 
order to understand the relation between God and systematicity (cf., e.g., 
 
42 As Kant also puts is, we are thinking “how we ought to use” the idea of highest intelligence 




Pasternack 2011). Others, for example Allison, have instead downplayed the 
importance of this step as nothing but an “icing on the cake” (cf. Allison 2004, 
440). Neither of the two positions seems to me fully correct. Personification is 
an important second-order analogical characterization, which is, however, 
not strictly necessary for the classificatory systematicity of nature. It is 
instead required for attaining the greatest use of our reason and “opening up” 
for it the possibility of teleologically connecting phenomena (A687/B715).  
 
6. Conclusion 
Let me conclude this chapter with a brief summary of the conception of God 
we have obtained so far and its overall usefulness to empirical investigation. 
First of all, the account I presented does not claim to be exhaustive. I limited 
my analysis to the characterizations of God Kant explicitly formulates in 
regulative terms. This, however, does not mean that we cannot analogically 
employ, for instance, the concepts of ‘cause’ or ‘substance’ to promote the 
greatest empirical use of reason. Indeed, the transcendental deduction 
openly admits that this is possible. It is important to point out, however, that 
all these analogical characterizations are legitimate, if correctly understood, 
and together explain the relation between the idea of God, as a mere 
schema, and the different degrees of systematic unity we need to 
presuppose when we investigate nature.  
As we saw, in all these positive characterizations of the idea of God 
the same terminological and theoretical machinery is at stake. Although ideal 
representations cannot be directly related to objects, they can be critically 
realized and obtain indirect objective reality. The idea is critically realized 
when it is presupposed as an “object in the idea,” or a “schema” for the 
systematization of empirical cognition. This corresponds, in the case of God, 
to presuppose an imagined ground of the systematic unity of the whole of 
nature. This ground is an unknown something that remains undetermined by 
the concepts of the understanding. However, since such a ground is 
necessary for promoting the empirical investigation of nature, we are 
compelled to think it in analogical terms. ‘Ens realissimum,’ ‘necessity in 
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existence,’ ‘highest intelligence’ are all examples of analogically thought 
concepts that do not attempt to describe the unknown ground of 
systematicity, but rather give us indispensable rules to investigate nature. 
This analogical conception finally explains how the idea of God, despite 
being “removed” from the objects of sense, is not detached from them and 












































1. Introduction: unity, pluralism, and perspectivism 
The unity of science thesis (‘monism’)—the idea that unity plays an 
important, if not crucial, role in the investigation of nature—has been severely 
criticized from many quarters in recent decades.1 Only a small minority of 
philosophers of science would now defend the once popular metaphysical 
claim that science is a unified system which is supposed to reflect the unity of 
nature.2 Setting here aside metaphysical questions regarding the unity of 
nature and its correspondence to scientific representations, critics have 
further argued that unity is not a welcome hypothesis even from a purely 
epistemic point of view. It is on the latter point of view—in particular, with 
respect to scientific theorizing3—that I will focus my attention in this chapter. 
Dupré, Cartwright, Chang, and many others have in different ways 
argued that unity is not a desirable epistemic requirement in the actual 
practice of how most of scientific research is conducted. For instance, Dupré 
1996 has argued that theoretical unity is socially and politically undesirable; 
Chang 2012 that it is such an unreachable requirement that we are better off 
not looking for unitary theories. Even more radically, it has been argued that 
such a thesis would detrimentally affect science as it would lead us to 
privilege systematic considerations over more valuable empirical evidence 
(see Cartwright 1999). Such accounts are undoubtedly persuasive. It is 
uncontroversial that the present state of scientific theorizing is characterized 
by a plurality of models, theories, and classifications, each revealing different 
aspects of phenomena. Pluralism—the view that phenomena cannot be 
 
1 Early criticism of the unity of science thesis can be found in Suppes 1978. More recent 
criticism in Dupré 1996, Cartwright 1999, and Chang 2012, discussed below. 
2 Proponents of this claim include, e.g., Paul Oppenheim and Hilary Putnam; see their paper, 
“The Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis” (1958). 
3 I use ‘scientific theorizing’ to refer to the construction and employment of theories in 
science, broadly construed. 
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completely explained by a single theory and, instead, require a plurality of 
theoretical approaches for their investigation—seems the meta-scientific 
principle that is best suited to guide scientific research.4 
There is a plurality of views about scientific pluralisms and the 
description I offer here is only a primer to a much complex topic. But what all 
pluralists seem to agree on is that the plurality of approaches that currently 
characterizes most areas of scientific investigation does not necessarily 
represent a “deficiency” of science (Kellert et al. 2006, x). A recent and 
influential account—‘perspectivism’ or ‘perspectival realism’ (Rueger 2005, 
Giere 2006a, Teller 2011, Massimi 2018)—felicitously captures and 
motivates this aspect of pluralism. Multiple approaches and theories are 
nothing but different perspectives from which we investigate phenomena. 
Given our epistemic limitations—the point of view we occupy—science is 
perspectival through and through.  
According to Giere’s perspectivism, not only is scientific observation 
perspectival because of the limited sensitivity of the instruments we use 
(partiality of the input, non-transparency of the instrument), scientific 
theorizing (from data models to scientific principles) is perspectival too: 
“Newton’s laws characterize the classical mechanical perspective; Maxwell’s 
laws characterize the classical electromagnetic perspective; the Schrödinger 
Equation characterizes a quantum mechanical perspective” and so on (Giere 
2006a, 14). As noted by Massimi, while Giere’s perspectivism focuses on 
historical considerations, other types of perspectivism, like the one 
advocated by Rueger 2005 and Teller 2011, privilege the cultural 
situatedness of our knowledge over the historical one (see Massimi 2018, 
168–9). As a result, they focus on the synchronic coexistence of different 
theories rather than on their development over time. While there are 
significant disanalogies between the two forms of perspectivism, they both 
share the insight that our epistemic limitations fundamentally condition the 
possibility of scientific knowledge. In both cases, the plurality of approaches 
 
4 For the distinction between plurality and pluralism, see Kellert et al. 2006, ix–x. 
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is not to be regarded as a defect of our knowledge. It is instead the inevitable 
result of the epistemic situation we occupy. 
If we accept that pluralism characterizes the way we need to think 
about nature, there seems to be no room left for a principle of unity in 
science. Indeed, as I will show in the next section, most pluralists (within and 
outside perspectivism) reject monism as a valuable epistemic principle in 
science. Such rejection, however, raises a number of concerns: Does the 
acceptance of pluralism inevitably entail the exclusion of unity from a purely 
epistemic point of view? Is pluralism sufficient as the only epistemic principle 
guiding scientific research? Isn’t it possible to redefine scientific pluralism 
and monism as non-conflictual principles? In the remainder of this chapter, I 
will try to address these questions and suggest a reconciling solution. I will 
first problematize the contemporary understanding of the relation between 
unity and pluralism in science (Section 2); I will then look at a perspectival 
approach to the problem Kant’s presents in the Critique of Pure Reason 
(Section 3); finally, I will try to explain how Kant’s perspectivism might inspire 
the current debate (Section 4). 
 
2. Unity vs. pluralism: an ‘antinomy’ that awaits a solution? 
The debate between pluralism and unity I briefly introduced in the previous 
section seems to present us with two mutually exclusive epistemic principles. 
Scientific research should be guided either by a pluralistic principle or by a 
postulated unity of scientific cognition. Since pluralism has proven to be 
empirically more suited to scientific research, one should fully endorse it and 
reject monism. I contend that such incompatibility is not the inevitable upshot 
of two contradictory principles. Rather, it results from a misleading 
characterization of these very principles. As I will argue, pluralism and 
monism can and, indeed, must coexist and complement each other in 
scientific research. 
Let’s first try to better qualify the conflict between pluralism and 
monism in the current debate. As previously mentioned, pluralism comes in 
different varieties. I will here focus on the variety of pluralism proposed by 
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Kellert, Longino, and Waters in their programmatic volume on scientific 
pluralism, namely “empirical pluralism,” or the “pluralist stance” (Kellert et al. 
2006, xiii). This version of pluralism is meant to avoid the limits of weaker 
and stronger formulations of pluralism, while remaining representative of 
most pluralist takes. Empirical pluralism amounts to a “commitment to avoid 
reliance on monist assumptions in interpretation or evaluation coupled with 
an openness to the ineliminability of multiplicity in some scientific contexts” 
(ibid.). With respect to scientific theorizing, this definition implies: i. 
(negatively) that an empirical pluralist should not rely on any monist 
assumption while elaborating scientific theories; and ii. (positively) that an 
empirical pluralist is open to the possibility of a persistent multiplicity of 
incompatible, yet explanatory, theories describing phenomena. 
As can be seen, the incompatibility with monism is built into the very 
definition of empirical pluralism. But what kind of monism should a pluralist 
avoid? As Kellert, Longino, and Waters put it, scientific monism is the view 
that “the ultimate aim of a science is to establish a single, complete, and 
comprehensive account of the natural world” (ibid., x). Crucially, scientific 
monism assumes that “the nature of the world is such that it can, at least in 
principle, be completely described or explained by such an account” (ibid.). 
Scientific monism is therefore defined as a metaphysical thesis about the 
nature of the world. Pluralists do not, however, support the opposite 
metaphysical claim. Instead, they argue that whether such theories might be 
unified is an “open, empirical question” (ibid.). I side with pluralists in thinking 
that unity cannot be simply stated as a metaphysical truth about the nature of 
the world. But I want to problematize the resulting rejection of monism as 
such. If we rule out unity as a metaphysical truth, does this mean that it 
cannot still play an important role from an epistemic point of view? 
I suggest that empirical pluralism, as the sole epistemic principle 
guiding scientific research, is, at the same time, both too strong and too weak 
a requirement. It is too strong for it does not fully account for the process of 
unification existing in science: history provides us with brilliant cases of 
theory unification (Einstein’s special theory of relativity is paradigmatic in this 
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sense) and there are fields, like fundamental physics, in which unification still 
plays a significant and programmatic function (e.g., in the quest for a theory 
of ‘everything’ that unifies the four fundamental forces). It is true that 
pluralists do not deny the possibility of unification—they treat it as an open 
question—, but the process of theory unification remains epistemically 
unexplained. If we commit ourselves to avoid monist assumptions, how could 
we even attempt to unify theories in the first place? The empirical pluralist’s 
reply that evidence should guide us is clearly ill-equipped to provide a 
satisfactory answer. Empirical evidence is exactly what prompts pluralism, 
and it is unclear how it can lead us to unificatory hypotheses without relying 
on a different set of assumptions. Indeed, theory unification is rarely possible 
on experimental grounds alone—the construction of the electroweak theory 
being a clear example of such evidential insufficiency for unification.5 
Furthermore, a pluralistic programme which is merely satisfied with a 
plurality of approaches and strategies seems also too weak a principle. For it 
does not really address the question of how scientific research ought to be 
done. Shall we regard the multiple approaches and theories presently 
available as the definitive ones? Or shall we look for ever finer-grained 
descriptions and explanations? An empirical principle of pluralism leaves us 
with no definite answer to such concerns. Indeed, since it rests content with 
any given plurality of theories, it seems insufficient to express the very 
pluralistic urge that motivates it.  
Some pluralists have come to explore the possibility of complementing 
pluralism with some weaker—metaphysically uncommitted—forms of 
monism. Giere’s perspectivism is emblematic in this respect. Although 
perspectivism is the pluralistic view that there is a plurality of legitimate 
historically (or culturally) motivated perspectives on phenomena, Giere 
recognizes that there are cases in which it is indeed recommendable to unify 
perspectives into larger points of view. What we need to do is not to 
introduce a metaphysical doctrine of the unity of the world. We need instead 
to complement perspectivism with a mere “methodological presumption,” 
 
5 See, e.g., Morrison 2008, 49. 
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according to which “we presume there is a unique causal structure to the 
world” (Giere 2006a, 34; see also 2006b, 36). Importantly, this should not be 
regarded as a necessary requirement of our reasoning: it is an additional 
desideratum of our scientific practice that might lead us to further 
unifications. As Giere puts it:  
From a perspectival point of view, one need not be too upset with the current 
situation in theoretical physics. Good theoretical science does not require finding 
genuinely universal principles. Well-fitting models, based on a variety of principles, 
are good enough. And, indeed, that is all that can be found across most of the 
sciences. (Giere 2006b, 33) 
The picture here suggested is of a self-sufficient epistemic principle of 
pluralism that may be complemented by a principle of unity at a higher level 
of inquiry. In other words, the two epistemic principles are compatible at 
different levels: while pluralism is necessary for scientific research as such, 
monism might turn out to be a useful methodological maxim when it comes to 
particularly ambitious scientific projects. I will argue, however, that the 
compatibility between pluralism and monism does not merely concern the 
possibility of further unification in science. Further unification is, as it were, 
the tip of the iceberg of a larger problem. Unification, I suggest, is an on-
going process that is ubiquitous at any level of science and is implied even at 
the level of the pluralistic image of models.  
The self-sufficiency of pluralism, even at the ‘basic’ level of science, is 
indeed questionable. Take two standard examples of ‘perspectives’ in the 
history of science: Newton’s theory of motion and Maxwell’s theory of 
electromagnetism. It is difficult not to see these two perspectives as 
themselves instances of unification. Newton’s theory famously unified 
celestial and terrestrial mechanics. Maxwell’s theory brought together 
electromagnetism and optics. Both theories (despite being ultimately 
incompatible) showed that different phenomena can be successfully unified 
with each other. More generally, to do without a principle of unity at the basic 
level of science would be to discourage the very process of theory 
construction, namely the hypothetical subsumption of different phenomena 
 81 
under general, abstract principles. To quote Giere’s own example, it would 
require “something like concluding that different samples of the same 
radioactive isotope had different half-lives and that no further explanation of 
this difference was possible” (Giere 2006a, 34–5). This example clearly goes 
a bit further than showing that a mere desideratum of unity might be added to 
a self-sufficient principle of pluralism. It seems to suggest, instead, that 
unification—as a methodological rule—is an epistemic principle that 
necessarily complements pluralism even at the basic level of scientific 
inquiry. 
There seems to be no contemporary account that offers promising 
solutions to this debate. But following Kitcher 1999 and Breitenbach and Choi 
2017, I submit that a solution can be inspired by Kant’s account of theoretical 
reason in scientific cognition. Rather than presenting a loosely Kantian-
inspired interpretation of the role of unity in science, however, I will look into 
Kant’s text to see whether it directly offers arguments that may be used in the 
current debate.6 Crucially, although Kant is generally presented as a strong 
advocate of the unity of science thesis, I will argue that Kant’s conception of 
systematic unity contains—perhaps surprisingly—compelling remarks on the 
compatibility between unification and pluralism in the space of reason. 
“Insightful men”—Kant notes at the end of the first part of the Appendix to the 
Transcendental Dialectic— are “in conflict with one another” as to whether 
they should follow a “maxim of the manifoldness of nature” or the one “of the 
unity of nature” in empirical investigations (A667/B695). As I will explain, the 
incompatibility between these two maxims results from an apparent 
‘antinomy’ of reason: the antinomy, however, soon disappears as we 
recognize the principles that ground the maxims as regulative principles 
 
6 Kitcher presents a Kantian-inspired ‘modest unificationism’ that tolerates multiple accounts, 
but still aims to reduce their number. Inspired by Kant’s notion of systematic unity, 
Breitenbach and Choi 2017 make a convincing case that the unavoidable plurality of 
accounts should not discourage our attempt to integrate them in a unified system. While my 
paper greatly benefits from both these contributions, I will present Kant’s systematic unity not 
merely as an ideal of unification but as a conceptual space that results from both unification 
and pluralism. 
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rather than opposed objective insights. As such, Kant says, “these maxims 
can of course be united” (ibid.).  
In particular, I suggest that an interesting variation on perspectivism 
can be found in Kant’s conception of reason.7 While standard perspectivism 
focuses on the plurality of observational points of view, Kant’s ‘perspectivism’ 
privileges the common space within which different perspectives can be 
taken up. Kant’s space of reason is a place where plurality and unity can and 
indeed must coexist with each other as principles, or ‘axes,’ that are both 
essential to scientific theorizing. In the following section, I will elaborate on 
what I take to be the three crucial features of Kant’s perspectivism (i. ideas 
as foci imaginarii; ii. plurality of points of view; iii. the unified space of 
reason). In the final section, after some clarification on the difference 
between Kant’s treatment of the problem and the contemporary debate, I will 
explain how Kant’s perspectivism might enlighten the discussion.   
 
3. Kant’s perspectival space of reason 
 
3.1 The regulative function of reason 
Kant addresses the problem of the systematic unity of our empirical cognition 
in the very much debated Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic in the 
Critique of Pure Reason.8 In the Appendix Kant finally presents the long-
promised positive use of reason and its ideas. Ideas are “deceptive” and 
“transcendent” when they are mistaken for “concepts of real things” 
(A643/B671). The Transcendental Dialectic shows that when we treat mere 
ideas as such—when, for example, we treat the idea of God as that of an 
object and we even attempt to demonstrate its existence—reason inevitably 
oversteps the boundaries of possible experience. Ideas, however, do retain a 
“good” and “immanent” use when directed not toward objects, but towards 
the faculty that, in Kant’s architectonic, directly has to do with objects, namely 
 
7 A similar proposal (with respect to realism in science) can be found in Massimi 2017a, 
forthcoming. This paper is, however, non-committal to the realism of scientific theories and 
focuses instead on the epistemic features of perspectivism. 
8 Particularly in its first part (A642/B670–A668/B696). 
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the faculty of the understanding, or the faculty of concepts (see A126). 
Reason, in its positive use, is therefore presented as a second-order faculty. 
While the understanding has to do with objects, reason, as Kant puts it, 
“does not create any concepts (of objects) but only orders them and gives 
them that unity which they can have in their greatest possible extension, i.e., 
in relation to the totality of the series” (A643/B671). As a result, in Kant’s 
terminology, the employment of reason cannot be constitutive as that of the 
understanding. The concepts of the understanding constitute the objects of 
experience, but reason, as we saw, is further removed from objects. Reason 
maintains, however, an important regulative function: that of guiding the 
activity of the understanding by ordering its particular concepts. 
From these two closely related features of reason (its being a second-
order faculty and having a regulative use) it would seem that its contribution 
to empirical cognition is a useful tool, or, at best a welcome desideratum.9 
Kant’s point would be similar to that of those pluralists who are willing to 
concede some role to unification in science. Although pluralism has proven to 
be efficacious in most cases, we might keep a methodological principle in 
favour of unity. Good science—they argue—does not require unity, yet we 
might desire or even look for higher forms of unification in some specific 
cases. A weak principle of unity is all that pluralist science may at best need. 
However, I contend that this is not a good depiction of Kant’s position, and 
further, that Kant has good reasons to think about unity and pluralism in a 
different way. Reasons that—as I will show in the last section—can be 
applied to the current debate (with some caveats). Importantly, Kant 
characterizes the regulative use of reason not just as desirable or useful, but 
as “an excellent and indispensably necessary” one (A644/B672). As 
emphasized by Massimi, this indispensably necessary use is clearly 
presented in ‘perspectival’ (and ‘optical’) terms (see Massimi 2017a, 
forthcoming). Let’s take a closer look at the Appendix in order to understand 
 
9 E.g., Guyer 1990 has famously argued for this position: “systematicity is not a factor which 
enters into understanding’s constitution of empirical knowledge itself, but only an additional 
desideratum which reason seeks to find or construct in the empirical knowledge produced by 
understanding” (28). 
 84 
what kind of perspectivism is here at stake. I contend that Kant’s 
perspectivism is best described by the following three main features. 
 
3.2 First perspectival feature: ideas as foci imaginarii  
The first perspectival feature of Kant’s account of reason has already 
attracted considerable attention in the literature. Kant presents the necessary 
function of ideas of reason in clear optical terms. Drawing upon optical 
treatises of his time, Kant defines the ideas of reason as foci imaginarii 
(imaginary standpoints) for the rules of the understanding. 
[Transcendental ideas] have an excellent and indispensably necessary regulative 
use, namely that of directing the understanding to a certain goal respecting which 
the lines of direction of all its rules converge at one point, which, although it is only 
an idea (focus imaginarius)—i.e., a point from which the concepts of the 
understanding do not really proceed, since it lies entirely outside the bounds of 
possible experience—nonetheless still serves to obtain for these concepts the 
greatest unity alongside the greatest extension. (A644/B672) 
In describing ideas as imaginary standpoints, Kant is presumably referring to 
the VIII axiom of the first book of Newton’s Opticks (1st edition 1704).10 It is 
worth comparing the Kantian example with its source. 
 
 
10 See, e.g., Grier 2001, 37, and Allison 2004, 425. Massimi forthcoming notes that Kant 
does not mention Newton in the Appendix nor in the Dreams of a Spirit-Seer (1766) where 
the metaphor appears for the first time. She then argues that Kant’s source is actually 
Descartes’s Treatise on Man (which Kant did mention in 1766). While it is plausible that Kant 
inherited the metaphor from Descartes, I also maintain that Kant was at least partly inspired 
by Newton’s Opticks. In the Dreams, just after mentioning the focus imaginarius for the first 
time, Kant explains this analogy by using the example of an object reflected by a concave 
mirror—interestingly, the same image appears in the second part of the VIII axiom (see 
Newton 1952, 19, and Dreams, 2:344). Furthermore, as I will argue below, the ‘optical 
illusion’ Kant is talking about perfectly matches Newton’s description of the illusion occurring 
when an object is reflected by a mirror. 
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Figure 1. Illustration of the VIII Axiom, from Newton's Opticks (4th edition, 1730)11 
 
According to the VIII axiom, an object (A) reflected by a mirror (mn) appears 
to be in the place (a) from where all the rays diverge towards the observer.12 
As the focal point (a) unifies all reflected lines and guides the eyes of the 
observer, ideas of reason unify the manifold of concepts and guide the 
understanding. Kant illustrates this use of reason with a number of examples 
taken from a variety of scientific disciplines: chemistry (“pure earth,” “pure 
water,” and “pure air”; A646/B674), psychology (“fundamental power”; 
A649/B677), astronomy (planetary motion; A663/B691), physics 
(“gravitation”; A663/B691), and biology (“hereditary distinctions between 
families”; A667/B695). In each of these cases, reason projects an idea in 
 
11 Reprinted in Newton 1952. Permission to reproduce the image granted by Dover 
Publications. 
12 “AX. VIII. An Object seen by Reflexion or Refraction, appears in that place from whence 
the Rays after their last Reflexion or Refraction diverge in falling on the Spectator’s Eye. If 
the Object A be seen by Reflexion of a Looking-glass mn, it shall appear, not in its proper 
place A, but behind the Glass at a, from whence any Rays AB, AC, AD, which flow from one 
and the same Point of the Object, do after their Reflexion made in the Points B, C, D, 
diverge in going from the Glass to E, F, G, where they are incident on the Spectator’s Eyes. 
For these Rays do make the same Picture in the bottom of the Eyes as if they had come 
from the Object really placed at a without the Interposition of the Looking-glass; and all 
Vision is made according to the place and shape of that Picture” (Newton 1952, 18). 
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order to bestow unity upon the particular cognitions of the understanding. In 
projecting ideas, however, reason runs the risk of taking them as concepts of 
real objects. But as we saw, ideas cannot be regarded as concepts of 
objects. As Kant explains: 
Now of course it is from this that there arises the deception, as if these lines of direc-
tion were shot out from an object lying outside the field of possible empirical 
cognition (just as objects are seen behind the surface of a mirror); yet this illusion 
(which can be prevented from deceiving) is nevertheless indispensably necessary if 
besides the objects before our eyes we want to see those that lie far in the 
background, i.e., when, in our case, the understanding wants to go beyond every 
given experience (beyond this part of the whole of possible experience), and hence 
wants to take the measure of its greatest possible and uttermost extension. (A644–
5/B672–3; my emphases) 
What is the optical “illusion” Kant is referring to? Newton’s axiom may help us 
answering this question. The object (A), which is placed behind the observer 
(and thus outside her visual field), appears to be in front of her (that is 
“behind the surface of a mirror”; mn), in the place a. The illusion is thus 
created by the fact that the reflected image is almost identical to the vision 
we would have if A were really placed in a.13 This seems to be exactly the 
optical phenomenon Kant uses in order to explain the ideal ‘vision.’ The rays 
between mn and a represent the illusion that enables the observer to extend 
the visual field from the space between her and the mirror (given experience: 
EB, FC, GD) to the space between the mirror and A (possible experience: 
AB, AC, AD). The illusion deceives the observer when she mistakes what is 
merely a focal point (a; an idea) for a real object (A; an actual object).14 By 
doing so, she turns a mere regulative principle into an unwarranted 
metaphysical principle. Reason, however, can fully recognize the nature of 
ideas as projections and use them to orient the concepts of the 
understanding. It thereby becomes critical: it can eliminate the error and 
legitimately hope to extend its visual field. 
 
13 The image is still reversed in the direction perpendicular to the mirror surface. 
14 This positive ‘illusion,’ as it were, is not really illusory or deceitful. As such, it must be 
distinguished from ‘transcendental illusion.’ I discuss this distinction in Chapter 1. 
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Let’s take stock here. While the perspectival nature of the ideas of 
reason as focal points should be clearer now, the status of necessity 
attached to them may still raise some perplexity. For Kant seems to 
formulate such necessity in hypothetical terms: we need to employ ideas only 
if we want to go beyond given experience and attain the greatest unity of 
cognition. Does this mean that the regulative function of ideas is a mere 
additional desideratum of science? In other words, are ideas ‘necessary’ only 
when we look for ‘higher’ unifications? I contend that this is not the case. 
Indeed, Kant presents this use of reason as hypothetical—but it would be a 
mistake to read it as a mere afterthought of scientific inquiry. Kant says: 
If reason is the faculty of deriving the particular from the universal, then: Either the 
universal is in itself certain and given, and only judgment is required for subsuming, 
and the particular is necessarily determined through it. This I call the ‘apodictic’ use 
of reason. Or the universal is assumed only problematically, and it is a mere idea, 
the particular being certain while the universality of the rule for this consequent is still 
a problem; then several particular cases, which are all certain, are tested by the rule, 
to see if they flow from it, and in the case in which it seems that all the particular 
cases cited follow from it, then the universality of the rule is inferred, including all 
subsequent cases, even those that are not given in themselves. This I will call the 
‘hypothetical’ use of reason. (A646–7/B674–5) 
Reason can be used either apodictically or hypothetically. In the former case, 
the universal is given and the particular is determined through it; in the latter, 
the particular is given but the universality of its rule is only projected as a 
“problematic concept”—i.e., as an idea.15 Now, to say that the hypothetical 
use of reason is only necessary for higher unities of empirical cognition 
would mean to say that at least some universal concepts are given to us in 
experience through concepts of the understanding and empirical intuitions—
 
15 Importantly, this does not mean that ideas themselves are to be understood as 
‘hypotheses’ that can be true of nature. If this were the case, ideas would be mistakenly 
used as concepts of objects. Rather, I take Kant to mean that the hypothetical use of ideas is 
necessary to generate empirical hypotheses. For example, the idea of fundamental power is 
not itself an empirical hypothesis, but it is necessary to generate the hypothetical, empirical 
concepts of fundamental powers—what Kant calls ‘comparatively fundamental’ powers. I 
criticize the hypothetical reading of ideas in Chapter 1, and I elaborate on how ideas 
contribute to the formation of empirical concepts in Chapter 4.  
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in other words, from experience.16 But can we obtain something like 
universality or apodictic certainty from experience? Kant is quite clear that 
this is not the case:  
Empirical concepts, together with that on which they are grounded, empirical 
intuition, cannot yield any synthetic proposition except one that is also merely 
empirical, i.e., a proposition of experience; thus it can never contain necessity and 
absolute universality […] No universally valid, let alone apodictic proposition could 
ever come from empirical intuition: for experience can never provide anything of this 
sort. (A47–8/B64–5) 
As Kant affirms here and elsewhere, experience can never yield any kind of 
“necessary and apodictic propositions” (A721/B749) for all empirical 
cognitions are confronted with the problem of induction. If the universal is 
never given in experience, then it must be postulated for any empirical 
concept in accordance with the ideas of reason. The Appendix teaches us 
that we can employ regulative ideas in order to extend the rule that we infer 
from given particular cases to all possible experience: this use of reason 
necessarily contributes to the formation of any universal empirical concept.17 
And since scientific cognition has to do with such concepts, it also follows 
that the regulative use of reason is necessary to transform any given 
experience into scientific knowledge. 
Kant presents the ideas projected by reason in its hypothetical use as 
perspectival focal points of unity. This function of reason—which Kant later in 
the text also calls the “logical principle of genera” (A654/B682) or of 
“homogeneity” (A658/B686)—is regulative, yet indispensable. It is regulative 
because reason is farther removed from objects and ideas cannot stand for 
actual things. In other words, it is not a metaphysical principle that constitutes 
nature as objectively unitary. Nevertheless, reason’s principle of unity 
 
16 It is worth noting that, for Kant, all concepts are universal (“in kind, all concepts are 
universal and can always hold of other things in a certain way”; see Vienna, 24:909. 
Empirical concepts are no exception. Kant often uses ‘empirical concept,’ ‘common concept’ 
and ‘universal concept’ interchangeably in his lectures on logic: see, e.g., Blomberg, 24:269. 
In the Appendix, Kant also reminds that “each species is always a concept that contains 
within itself only what is common to different things” (A655/B683). 
17 See Chapter 4 for a detailed analysis of empirical concepts formation. 
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necessarily regulates the conceptualization activity of the understanding. In 
particular, it projects the unity and universality of given particulars, thus 
enabling the formulation of empirical concepts: an activity which is an integral 
part of science. 
 
3.3 Second perspectival feature: plurality of points of view  
The characterization of ideas as focal points might incline us to think that, for 
Kant, there is as much science as there is unity. This is, however, only one 
side of the story. Kant’s theory of theoretical reason includes a principle of 
unity but is not limited to that. As Kant puts it: 
To the logical principle of genera there is opposed another, namely that of species, 
which needs manifoldness and variety in things despite their agreement under the 
same genus, and prescribes to the understanding that it be no less attentive to 
variety than to agreement. This principle (of discrimination, or of the faculty of 
distinguishing) severely limits the rashness of the first principle (of wit). (A654/B682; 
my emphases) 
The principle of “species” (“variety”; A657/B685; or “specification”; 
A658/B686) prescribes to look for variety in things despite their being unified 
under the same genus. I propose to look at this principle as the second 
perspectival feature of Kant’s theory of reason. While the first feature tells us 
that ideas are focal points of unification, this second principle limits the first 
one and prescribes to specify each concept in a plurality of points of view.  
If this is correct, I contend that Kant’s principle of specification is 
similar enough to contemporary empirical pluralism to draw an interesting 
comparison between the respective cases. Recall that empirical pluralism 
has a negative part (i. avoidance of monist assumptions) and a positive part 
(ii. admission of plurality of accounts). As concerns i., to follow the principle 
of specification does imply avoiding monist assumptions. One may take 
Kant’s principle of specification to be subordinated to the principle of unity (as 
a species is subordinated to its genus). But note that Kant’s principle of 
specification is more radical than that: 
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Here reason shows two interests that conflict with each other: on the one side, an 
interest in the domain (universality) in regard to genera, on the other an interest in 
content (determinacy) in respect of the manifoldness of species; for in the first case 
the understanding thinks much under its concepts, while in the second it thinks all 
the more in them. This expresses itself in the very different ways of thinking among 
students of nature; some of whom (who are chiefly speculative) are hostile to 
differences in kind, while others (chiefly empirical minds) constantly seek to split 
nature into so much manifoldness that one would almost have to give up the hope of 
judging its appearances according to general principles. (A654–5/B682–3) 
While unification universalizes the domain of a concept, this second principle 
tells us to find variety in the content of a concept. Specification does not 
merely express the subordination of species under genera, but it directly 
opposes to unification inasmuch as it disunifies the content of any universal 
concept. In Kant’s words, “chiefly empirical minds” do not simply specify a 
given unitary concept into species and subspecies, but they “split nature into 
so much manifoldness that one would almost have to give up the hope of 
judging its appearances according to general principles.” The two principles 
therefore result in interests that conflict with each other—a conflict that 
seems very much alive even today.  
What about the positive requirement of admitting multiple accounts of 
phenomena (ii. above)? Here there seems to be a difference for, while Kant’s 
principle results in the specification of particular phenomena, a contemporary 
pluralist welcomes different accounts of phenomena. Let’s take a typical 
example of contemporary pluralism: the concept of species. There are 
different concepts of species: the biological species concept (based on 
interbreeding), the phylogenetic species concept (based on ancestry), the 
ecological species concept (based on ecological niches), etc. Pluralists think 
there is no best account of ‘species’ and all these concepts are legitimate 
representations of particular aspects of the complex ‘species’ phenomenon. 
Although Kant’s terminology differs from the one used in the contemporary 
debate, I do not see any reason not to regard this and similar cases as 
contemporary applications of Kant’s principle of specification. After all, 
different concepts of species are nothing but particular aspects of a complex 
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phenomenon and ultimately, they are all based on particular phenomena 
(interbreeding, ancestry, ecological niches, etc.). Empirical pluralists can 
therefore be seen as contemporary “chiefly empirical minds” who “split 
nature” as much as possible by replacing unitary concepts with a variety of 
concepts of particular aspects of phenomena. 
There is, however, a lingering worry, namely that the kind of pluralism 
resulting from Kant’s principle of specification may be closer to what is known 
in the literature as ‘modest pluralism’ than to a genuinely perspectival take on 
scientific investigation.18 According to modest pluralism (of which Mitchell is 
perhaps the best-known advocate; see, e.g., Mitchell 2003), scientists must 
indeed engage in a plurality of accounts, but such accounts are meant to 
contribute to a single, integrated picture of a complex phenomenon. For an 
empirical pluralist, no such commitment to ‘integration’ is necessary. On the 
contrary, different perspectives (for instance, different accounts of species) 
may be inconsistent with each other and still enhance our understanding of 
nature. To answer to this worry, it is important to point out that Kant’s 
principle of specification is uncommitted as to whether the ‘particulars’ 
resulting from it contribute to an integrated account of a phenomenon. All the 
principle does prescribe is, instead, to indefinitely split nature into more and 
more particular phenomena. But if this is the case, one may wonder if it still 
makes sense to talk about an integrated picture of a complex phenomenon 
rather than just a plurality of particular accounts. Even for a Kantian 
“empirical mind” then, the investigation of particular phenomena may not 
contribute to any single, integrated account of a complex phenomenon. 
I have suggested that Kant’s principle of specification can be read in a 
way that invites the evolution towards contemporary perspectivism. We 
should not forget, however, that in Kant’s view this principle, exactly as the 
principle of homogeneity, can be only regulatively employed. This has two 
key implications that I will fully explore in the following section. First, as a 
regulative principle, specification does not metaphysically assert that nature 
is an irreducible manifoldness or variety of things. It is instead a regulative 
 
18 See Kellert et al. 2006, xii–iii. Thanks to Luigi Caranti for pressing me on this point. 
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principle that is only meant to promote the empirical investigation of nature. 
As such, it can be made compatible with an equally regulative principle of 
unity: indeed, the two opposite principles mutually complement each other.19 
Second, as a non-objective principle, it can legitimately prescribe not just 
plurality of species, but indefinite specification of concepts.  
Reason demands in its entire extension that no species be regarded as in itself the 
lowest; for since each species is always a concept that contains within itself only 
what is common to different things, this concept cannot be thoroughly determined, 
hence it cannot be related to an individual, consequently, it must at every time 
contain other concepts, i.e., subspecies, under itself. (A655–6/B683–4) 
The process of specification can thus be held as indefinite, or potentially 
infinite.20 This means that a Kantian “empirical mind” should not be satisfied 
with a given plurality of concepts of phenomena. Rather, she should 
constantly seek to further specify and disunify any postulated universal 
concept. 
Kant concludes his account of principles of reason by introducing a 
third principle—“continuity” (A658/B686) or “affinity” (A660/B688)—resulting 
from the combination of the first two.  
The last arises by uniting the first two, according as one has completed the 
systematic connection in the idea by ascending to higher genera, as well as 
descending to lower species; for then all manifolds are akin one to another, because 
they are all collectively descended, through every degree of extended determination, 
from a single highest genus. (A658/B686) 
The systematic interconnection of concepts according to unity and disunity 
results in continuity of concepts, or “continuous transition from every species 
to every other” (ibid.). In other words, reason’s combined presuppositions of 
 
19 The concepts of genus and species are mutually related, see Jäsche, 9:97: “Like higher 
and lower concepts, genus and species concepts are distinguished not as to their nature, 
then, but only in regard to their relation to one another (termini a quo or ad quod) in logical 
subordination.” 
20 Kant, however, explicitly rejects the Leibnizian idea of “actual infinity” for, he explains, that 
would determine the conceptual sphere of division. The logical principle of species only 
asserts the “indeterminacy” of conceptual specification (A656/B684). 
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conceptual unification (leading to a highest genus) and of (potentially) infinite 
specification give rise to a unified picture in which, as Kant puts it, all different 
genera are only “partitionings” of as single genus and there cannot be any 
“leap” between species (A659/B687). Interestingly, Kant illustrates this 
principle with an example from astronomy: the highly elliptical path of 
comets. Empirical observation, explains Kant, does not show us their paths 
in their entirety, yet we guess at a “parabolic course for them since it is still 
akin to the ellipse and, if the major axis of the latter is very long, it cannot be 
distinguished from it in all our observations” (A662/B690). We thereby 
presuppose an affinity of the paths of comets with those of planets. This is 
only possible on the basis of the combination of the previous principles. In 
this specific case, as Kant explains, we conceive the “world system” as both 
“unbounded” (infinitely specified) and “connected through one and the same 
moving force” (supremely unified) (A663/B691): such a system allows us to 
presuppose “continuous transition” in the paths of celestial bodies in general. 
As for the previous principles, continuity should not be read in constitutive 
terms either. This last principle does not tell us that the world is a continuum: 
no actual continuity, as Kant explains, can be found in experience (see 
A661/B689). Continuity is instead a regulative principle which, however, is 
“legitimate and excellent” inasmuch as it “points the way toward systematic 
unity” (A668/B696). 
 
3.4 Third perspectival feature: the space of reason 
I can now elucidate the third perspectival feature of Kant’s system of 
knowledge. We saw that the principle of unity and disunity are perspectivally 
characterized in Kant’s theory of reason. The logical principle of unity 
postulates identity under concepts that allows us to project ideas as foci 
imaginarii. By contrast, the logical principle of variety postulates a potentially 
infinite specification of concepts that grounds the opposite rational interest of 
specifying ideas into ever finer-grained parts. Now, I further contend that 
these two principles (together with the third principle that results from their 
combination: continuity) make up a perspectival space—Kant’s space of 
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theoretical reason. Within this perspectival space, it is possible to pursue 
unity as well as disunity of cognition. I will first clarify why I think this is a 
perspectival feature and then comment on the passages that suggest this 
interpretation. 
Perspectivism is generally presented as the view that that there are 
different standpoints from which we ‘frame’ the world. As the term exploits 
the metaphor of experientially different perspectives, the emphasis is very 
much on the plurality and potential disagreement among different points of 
view. It is in this sense that the term ‘perspectivism’ is generally used in the 
current debate. But this usage fails to portray another crucial aspect of 
perspectivism, namely the fact that different perspectives or points of view 
presuppose—and are only possible within—the same space of 
representation. It might be instructive to take a brief look at the history of 
perspective in the arts. Perspective—once a synonym for optics21—acquired 
a specific artistic meaning during the Renaissance when artists and theorists 
(first and foremost, Brunelleschi and Alberti) started applying optical and 
geometrical studies to the construction of an artistic representation. The art 
of perspective subsequently spread as allegedly the most accurate 
representation of reality. As recognized by several art critics, however, this 
kind of representation was based on a precise conception of space, namely a 
perfectly homogeneous, infinite and continuous mathematical space.22 The 
assumption of this space is the first logical premise in any perspectival 
construction. 
We can apply this consideration to our present case. As perspectival 
representations are only possible within a precise system of geometrical 
assumptions about the topology of space, attempts at conceptual unification 
and specification of phenomena are only possible within a perspectival 
system or space of representation. Quite remarkably, Kant says that reason 
 
21 The Latin word perspectiva comes from perspicere meaning ‘to see clearly.’ It thus 
amounts to a literal translation of the Greek word optikḗ; See Panofsky 1991, 75–6. 
22 See, for example, Panofsky 1991, 31. According to Panofsky perspective is a kind of 
representation in which “bodies are absorbed into a homogeneous and infinite system of 
dimensional relationships,” that is a “quantum continuum” (ibid., 44). Similar remarks are 
easy to find throughout the secondary literature (see, e.g., Belting 2011). 
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“prepares the field for the understanding” by presupposing unity, variety, and 
continuity of concepts (A657/B685). In other words, it presupposes a 
systematic conceptual framework within which scientific knowledge is 
possible. Kant goes on to illustrate this ‘conceptual space’ by using once 
again specifically perspectival metaphors: 
Systematic unity under the three logical principles can be made palpable in the 
following way. One can regard every concept as a point, which, as the standpoint of 
an observer, has its horizon, i.e., a multiplicity of things that can be represented and 
surveyed, as it were, from it. Within this horizon a multiplicity of points must be able 
to be given to infinity, each of which in turn has its narrower field of view; i.e., every 
species contains subspecies in accordance with the principle of specification, and 
the logical horizon consists only of smaller horizons (subspecies), but not of points 
that have no domain (individuals). But different horizons, i.e., genera, which are 
determined from just as many concepts, one can think as drawn out into a common 
horizon, which one can survey collectively from its middle point, which is the higher 
genus, until finally the highest genus is the universal and true horizon, determined 
from the standpoint of the highest concept and comprehending all manifoldness, as 
genera, species, and subspecies, under itself. (A658–9/B686–7; my emphases) 
As the perspectival space is made up of infinite points, each of which 
potentially represents a point of view, the logical space of reason is made up 
of concepts as points. Every concept can be regarded as a viewpoint with its 
horizon, that is, to quote Kant, “a multiplicity of things that can be 
represented and surveyed, as it were, from it.” This horizon is also a 
multiplicity of points and each of these points in turn has its own “narrower 
field of view.” On the one hand, conceptual specification is potentially infinite 
as there is no such a thing as a species which includes only an individual 
within its horizon.23 On the other, the presupposition of unity leads us to a 
highest genus encompassing all concepts that must be presupposed as the 
“universal and true horizon.” 
This system of concepts is not, to be sure, how scientific knowledge 
looks like according to Kant. Indeed, we may never be able to construct such 
a system. It is, however, the ideal framework according to which empirical 
 
23 The nature of a concept is such that it can only contain what is common to different things. 
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cognition can be progressively systematized—that is, unified as well as 
in(de)finitely divided. It is, as it were, a ‘blank’ space which leaves the content 
of experience completely undetermined. Kant specifies that the unity of 
reason is “in itself undetermined in regard to the conditions under which, and 
the degree to which, the understanding should combine its concepts 
systematically” (A665/B693). Reason cannot constitute the content of 
cognition, yet it provides an ordering template of maximal unity and division 
of concepts—in Kant’s word, an “analogue of a schema” (A665/B693)—that 
is necessary for us to transform disparate and particular empirical cognitions 
into scientific knowledge. In other words, the two principles of theoretical 
reason (unity and specification) together with the principle that results from 
their combination (continuity) act as the ‘axes’ of an ideal conceptual space 
within which each “student of nature” is able to systematize empirical 
cognition according to her inclination (A655/B683). Within such a space, as I 
will argue in the next section, we can reconsider the contemporary principles 
of unification and pluralism as mutually consistent meta-scientific guidelines. 
 
4. A Kantian solution to the ‘antinomy’ between pluralism and 
monism 
In this section, I want to elaborate on how Kant’s theory of systematic unity 
might illuminate the contemporary debate on monism and pluralism. 
Needless to say, Kant’s theory is grounded on specific assumptions that 
might not be shared by contemporary discussants.24 But even taking into 
account inevitable disanalogies between Kant’s approach and the 
contemporary status of the debate, one might doubt the very possibility of a 
comparison between Kant’s treatment of scientific rationality and the current 
debate for at least two reasons. First, Kant seems to take for granted that 
systematic unity characterizes scientific knowledge—a characterization that 
seems to beg the very question at stake in the debate. I already suggested 
that this is not fully accurate. Indeed, Kant defines scientific knowledge as 
 
24 One, for instance, might question the nature of the Kantian faculties or the conceptual 
approach to the investigation of nature to begin with. 
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systematic cognition.25 But systematic unity is not mere unity, it is a 
systematic organization of concepts in which unity and plurality play equally 
important roles and express opposite interests of reason. If this is correct, 
Kant’s systematic unity should not be merely equated with a regulative ideal 
of unification or integration of multiple accounts. Since we do not know 
whether nature is really a unity or a plurality, we should not only aim to unify 
and integrate our theories as much as possible. Rather, we should pursue 
both maximal unity and maximal plurality as epistemic principles leading to 
systematic cognition.26 
Second, one might find Kant’s taxonomic terminology—‘genera’, 
‘species,’ ‘transition among species’—ill-suited to be used in the 
contemporary discussion. While we will probably use neither the image of an 
all-encompassing genus to describe the ideal of unity nor the idea of an 
indefinitely specified series of species to illustrate the principle of pluralism, it 
is not difficult to adapt Kant’s terminology to the present debate. Kant himself 
suggests a very broad interpretation of those principles. Not only he 
equivalently uses more general terms like “identity” or “variety” to describe 
how the principles of genera and species are supposed to work, he also 
explicitly specifies that these principles concern “not merely things, but even 
more the mere properties and powers of thing” (A662/B690). Interestingly, 
Kant uses the principles of reason to explain how we implement geometrical 
and mathematical abstractions in modelling phenomena: for instance, we 
employ the principle of genera to infer the elliptical path of planets, while the 
principle of continuity is used when “conceiving hyperbolical paths for comets 
in which these bodies leave our solar system entirely” (A663/B691). These 
considerations suggest that Kant’s principles should be read as meta-
 
25 “Systematic unity is that which first makes ordinary cognition into science, i.e., makes a 
system out of a mere aggregate of it” (A832/B860). 
26 Cf. Breitenbach and Choi 2017 on this point. They argue that “ideal science” may turn out 
to be a single theory of everything or a “unity constituted of heterogeneous parts”; “we have 
to wait nature to tell us” (398). Note, however, that empirical pluralism denies that scientists 
should aim for the integration of heterogeneous accounts (see 3.3). Such alternative may 
therefore be too ‘unificationist’ for the empirical pluralist. On my reading, the alternative is not 
between a single and an integrated unity of nature, but between a unified and a disunified 
(i.e., non-integrated) account of nature. 
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scientific norms rather than mere taxonomic guidelines.27 A principle of 
genera, for instance, is invoked not only when we classify different species of 
things under the same genus (say, ‘oak’ and ‘chestnut’ under the genus 
‘Fagaceae’), but also when we presuppose that the same geometrical or 
mathematical abstraction describes a property of various phenomena.  
What are then the advantages of this comparison and the insights in 
Kant’s account of reason we can exploit? In Section 2, I presented the 
debate over pluralism. I argued that the contemporary discussion implies that 
pluralism and monism are incompatible principles. Pluralism is generally 
interpreted as a self-sufficient principle which either excludes any principle of 
unity or is complemented by a weak form of monism when it comes to the 
desire of unifying different theories. I already suggested that both solutions 
are unsatisfactory, for they do not recognize the role unification plays at any 
level of science—from ‘basic’ theory formation to ‘higher’ theories unification. 
Moreover, an empirical form of pluralism does not fully express the 
prescriptive urge that motivates pluralism itself. Kant provides us with a 
useful meta-scientific framework for thinking about these two principles in a 
new, possibly more promising way. In what I take to be Kant’s variation on 
perspectivism, unity and pluralism do not give rise to an antinomy but are 
compatible principles that essentially complement each other. I will now show 
how each of these two principles and their combination can be reconsidered 
according to the Kantian framework.  
 
4.1 Regulative unity 
We saw that contemporary pluralism tends to neglect the significance of a 
principle of unity in science. Pluralists only admit a principle of plurality, yet 
they do not go as far as to affirm that unity of nature is impossible. It is an 
open question, they argue, whether there is unity in nature. From this insight, 
however, it does not follow that unity should not play any epistemic role in 
science. From a Kantian perspective we can perfectly agree with the claim 
that we do not know whether nature is actually a unity—indeed, this is why 
 
27 Guyer 2017, 56–7, makes a similar point. 
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Kant presents unification as a regulative principle. The rejection of a principle 
of unity is instead grounded in a misleading characterization of the very same 
principle. This characterization is parasitic on what Kant would call a 
metaphysical reading of the principle of unity. According to this reading, the 
nature of the world is such that can, at least in principle, be fully explained by 
a single account. In Kantian terms, as we saw, that would mean to be 
deceived by an ‘illusion.’ To be guided by a perspectival principle of unity is 
not to determine the nature of the world. It is, instead, to use ideas in order to 
universalize what is only particularly given to us in experience. Unity, if 
thought along the Kantian lines, is only a regulatively employed principle and, 
as such, can be maintained without posing any threat to a principle of 
plurality. 
The regulative status of the principle should not, however, incline us to 
consider unity as a mere additional desideratum of science. We saw that 
some forms of pluralism—most notably, Giere’s perspectivism—allow weak 
forms of unification provided that pluralism remains the only necessary 
requirement when we do science. I suggested, however, that the exclusion of 
a principle of unity at the ‘basic’ level of science poses an additional 
challenge. For epistemically situated perspectives are themselves instances 
of unity: Newton’s theory of motion, Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetism, 
Einstein’s special theory of relativity are all clear examples of perspectives as 
brilliant unificatory achievements. Although Giere introduces his 
methodological principle of unity as an anti-Kantian move (Giere 2006b, 36), 
Kant would not only agree with the need of a principle complementing 
pluralism, he would also have internal resources to address the above-
mentioned challenge. 
In Kant’s perspectivism, unity does not merely play an auxiliary 
function but is an integral part of the formation of a perspective—each 
perspective results from an ideal projection and is itself a form of theoretical 
unity. Furthermore, we saw that the presupposition of identity has not merely 
a taxonomic import but is equally employed in geometrical and mathematical 
representations of phenomena. This different kind of perspectivism can 
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therefore inspire an integration of unity into the perspectival picture we are 
familiar with. If we look at how scientific theorizing works across different 
perspectives, unification indeed plays an important role. Scientific theories 
typically contain general and abstract principles that are supposed to unify 
seemingly different cognitions of phenomena and properties of phenomena. 
As Morrison has shown, this is commonly obtained through the mathematical 
elaboration of general and abstract frameworks. Such frameworks usually 
contain “a theoretical parameter, quantity or concept that ‘represents’ the 
unifying mechanism—that is, a parameter that functions as the necessary 
piece of theoretical structure that either facilitates or represents the 
unification of distinct phenomena” (Morrison 2000, 4). In Maxwell’s 
electrodynamics, for instance, this theoretical unifier is represented by 
electric displacement together with the Lagrangian formalism. 
Granted that unification plays a role in the process of scientific 
theorizing, one might still ask why that is the case. In other words, what is 
precisely the epistemic function of unification? The answer that unifying our 
cognitions of phenomena affords a deeper understanding of them is 
intuitively appealing but needs further clarification. Kitcher and Friedman 
have proposed influential epistemological models according to which 
unification is essential to scientific explanation.28 To put it in Friedman’s 
word, “science increases our understanding of the world by reducing the total 
number of independent phenomena that we have to accept as ultimate or 
given. A world with fewer independent phenomena is, other things equal, 
more comprehensible than one with more” (Friedman 1974, 15). Despite 
their plausibility, these models have been faced with a plethora of objections 
in the last decades. Convincing counterexamples suggest a more cautious 
distinction between unification and explanation. For example, it has been 
shown that in some cases unification provides us with little or no 
explanation—a possible example being the derivation of Mendelian rules of 
inheritance within molecular cell biology: even if possible, such a derivation 
 
28 See, in particular, Friedman 1974 and Kitcher 1981. 
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would not enhance our understanding.29 More generally, it is commonplace 
in contemporary science to obtain a deeper understanding of phenomena by 
pursuing disunity rather than unity at the explanatory level. 
The need to problematize the relation between unification and 
explanation, however, does not undermine the explanatory value of unifying 
cognitions and theories. Newton’s mechanics, Maxwell’s electrodynamics, 
Einstein’s special relativity all successfully explain phenomena by 
recognizing them as instances of general principles.30 The challenge is rather 
to understand why there is no simple identification between unity and 
explanation. This—I argue—is perfectly understandable from the Kantian 
approach here suggested. It is true that Kant’s principle of unification follows 
a model of explanation in which the universal explains the particular. But 
crucially, unity is only a regulative idea that neither determines the content of 
cognition nor gives us any assurance that our attempts will succeed. Such an 
idea only prescribes to search, for any given cognitions, for higher 
explanatory principles.31 Scientists might simply not find truly explanatory 
universal principles, and, as we saw, universals are only hypothetically 
postulated—therefore, revisable through further empirical evidence.  
As a result, our epistemic necessity to presuppose unity in order to 
elaborate general principles is compatible with the admission of a gap 
between unification and explanation. Indeed, given that unity does not 
commit us to a metaphysical thesis of unity nor to the realizability of a unified 
system, we have no reason to expect this relation to be otherwise. 
Explanatory unification may simply be out of reach and we may be better off 
relying on a plurality of explanations as in the case of non-derivation of 
Mendelian rules within molecular cell biology. Even when available, 
theoretical unities should be best understood as “starting points” for further 
explanation: one might, for instance, argue that Einstein’s general relativity 
offers a better understanding of gravitation than Newton’s mechanics (see 
 
29 Example taken from Kitcher 1999, 337. 
30 For a discussion of how theory unification does not necessarily imply loss of explanation, 
see Rueger 2005.  
31 See my discussion of the prescriptive value of reason in Chapter 1. See also Willaschek 
2018, 66–7. 
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Morrison 2000, 33). In neither case, however, is unity undermined as an 
explanatory valuable idea that scientists should strive to realize as much as 
possible—from ‘basic’ theory construction to ambitious theories unification. 
 
4.2 Regulative pluralism 
Since regulative unity does not posit the existence of a unity of nature, 
nothing prevents us from also embracing a principle of plurality. Importantly, 
the use of this principle should not be interpreted in constitutive terms either. 
The principle of specification does not correspond to the metaphysical 
assertion that nature is an infinite and irreducible variety or manifoldness. 
Nor is it the mere epistemic satisfaction with a given plurality of models and 
theories. As we saw, an unqualified form of pluralism does not fully portray 
the motivation behind pluralism itself—it is too weak a principle. Regulative 
pluralism amounts instead to the presupposition of a maximally specifiable 
system of concepts describing phenomena. While following this principle, 
scientists are not simply satisfied with a plurality of ‘local’ unities as empirical 
pluralists seem to suggest. Scientists are instead interested in the 
progressive, indefinite diversification of phenomena according to ever finer-
grained perspectives. 
As mentioned in the previous subsection, the explanatory role of 
pluralism can be as beneficial as that of unification. Since the current system 
of knowledge is incomplete and hypothetical, unified explanations may be 
unavailable or too general to be explanatorily satisfactory. This is why it is not 
uncommon to find disunity at the level of explanation in many fields of 
contemporary science. We can generalise from this fact. Given that 
unification is an on-going process that does not metaphysically reduce 
particulars to universals, we necessarily need to rely on specific theories to 
explain particular phenomena or particular aspects of phenomena. To 
regulatively presuppose pluralism of cognition amounts to the demand to 
seek for ever more specific theoretical approaches. And such prescription 
allows us to account for the explanations of phenomena that unified theories 
are not able to provide us with.  
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Thinking about unity and pluralism in regulative terms finally answers 
our initial question on the apparent incompatibility between these two 
principles in contemporary debates. As Kant argues, an antinomy is taking 
place between unity and pluralism only when these principles are interpreted 
as “constitutive” or “objective” principles: 
If merely regulative principles are considered as constitutive, then as objective 
principles they can be in conflict; but if one considers them merely as maxims, then it 
is not a true conflict, but it is merely a different interest of reason that causes a 
divorce between ways of thinking […] In this way the interest in manifoldness (in 
accordance with the principle of specification) might hold more for this sophistical 
reasoner, while unity (in accordance with the principle of aggregation) holds more for 
that one. Each of them believes that his judgment comes from insight into the object, 
and yet he grounds it solely on the greater or lesser attachment to one of the two 
principles, neither of which rests on any objective grounds, but only on the interest of 
reason, and that could better be called ‘maxims’ than ‘principles.’ (A666–7/B694–5; 
my emphasis) 
As soon as we stop regarding these principles as insights into the nature of 
objects, the antinomy between them disappears. We are left instead with 
different “maxims” that, although in conflict with each other, can be reunited 
as compatible “ways of thinking” in the larger framework of reason. One 
reasoner may be inclined towards finding unity in nature; another may 
instead be interested in empirical variety. Although each of them believes 
that her judgment is objectively motivated—that is, constitutive of nature—
their conflict does not result from rational incompatibility. It only regards their 
“attachment to one of the two principles.” I contend that the present debate 
on pluralism and unity presents us with a similar ‘antinomy.’ Monism and 
pluralism are both legitimate and compatible ‘axes’ of the same conceptual 
space of scientific thinking. Conflicts arise only when at least one of these 
two principles is held as an objective insight. Classic metaphysical monism 
holds unity as an objective truth about the natural world. Empirical pluralism 
does not fare better than the classic view for it recognizes unity only as an 
objective claim about the world and rejects it altogether. These judgements, 
however, are mistaken about the very rationale of these two principles. As 
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we saw, both principles, if regulatively employed, are needed to successfully 
promote the scientific investigation of nature. 
 
4.3 The space of theoretical reason 
The resolution of the antimony, however, still leaves us with a lingering 
problem. For if monism and pluralism are regarded as compatible subjective 
maxims, we seem to have lost the necessary status Kant also attaches to 
these epistemic principles. Indeed, several interpretations have been misled 
by Kant’s terminology and suggest a weak reading of the principles of reason 
as mere maxims.32 As we saw, however, unity and pluralism are not just 
welcome epistemic rules, they are necessary, meta-scientific principles. 
Together they make up a perspectival space in which scientific knowledge is 
possible. Are scientific maxims compatible with Kant’s overall picture? And if 
this is the case, how can this inspire the contemporary debate? First, Kant’s 
language should not mislead us. The previous passage seems to suggest 
that objective principles should be replaced by merely subjective, individual 
maxims. In this way, an antinomy turns out to be a mere conflict between 
opposed interests. This is correct as far as it goes. However, Kant clarifies: 
Reason has in fact only a single unified interest, and the conflict between its maxims 
is only a variation and a reciprocal limitation of the methods satisfying this interest 
(A666/B694).  
I take reason’s “single unified interest” to mean the systematization of 
empirical knowledge that results from the combination of the principles of 
reason.33 Maxims are not mere synonyms for the “indispensably necessary” 
regulative principles as the previous passage may seem to suggest. Instead, 
they only express the individual attachment each scientist has to one 
principle rather than to the other. They are therefore merely alternative, yet 
compatible “methods” and together satisfy the only real interest of reason, 
namely the construction of the system of knowledge. If this is correct, the fact 
that scientists may be individually interested in following just one maxim does 
 
32 See, e.g., Guyer and Walker 1990, 227–8, and Pickering 2011. 
33 For a similar suggestion, see Watkins 2017, 26. 
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not undermine the necessity of both unity and disunity as epistemic 
principles. Although each principle can be isolated as a maxim, systematic 
unity requires the presupposition of both unity and plurality of cognition for its 
construction. These principles make up the conceptual space within which 
any individual attempt to maximize either unity or disunity of cognition is 
possible. 
We can finally apply this insight to the contemporary debate. Pluralism 
and unification should not be regarded as merely compatible methodological 
maxims. ‘Pluralists’ are more interested in empirical variety and privilege the 
axis of plurality; ‘monists’ are more inclined towards rational unity and 
therefore pursue unification of cognition. Despite individual conflicts of 
interests, however, they ultimately share the same meta-scientific conceptual 
space of investigation. Perspectivism can therefore be reconsidered not just 
as the place of conflict among perspectives nor as a form of pluralism 
opposed to monism, but as the common space where different perspectives 
can always be further unified and disunified. The space of theoretical reason 
does not, to be sure, prescribe or determine the content of phenomena. Yet, 
it provides scientists with a template of maximal systematicity of knowledge 
which grounds the possibility of different, compatible perspectives—either 
aimed at unity or at disunity of scientific cognition. 
 
5. Conclusion 
I suggested that the current conflict between pluralism and monism is based 
on a misrepresentation of those epistemic principles. The conflict ultimately 
resides in a metaphysical characterization of unity in science that does not 
fully capture the epistemic significance of monism in scientific theorizing. 
Looking at Kant’s perspectivism in the Critique of Pure Reason not only 
allows us to resolve this apparent antinomy, but also to rethink unity and 
pluralism as necessary regulative principles. These principles together make 
up a meta-scientific space of reason, within which each scientist can follow 
her inclination towards unity or disunity of cognition. 
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There are several important issues this chapter leaves open. Let me 
conclude by mentioning one which is particularly pressing. I focused on the 
epistemic function of unity and pluralism within a perspectival framework. I 
therefore bracketed the question of whether perspectivism may deliver a 
form of truth in science (and if so, what kind of truth). To investigate this 
issue from a Kantian perspective would require looking more closely at the 
transition from logical to transcendental principles of systematic unity Kant 
presents in the Appendix. Kant has a fairly complex story regarding whether 
and how this transition might be justified. I will reconstruct and interpret this 











There have long been questions about how to understand the relations 
between faculties in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. The debate between 
conceptualist and nonconceptualist readings of Kant, in particular, has been 
focusing on the relation between sensibility and the understanding in the 
production of perceptual experience. There is, however, another important 
relation that has been far less studied in the literature: the relation between 
the understanding and reason. In this chapter, I will show that reason plays a 
key and underappreciated role in allowing the understanding to obtain 
empirical cognition and, in particular, empirical truth. Investigating this role 
can therefore deepen our understanding of the relations between faculties in 
the First Critique and of Kant’s critical project as a whole.1 
Kant introduces reason and its principles of systematic unity (often 
referred to in the secondary literature as reason’s systematicity) in the first 
part of the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic. After severely delimiting 
the function of reason in the course of the Dialectic, this is one of the few 
sections in which Kant finally seems to speak of this faculty in positive terms. 
In the Appendix, Kant examines how reason relates to the understanding not 
only by limiting its use, but also by giving direction to it and unifying its 
cognitions. Moreover, he unequivocally characterizes this positive use as 
“indispensably necessary” (A644/B672) as well as based on “transcendental 
principles” (A651/B679–A663/B691). 
 
1 As is well known, Kant’s discussion of systematic unity in the First Critique has a close 
relation to the treatment of reflective judgment and the principle of purposiveness in the 
Critique of the Power of Judgment. In this chapter, I will not thematize this complex and 
enigmatic relation. However, I will highlight several features of Kant’s discussion of the 
possibility of empirical cognition in the First Critique that surprisingly anticipate key passages 
of the Introductions to the Third Critique. My reading of systematic unity can therefore help 
understand Kant’s later position as a refinement rather than a complete revision of his 
previous position (cf. Guyer 1990). For a detailed discussion of the relation between 
reason’s systematicity and reflective judgment, see Zuckert 2007. 
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The positive contribution of reason is, however, far from being clearly 
spelled out. The details of Kant’s account of reason are so controversial that 
some commentators have even charged Kant with self-contradiction, starting 
from Kemp Smith’s influential reading (Kemp Smith 1962, 543–52). Most 
readings of the Appendix, however, can be characterized as methodological 
interpretations.2 According to McFarland 1970, Guyer 1990, Pickering 2011, 
and Willaschek 2018, among several others,3 Kant’s text is minimally 
interpreted as follows: the systematic use of reason is indeed essential for 
us, but only if our aim, for scientific or classificatory reasons, is to take our 
empirical cognition to its greatest extension. The core of this interpretation, 
as Geiger suggests, is that some basic empirical knowledge of nature is 
possible without reason’s systematicity (see Geiger 2003, 279). Strictly 
speaking, therefore, reason is neither “indispensably necessary,” as Kant 
claims it is,4 nor a transcendental condition of empirical cognition, but it acts 
as an important guideline for extending our knowledge. 
To date there has been a more limited literature opposing this view. 
Walker 1990, Abela 2002, Geiger 2003, Allison 2004, and Mudd 2017 have 
in different ways proposed more radical interpretations which try to vindicate 
the systematicity of reason not just as an additional desideratum that extends 
our knowledge, but as a transcendental principle of experience.5 Note that to 
say that systematic unity is a transcendental principle does not plausibly 
mean that it is a condition of the very possibility of experience, or experience 
as such (like e.g. the categories of the understanding), but that is a 
necessary and indispensable condition of experience as giving rise to 
 
2 This characterization is used both by Abela 2002 and Geiger 2003. 
3 E.g., Kitcher 1986, Wartenberg 1996, Grier 2001. 
4 Massimi has recently drawn attention to this aspect. On her account, even the 
interpretations according to which the illusion of reason motivates the understanding and 
allows us to conceive of ideal illusory objects (such as Grier 2001) do not make full justice to 
Kant’s text: for this ability “might at best be useful, instrumental, desirable; but not 
indispensable” (Massimi 2017a, 70). 
5 Other approaches that take seriously the transcendental status of the principles of reason, 
without however clearly presenting them as conditions of experience, include Buchdahl 
1992, Neiman 1994, Ypi 2017, and Massimi 2017a. Guyer 2017 and Breitenbach 2018 also 
offer strong interpretations of reason, although in close connection with the specific problem 
of empirical laws of nature which I cannot discuss in this chapter (for a discussion of the role 
of reason with respect to empirical laws of nature, see Chapter 5). 
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empirical cognition. Despite being supported by several passages of the 
Appendix, this reading has the disadvantage of being not easily reconcilable 
with the Transcendental Analytic in which Kant seems to leave no room for a 
transcendental function of reason.6 
These interpretative problems are clearly exemplified when trying to 
understand the particular aspect of reason that represents the main concern 
of this chapter: namely, the fact that reason’s systematic unity is repeatedly 
presented as a criterion of empirical truth. Take the following passages from 
the Appendix: 
 
The hypothetical use of reason is therefore directed at the systematic unity of the 
understanding’s cognitions, which, however, is the touchstone of truth (Probierstein 
der Wahrheit) for its rules. (A647/B675) 
 
For the law of reason to seek unity is necessary, since without it we would have no 
reason, and without that, no coherent use of the understanding, and, lacking that, 
no sufficient mark of empirical truth; thus in regard to the latter we simply have to 
presuppose the systematic unity of nature as objectively valid and necessary. 
(A651/B679; emphasis added) 
 
The systematic connection that reason can give to the empirical use of the 
understanding furthers not only its extension but also guarantees its correctness 
(Richtigkeit). (A680/B707; emphasis added) 
 
In these passages, Kant links the employment of reason not only to the 
extension of our empirical knowledge, but also to its truth and correctness. 
As a result, it is hard to reconcile them with any methodological 
interpretation. If reason only provides us with a method to extend our already 
 
6 Several affinities can be found between the present discussion and the debate about 
Kant’s conceptualism vs. Kant’s nonconceptualism. The former concerns the role of reason 
in the production of empirical cognition, whereas the latter focuses on the role of sensibility 
and understanding in producing perceptual content (see Allais 2016). Indeed, the debate 
between conceptualist and nonconceptualist readings turns on interpreting passages, e.g., 
A90/B122–3, where it is unclear whether Kant is discussing a genuine metaphysical 
possibility or a merely epistemic one (see Allais 2016). As I will show, a similar interpretative 
challenge will prove to be crucial to the present discussion. Given the complexities involved, 
however, a careful analysis of the relation between the two problems and respective debates 
cannot be pursued here. 
 110 
secured basic experience ever further, how can it play any substantial role in 
relation to empirical truth?7 Methodological interpreters generally undercut 
the significance of this aspect of reason. However, the latter strategy does 
not seem particularly successful in terms of textual analysis. Kant generally 
employs the word “touchstone” in relation to truth with a strong meaning, 
namely that of necessary condition.8 This reading is clearly supported by the 
second passage quoted above: if, without the coherent use of the 
understanding guaranteed by reason, there would be no sufficient mark of 
empirical truth, it seems that reason must play some fundamental role in 
making empirical truth possible. 
Despite such resounding statements, however, Kant does not 
particularly elaborate on why and how reason is a necessary condition of 
empirical truth. This has made the interpretation of such passages puzzling 
also for transcendental interpreters. Most of them do not offer a 
reconstruction of such a contribution or appeal to a vaguely determined form 
of ‘coherentism.’9 This, however, does not seem either supported by the text 
or enough to discard the methodological interpretation. For it is commonly 
accepted that the question of truth–if a question, at all–is fully settled in the 
Transcendental Analytic and that reason is not really required for making 
empirical truth possible. 
In this chapter, I will attempt a reconstruction of reason as a 
‘touchstone of truth’ in close connection with Kant’s general theory of truth. In 
particular, I will try to answer the following questions: Is the notion of truth 
Kant expounds in the Transcendental Analytic complete? Does it need the 
contribution of the faculty of reason? And if this is the case, how should we 
conceive of such a contribution? I will argue that Kant’s treatment of truth in 
the Analytic gets completed in the Appendix with an often neglected but 
 
7 Guyer makes a similar point; see Guyer 2017, 54. 
8 Kant generally gives a strong meaning to this term when related to truth. For example, the 
principles of general logic are called the “negative touchstone” of truth (see 2.1). In On a 
Discovery Whereby Any New Critique of Pure Reason Is to Be Made Superfluous by an 
Older One (1790), Kant explicitly refers this term to the “elements of our a priori cognition 
and the ground of their validity with regard to objects prior to all experience” (Discovery, 
8:188). 
9 See Walker 1990, Abela 2002, and Allison 2004. 
 111 
compelling argument (what I shall call the Variety Argument). This argument 
postulates such a variety in the appearances that are given to us as to 
undermine any attempt at formulating empirical truths. Crucially, I will argue 
that this variety does not depict an extreme-case scenario, but our own 
epistemic situation without reason. Reason completes Kant’s theory of truth 
by allowing the understanding (i.) to form empirical concepts and (ii.) 
approximate to empirical truth. The strategy of the chapter is as follows. I will 
first introduce the key elements of Kant’s theory of truth (Section 2). I will 
then present and criticize the methodological and transcendental 
interpretations of reason’s contribution to truth (Section 3). I will use this 
criticism to propose a refined reading of the main argument of the first part of 
the Appendix and I will explain how such an argument helps us understand 
reason’s contribution to truth (Section 4). Finally, I will conclude (Section 5). 
 
2. A brief reconstruction of Kant’s notion of truth  
 
2.1 Kant’s definition of truth 
Right at the beginning of the Appendix, Kant specifies that the categories of 
the understanding “lead to truth, i.e., to the agreement of our concepts with 
their objects,” while reason and its ideas effect only a mere “illusion” 
(A642/B670). The reason for this difference seems to be the following: while 
the concepts of the understanding directly have to do with objects, ideas 
relate to the concepts of the understanding and hence have to do with 
objects only indirectly. From this, however, it does not follow that reason 
cannot have an indirect contribution to truth. This is exactly how Kant 
repeatedly and carefully portrays such a contribution. As is evident from the 
passages above, reason’s contribution to truth is always mediated by the 
understanding. Reason is not directly a touchstone of truth, but a “touchstone 
of truth for the rules of the understanding”; without reason, we would have 
“no coherent use of the understanding, and, lacking that, no sufficient mark 
of empirical truth”; reason’s systematicity guarantees the “correctness” of the 
“empirical use of the understanding.” If reason is a necessary condition of 
truth, then it must be an indirect condition of truth.  
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Unfortunately, Kant does not offer anywhere a systematic account of 
truth. But when he does speak about it, he always refers to the concept of 
truth as ‘agreement’ (or correspondence) he inherits from the tradition.10 In 
the third section of the Introduction to the Transcendental Logic, Kant 
explicitly claims that the definition of truth as “the agreement 
(Übereinstimmung) of cognition with its object” is “granted and presupposed” 
in his Critique (A58/B82). 
He specifies that this definition of truth does not provide us with “the 
general and certain criterion of the truth valid of any cognitions” (A58/B82), 
or, as he puts it in the Jäsche Logic, the “universal material criterion of truth” 
(Jäsche, 9:50–1). Such a criterion, similarly to the Cartesian criterion of 
clarity and distinctness or the Leibnizian principle of identity, would be a sign 
or rule that always allows us to decide whether a certain cognition is true or 
not. But, for Kant, if truth is the agreement of cognition with its object, then no 
universal material criterion of truth can be possible (see A58–9/B83). It is 
simply contradictory, Kant argues, to demand a criterion that can account for 
the agreement of a particular cognition with a particular object and that is, at 
the same time, valid for all cognitions. There can be a universal criterion, but 
it must be formal. In the First Critique as well as in the lectures on logic, he 
identifies the latter with the principles of general logic (the principle of 
contradiction, the principle of sufficient reason and the principle of excluded 
middle; as they are listed in Jäsche, 9:51–3), which can merely certify 
whether a cognition is formally correct; that is, whether it agrees with itself, 
not with the content to which is related. As a result, this formal criterion is a 
necessary, but insufficient condition of truth: the “negative touchstone of all 
truth” (A60/B84). 
One might take this treatment of truth to mean two things: that for Kant 
there cannot be other criteria of truth than the merely negative ones provided 
by general logic; and that, as a result, the definition of truth as ‘agreement’ 
 
10 Often referred to as the ‘correspondence theory of truth.’ I do not suggest, however, that 
Kant’s theory of truth can be read along the lines of contemporary interpretations of the 
same theory as, for example, Hanna 2000 does. 
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does not play a really significant role in Kant’s philosophy.11 However, 
following Hanna 2000 and Rosenkoetter 2009, neither of these claims is 
supported by the text. As regards the former, Kant only claims that there 
cannot be a unique, universal material criterion; from this, however, it does 
not follow that there cannot be other criteria of truth in addition to general 
logic (see Hanna 2000, 244). As regards the second claim, it is sufficient to 
note that Kant argues for the self-contradiction of a universal material 
criterion on the very premise that truth is “correspondence” (A58/B83).12 
Since this premise is never questioned elsewhere—as we saw, instead, the 
definition is “granted and presupposed”—and is mentioned again and again 
in crucial passages throughout the Critique, we should take the definition 
very seriously as our best effort to defining truth (see Rosenkoetter 2009, 
196–7). 
 
2.2 The relation between truth and the understanding  
It is admittedly difficult to complement the view on truth Kant offers in the 
Introduction to the Transcendental Logic and in his logic lectures with the 
positive parts of his transcendental philosophy. It is, however, worth noting 
that in the course of the Analytic Kant repeatedly connects the faculty of 
understanding with truth.13 What has the pure understanding got to do with 
truth? How does it enter the picture of truth as ‘agreement’ illustrated above? 
An answer is offered by the following passage: 
 
These rules of the understanding are not only true a priori but are rather even the 
source of all truth, i.e., of the agreement of our cognition with objects, in virtue of 
containing the ground of the possibility of experience, as the sum total of all 
cognition in which objects may be given to us (A237/B296; emphases added) 
 
 
11 Indeed, this has been a standard approach to the question of truth in Kant. See, for 
instance, Kemp Smith 1962. 
12 With respect to the self-contradiction of a material universal criterion, Kant says: “it is 
already a great and necessary proof of cleverness or insight to know what one should 
reasonably ask” (A58/B82). 
13 Kant calls the aspect of truth that has to do with the transcendental principles of the 
understanding “transcendental truth” (A146/B185). 
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A necessary condition of truth (as the agreement of cognition with object) is 
the possibility for objects to be given to us. Since for Kant objects are given 
to us in experience as “the sum total of all cognition,” this amounts to the 
possibility for our cognitions to be objectively valid. Pure understanding offers 
such a necessary condition. Truth is made possible by the fact that the 
understanding, while providing the conditions of possibility of experience, 
also provides the conditions of possibility of the objects of experience (see 
also A111 and A158/B197). 
The problem of how objectively valid cognitions are possible 
represents the leading question of Kant’s critical Erkenntnistheorie, from his 
letter to Marcus Herz (1772) to the core parts of the Transcendental Analytic 
in the First Critique. As such, the full theory cannot even be summarized 
here.14 For present purposes, I would like to highlight only the relation 
between the concepts of the understanding and empirical truth. The 
transcendental deduction alongside the doctrine of schematism are 
supposed to show how the pure concepts of the understanding acquire 
objective validity when applied to appearances. Categories of understanding 
are related to appearances through their respective schemata which provide 
them with “significance” (A146/B185). As a result, Kant says, they are “in the 
end of none but a possible empirical use”, since they merely serve to subject 
empirical appearances to general rules (ibid.) The understanding thus makes 
the agreement between cognitions and objects possible at the empirical 
level; that is, it “makes empirical truth possible” (ibid.).15 
But how shall we conceive of such an intellectual grounding of 
empirical truth? Is that a full-blown derivation such as, for instance, the 
Leibnizian deduction of all truth from the principle of identity? This cannot 
evidently be the case for otherwise the categories would be universal 
material criteria of truth. Kant is very careful in delimiting this condition of 
possibility. The “agreement with the laws of the understanding”, Kant says, is 
 
14 See Rosenkoetter 2009 for an extended discussion of the Analytic as a “logic of truth” 
(A131/B170). 
15 The passage reads: “all of our cognitions, however, lie in the entirety of all possible ex-
perience, and transcendental truth, which precedes all empirical truth and makes it possible, 
consists in the general relation to this.”  
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the “formal aspect of all truth” (A294/B350). And similarly, the Analogies of 
Experience, based on the categories of relation, are said to account only for 
the “formal conditions of empirical truth” (A191/B236). Kant is clear: the 
content of appearances—the appearances in their materiality—can only be 
given to us in intuition. As a result, the material aspect does not depend on 
the understanding. Rather, as Kant puts it, “the understanding depends on 
this as its condition: that are given to us in intuition, to which it can be 
applied” (A62/B87).  
The main points of Kant’s notion of truth can be summarized as 
follows. For Kant, truth is the agreement of cognition with its object. Such a 
definition, however, does not give us a universal material sign of truth. From 
the definition it follows, instead, that the notion of such a sign or criterion is 
self-contradictory. There can be universal criteria, but they must be formal: 
the rules of general logic and the principles of the understanding. Their 
formality, however, must be distinguished. Logical rules merely assure the 
internal consistency of cognitions. The laws of the understanding are, 
instead, responsible for making our cognitions objective, and yet they cannot 
determine the content of our experience. This latter aspect of truth is given to 
us only in intuition.  
 
2.3 Empirical truth: textual analysis 
Is the above reconstruction complete? Do the rules of logic and the rules of 
the understanding suffice when it comes to grounding empirical truths? To 
answer these questions and see whether reason might enter this picture, we 
need to focus a bit more on Kant’s notion of empirical truth. Recall that in the 
Appendix systematicity is presented as providing a criterion of empirical 
truth—we should, therefore, evaluate whether systematicity might actually be 
required by empirical truth, or as claimed by the methodological interpretation 
represents just a desideratum for extending our knowledge. 
The definition of truth implies that, at the empirical level, truth is the 
agreement of empirical cognitions with objects. First, what is an empirical 
cognition? Since for Kant cognition always results from the unification of 
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intuitions provided by the faculty of sensibility and concepts provided by the 
understanding (see A51/B75–6), a cognition that regards empirical 
experience is a cognition that involves sensible intuitions and empirical 
concepts. Second, according to the definition of truth, empirical cognitions 
must agree with objects. There are, therefore, at least two preconditions 
required in order to have empirical truth: (i.) the possibility of formulating 
empirical concepts; and (ii.) the agreement of empirical cognitions with 
objects. A standard reading of Kant’s account of empirical concepts, shared 
by methodological interpreters, does not invoke reason as a condition of truth 
and finds the answers to (i.) and (ii.) in our experience and the application of 
the concepts of the understanding.16 This reading is textually supported as 
follows. 
(i.) The locus classicus for Kant’s account of empirical concepts 
formation is the Jäsche Logic. There Kant provides an empiricist account of 
the origin of empirical concepts. Empirical concepts, for Kant, both contain 
marks and can be contained in other concepts as marks: for example, the 
concept ‘gold’ contains the marks ‘yellow’ and that of ‘not-rusting’ and is 
contained in the concept ‘metal.’ As regards their origin, Kant claims that it is 
possible to derive empirical concepts from sensory experience through 
“comparison of objects of experience”: 
 
An empirical concept arises from the senses through comparison (Vergleichung) of 
objects of experience and attains through the understanding merely the form of 
universality. The reality of these concepts rests on actual experience, from which, 
as to their content, they are drawn. (Jäsche, 9:92; emphases added) 
 
The content of empirical concepts is drawn from actual experience; their 
universal form is instead attained through the understanding. But how can 
this universality be explained? The “logical actus” of origination of the form of 
concepts, Kant explains, consists in the three operations of comparison, 
 
16 Compare the following view of a methodological interpreter (Pickering 2011, 438): “the 
Transcendental Analytic and the Jäsche Logic provide an account of the formation of 
empirical concepts which makes no mention of a presupposition of necessary homogeneity.” 
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reflection, and abstraction (Vergleichung, Überlegung, Absonderung; Jäsche, 
9:94–5). The concept ‘tree,’ to use Kant’s example, results from comparing 
the differences of objects as regards their parts (trunks, branches, leaves, 
etc.), reflecting on their commonalities and abstracting from their other 
properties (see ibid.). Abstraction is only considered as a “negative condition” 
for generating universal representations; comparison and reflection are the 
operations actually responsible for this generation (ibid., 9:95). It seems, 
therefore, that once the content of empirical concept is provided by intuition 
and perceptions, their universality can be explained in purely logical terms. 
(ii.) If, according to the definition of truth, empirical cognitions must 
agree with objects, they must have some form of objective validity (or 
reality)—in other words, they must be legitimately applied to objects. As we 
saw in 2.2, this requirement is provided by the categories of the 
understanding that make empirical truth possible. But as highlighted by 
Hanna 1993 and Willaschek and Watkins 2017, this requirement is not a 
sufficient condition for a cognition to be true. Kant clearly distinguishes the 
objective validity of a cognition from its being true or false. For example: 
 
A cognition is false if it does not agree with the object to which it is related even if 
it contains something that could well be valid of other objects. (A58/B83; emphases 
added) 
 
An objectively valid cognition describes a possible object of experience, 
which, however, may not agree with the actual object of empirical intuition. If 
we want to distinguish between true and false empirical cognitions, we need 
a criterion that tells us that possible objects of experience and actual objects 
do agree with each other. Now, appearances are not by themselves decisive 
criteria of truth for the origin of such representations might be entirely 
subjective, as in dreams or hallucinations. For Kant, such criterion seems to 
be instead the coherent “connection of representations” through the concepts 
of the understanding: 
 
If an appearance is given to us, we are still completely free as to how we want to 
judge things from it. The former, namely the appearance, was based on the 
 118 
senses, but the judgment on the understanding, and the only question is whether 
there is truth in the determination of the object or not. The difference between truth 
and dream, however, is not decided through the quality of the representations that 
are referred to objects, for they are the same in both, but through their connection 
according to the rules that determine the connection (Zusammenhang) of 
representations in the concept of an object, and how far they can or cannot stand 
together in one experience. (Prolegomena, 4:290) 
 
As Hanna puts it, the connection, or better, coherence (Zusammenhang) of 
representations results from the “effective application” of the rules of the 
understanding to perceptions (see Hanna 1993, 12–13). The effective 
application of such rules allows us to distinguish a merely subjective ordering 
of perceptions (such as the one we have in dreaming) from a necessary and 
rule-governed ordering of them. But for Kant, a necessary and rule-governed 
order of perceptions is precisely what establishes an object of experience 
that exists independently of our perceptual access to it (see, e.g., 
A191/B236). In short, the fact that appearances are coherently organized 
according to the conceptual rules of the understanding is a necessary 
criterion to distinguish a merely subjective from a true empirical cognition. It 
thus seems that reason is not required to ensure the possibility of the 
agreement of empirical cognitions with objects. 
In my view, the above reconstruction of empirical truth, although 
faithful to several passages of Kant’s corpus, gets challenged by Kant 
himself in the Appendix. My interpretative strategy, however, does not 
consist in charging Kant with contradiction. Rather, I will argue that reason 
completes the conditions provided by the understanding and 
transcendentally complements the empiricist account of concept formation 
offered by Kant in the texts quoted above. This contribution has been unjustly 
neglected by methodological interpreters as well as not fully recognized by 
transcendental ones either. Or at least this is what I shall argue in the 
remainder of this chapter. 
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3. Methodological and transcendental interpretations of the 
systematicity of reason 
 
3.1 Logical systematicity and methodological interpretations  
Why do need to complement Kant’s account of empirical truth with reason’s 
systematicity? In order to answer this question, we need to understand what 
our epistemic situation without the systematicity of reason is like and how 
exactly reason is supposed to contribute to it. These are not easy matters to 
settle. The Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic is a convoluted text, and 
interpretations substantially differ. Although Kant’s presentation of 
systematicity may seem to have little to do with truth, I will show that this not 
the case and that Kant does present a compelling argument that explains 
why reason is a necessary condition of empirical truth. 
Kant initially presents reason’s systematic unity as a “logical principle” 
(A648/B676). That is, a principle that applies to concepts of the 
understanding. Since, as we saw, reason has no direct relation with objects, 
it cannot create concepts of objects. Rather, it “unites the manifold of 
concepts through ideas by positing a certain collective unity as the goal of 
the understanding’s actions” (A644/B672). This process of logical unification 
is called by Kant the “hypothetical use of reason” (A647/B675). Reason is 
used hypothetically when the universality of a concept is not given, but only 
assumed “problematically” —as a “mere idea” (ibid.). 
Kant uses clear examples to illustrate the hypothetical use of 
systematic unity: the ideas of pure elements in the chemistry of his time 
(“pure air,” “pure water,” and “pure earth”; A646/B674) and, more extensively, 
the idea of “fundamental power” (Grundkraft) (A649/B677). The latter (FP), 
for instance, is an idea which is supposed to unify all particular cognitions (or 
representations) of powers (P). When applied to the human mind, this idea 
unifies “sensation, consciousness, imagination, memory, wit, the power to 
distinguish, pleasure, desire, etc.” (P1, P2, P3, etc.).  We do not logically know 
“whether there is such a thing” (ibid.)—and yet we introduce such an idea in 
order to “test” each particular case: 
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Several particular cases, which are all certain, are tested (versucht) by the rule, to 
see if they flow from it, and in the case in which it seems that all the particular 
cases cited follow from it, then the universality of the rule is inferred, including all 
subsequent cases, even those that are not given in themselves. (A646–7/B674–5; 
emphases added) 
 
To use Kant’s example, in accordance with FP we try to see “if imagination 
combined with consciousness may not be memory, wit, the power to 
distinguish, or perhaps even understanding and reason” (A649/B677). If we 
manage to reduce several particular cases to common rules, we infer their 
universality: in this case, we infer the hypothetical concepts of “comparatively 
fundamental” powers (FP1, FP2, etc.; ibid.). We can then compare these 
concepts once again in order to approximate the unity and universality of an 
“absolutely fundamental” power (FP; ibid.)—the latter, however, remains an 
idea beyond our reach. 
Although Kant explicitly says that the systematic unity to which the 
hypothetical use of reason is directed is a “touchstone of truth” for the rules 
of the understanding (A647/B675), most interpreters have not been 
impressed by this and other similar claims. Methodological readers, in 
particular, maintain that systematic unity is a subjective method for extending 
our already obtained empirical cognitions rather than a necessary condition 
of empirical truth. In fact, they take the standard account of empirical truth I 
presented in 2.3 to mean that the act of comparison is sufficient to generate 
the basic level of empirical concepts (in the example, P1, P2, P3, etc.). 
Reason is instead required to ground second-order concepts that have no 
direct evidence to support them (e.g., fundamental powers, FP1, FP2). As 
such, it is at best a necessary condition for extending our empirical cognition, 
rather than making it possible.  
I submit that, at this stage of Kant’s formulation, one may be tempted 
to agree with the methodological reading. For logical systematicity is a 
principle that can only be valid as a subjective principle that applies to our 
cognitions. Indeed, Kant says that it is a “subjectively and logically necessary 
as method” (A648/B676). But if systematicity is only a subjective method, it is 
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unclear how it can contribute at all to empirical truth as the agreement of 
empirical cognition with objects.  
This is not, however, the end of the story. Kant is explicit that the 
employment of a logical principle of unification that allows us to postulate 
ideas, in turn, requires a corresponding principle that does not merely reflect 
a subjective “economy” or “an interest of reason,” but somehow applies to 
the “constitution of objects” (ibid.). Such a principle, Kant says: 
 
would be a transcendental principle of reason, which would make systematic unity 
not merely something subjectively and logically necessary, as method, but 
objectively necessary. (A658/B676) 
 
The transcendental principle of systematic unity, which Kant most often 
exemplifies with the principle of “genera” or “sameness of kind” (A654/B682), 
is presented as a precondition for the logical principle of unity: 
 
In fact it cannot even be seen how there could be a logical principle of rational unity 
among rules unless a transcendental principle is presupposed, through which such 
a systematic unity, as pertaining to the object itself, is assumed a priori as 
necessary. (A650/B678) 
 
Moreover, Kant expands his account to include other rational operations for 
the use of the understanding according to a triadic structure similar to that of 
the categories. To the transcendental principle of genera is opposed the 
“transcendental principle of species,” which demands “manifoldness and 
variety in things despite their agreement under the same genus” 
(A657/B685). And finally, a third principle—as the combination of the first 
two—is included in order to complete the systematic unity of reason: the 
“transcendental principle of affinity,” which presumes continuity of natural 
forms, that is “continuous transition” among species (ibid.).17 
 
17 In this chapter, I particularly focus on the first, and probably most exemplary, application of 
systematic unity (‘sameness of kind’). This is not to say, however, that the other two 
principles would not deserve a more detailed examination than the one presented here. On 
‘specification’ and ‘affinity’ as logical principles of reason, see Chapter 3. 
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It is important to point out that the mere transition from logical to 
transcendental principles is insufficient to settle the controversy between 
methodological and transcendental interpretations. Transcendental principles 
can still be interpreted in a way that does not make them necessary condition 
of empirical cognition. Most methodological interpreters have indeed tried to 
square their accounts with the transcendental principles of reason: either 
interpreting them in a deflationary way,18 or as mere presuppositions 
resulting from an illusion.19 Nor is the transition per se particularly telling 
regarding our specific question about empirical truth. I will argue, however, 
that Kant, in order to support the transition from logical to transcendental 
principles of reason, offers a specific argument—the Variety Argument—
which is supposed to complement his doctrine of empirical truth. In the next 
subsection I will introduce the argument and critically engage with previous 
interpretations of it. 
 
3.2 Transcendental interpretations of reason’s systematicity and 
objections  
The Variety Argument takes the form of a reductio ad absurdum and is 
heavily relied upon by transcendental interpreters. The argument reads as 
follows in its most detailed formulation: 
 
If among the appearances offering themselves to us there were such a great 
variety (Verschiedenheit)—I will not say of form (for they might be similar to one 
another in that) but of content, i.e., regarding the manifoldness of existing 
essences  (der Mannigfaltigkeit existirender Wesen)20—that even the most acute 
human understanding, through comparison (Vergleichung) of one with another, 
could not detect the least similarity (a case which can at least be thought), then the 
logical law of genera would not obtain at all, no concept of a genus, nor any other 
universal concept, indeed no understanding at all would obtain, since it is the 
understanding that has to do with such concepts. The logical principle of genera 
 
18 That is, not as conditions of experience as empirical cognition. On Guyer’s account the 
idea of systematic unity is only “transcendental in some sense” (Guyer 1990, 28). Similarly, 
Willaschek argues that “transcendental” here only means “concerning objects” (see 
Willaschek 2018, 117). 
19 E.g., Grier 1997 and Pickering 2011.  
20 I have modified Guyer’s translation which reads “manifoldness of existing beings.” 
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therefore presupposes (setzt…voraus) a transcendental one if it is to be applied to 
nature (by which I here understand only objects that are given to us). According to 
that principle, sameness of kind is necessarily presupposed in the manifold of a 
possible experience (even though we cannot determine its degree a priori), 
because without it no empirical concepts and hence no experience would be 
possible. (A653/B681) 
 
Despite its apparent simplicity, the argument has proven to be particularly 
difficult to unravel. Geiger 2003 offers the most detailed reconstruction of 
reason’s transcendental contribution to truth and finds in this passage textual 
support against the methodological reading. For here Kant clearly envisages 
a situation in which no empirical cognition would be possible without reason’s 
transcendental principles. What is then the problem with the methodological 
reading?  
Geiger argues that the methodological interpretation erroneously 
assumes that for basic concepts of experience the condition of applicability is 
given by intuition alone. The lowest level of experience, according to 
methodological readers, seems not to require any additional transcendental 
assumption but it is just, as it were, “read off intuition” (Geiger 2003, 288). To 
use the example of the concept ‘gold’ we have seen in 2.3, the marks that 
allow us to apply this concept (‘yellow,’ ‘not-rusting,’ etc.) are simply given to 
us in intuition through comparison of similarities. 
For Geiger, this assumption fails to recognize an important implication 
of Kant’s claim that intuitions without concepts are “blind” (B75): as he puts it, 
that “intuitions without empirical concepts are still blind” (Geiger 2003, 290). 
On this reading, the Variety Argument shows that even ‘basic’ relations of 
similarity must be conceived of as conceptual relations holding between 
appearances. For instance, to say that that two appearances are similar (say, 
yellow) is to say that they can be subsumed under a single concept (the 
concept ‘yellow’). At the same time, this concept must be further specified 
according to its own marks (which are also empirical concepts).  
We therefore need ever more general and specific empirical concepts 
to determine the basic level (and any level) of experience. The 
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transcendental assumption of an infinitely specified system of concepts is 
therefore, for Geiger, a necessary condition for concepts to correspond to 
objects (see ibid., 291). This reference is never immediately extracted from 
intuition, but always made possible by a systematic relation of concepts.21  
This reading, as I see it, has the merit of attempting to explain why 
systematicity should be thought of as a necessary condition of all empirical 
cognition. Its interpretative cost, however, is high. Kant’s corpus is 
notoriously ambiguous on whether empirical concepts are required in order 
for particular objects to be given to us.22 Indeed, methodological readers 
have rejected this reading by appealing to passages in which Kant seems to 
admit that particular objects can be given to us in intuition.23 Moreover, this 
interpretation does not seem to fully capture what Kant is after when 
introducing reason’s transcendental principles and presenting the Variety 
Argument. Geiger suggests reading transcendental systematicity as the 
presupposition of an infinitely specified system of concepts. But as we saw, 
transcendental principles are not logical principles that apply to concepts. 
They rather presuppose systematic unity as “objectively necessary,” or 
“pertaining to the object itself” (A658/B676; A650/B678; see also 
A668/B696). Indeed, in the Variety Argument Kant seems concerned with the 
problem of how logical principles (presupposing systematic unity of concepts) 
can be “applied” to the objects of nature (A653/B681).  
Allison’s account of the Appendix seems to better capture this aspect 
of the principles of reason. According to his reconstruction, the 
transcendental principles of reason amount to the presuppositions of an 
underlying order of nature (or of “natural kinds”; Allison 2004, 434) which acts 
as an “application condition” for the concepts of the understanding and 
 
21 See Geiger 2003, 290–1: “The reference of a concept is given through its systematic, 
conceptual relations with other concepts. The world of objects is given to us through a 
system of concepts.” 
22 Geiger seems therefore committed to a form of ‘conceptualism’ when arguing that the 
“empirical world” can be given to us only through empirical concepts (see Geiger 2003, 290–
1). 
23 See, e.g., Pickering 2011. 
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assures the rationality of our application of logical principles to nature (ibid., 
435). In his words: 
 
Without unity, that is, without the possibility of grouping diverse phenomena into 
genera and these into higher genera, and so forth, the understanding could gain no 
foothold in the world. Similarly, without the capacity to draw distinctions within 
these genera, that is, to divide them into species, and these into subspecies, and 
so forth, the understanding would be unable to take a single further step. (Allison 
2004, 434)  
 
While Allison’s proposal seems closer to the gist of the Variety Argument, the 
reason why the understanding “could gain no foothold in the world” without 
reason is far from clear. Why would the understanding be insufficient to 
group different phenomena? What is missing in our epistemic situation 
without reason? And what does reason do precisely to enable empirical 
cognition? These questions remain largely unanswered in Allison’s reading, 
thus making the view that systematicity is a necessary condition of empirical 
cognition easily objectionable.  
One prominent challenge has been recently made by Pickering. For 
Kant, as we saw, seems to hold an empiricist account of concepts. Since we 
actually discover regularities in our experience of nature, why do we have to 
transcendentally assume something that experience can teach? From a 
methodological perspective, Pickering argues that the fact of experience 
absolves us of the need to make such an assumption. Systematicity cannot 
be a transcendental principle, for the simple reason that empirical cognition 
and experience are possible without it.  
 
The passage [the one presenting the Variety Argument: A653/B681] concerns the 
possibility that the manifold of possible experience is completely heterogeneous. 
Of course, if this were true, then neither empirical concepts nor experience would 
be possible. But all Kant has supposed in this counterfactual statement is there 
being no similarity at all among appearances. (Pickering 2011, 439) 
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Pickering notices that the argument only holds in the scenario postulated at 
the beginning of the passage: a world populated by irreducible differences. 
This is, however, our case—we normally cluster properties and things, at 
least minimally, without the aid of reason because our world is indeed full of 
amenable similarities. Reason is instead only responsible for systematizing 
such an ordering: in the methodological terminology, systematicity gives us a 
“maximum” of order, not the “minimum” we need for basic experience (ibid.).  
This objection may indeed deal a mortal blow to any transcendental 
interpretation. I think, however, that a convincing answer to this challenge 
can be given by revising the interpretation of Kant’s argument. 
 
4. Reason’s contribution to truth 
 
4.1 The Variety Argument revisited 
One may assume that the scenario Kant introduces with the Variety 
Argument applies only to a world with no similarities. Pickering convincingly 
argues that the fact of experience already dispenses us from any proper 
transcendental assumption.24 But if this is correct, what use would a 
counterfactual postulating a world populated by irreducible differences have? 
I contend that the function of the Variety Argument is not simply that of 
postulating an extreme-case scenario which happens not to be our own. 
Rather, it describes a ‘genuine’ possibility, namely a possibility that applies to 
our world and that would undermine our epistemic situation if we were not 
equipped with reason’s principles of systematicity. In other words, it tells us 
what is missing without reason’s contribution and what reason is required to 
do to correct the initial state. 
In order to understand what jeopardizes our epistemic situation 
without reason, we first need to clarify what is exactly postulated in this 
scenario. Kant specifies that the “great variety” of appearances does not 
concern the forms we encounter in experience—in fact, appearances “might 
be similar to one another in that”—but the very “content” of appearances—
 
24 Pickering maintains reason’s principles as illusory principles that are “only assumed to be 
or presupposed as transcendental” (Pickering 2011, 446). 
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the “manifoldness of existing essences (Wesen).” In this scenario, Kant 
continues, even “the most acute human understanding” could not detect “the 
least similarity.” Accordingly, the similarities that any understanding could not 
identify among appearances are similarities in terms of “content” or 
“essence.” Kant also calls the essence of something its “nature” (e.g., 
Vienna, 24:840) and defines it as the “first basic concept of everything that 
really and in fact belongs to the thing” (Blomberg, 24:116; see also Jäsche, 
9:144).25  
But what does it mean for appearances to be formally similar, yet 
various in terms of ‘essential’ content? To answer this question, we need to 
go back to our discussion of empirical truth and take a closer look at the 
example Kant most extensively discusses in the first part of the Appendix: 
the idea of fundamental power (FP). In our previous discussion, we saw that 
the understanding contributes to the formal aspect of empirical truth. It does 
so by allowing objects to be represented through its concepts—for instance, 
through the pure concept of substance. These concepts, however, do not 
determine the particular content of the given object—the content of 
appearances is given to us in experience only. This means that two 
appearances may be formally similar as ‘substances,’ and yet radically differ 
with respect to their content. 
This distinction finds textual confirmation in the way Kant describes 
the particular concepts of powers that the idea of fundamental power (FP), as 
we saw, is supposed to unify. These powers (P1, P2, P3, etc.) issue from the 
application of the concept of “causality of a substance” or “power” (Kraft) to 
the manifold of appearances. Note that ‘power’ (P) is a concept of the 
understanding and results from the combination of two categories: substance 
 
25 It is plausible to assume that Kant is here referring to what he otherwise calls “real 
essence.” See, for example, Jäsche, 9:61: “for the real essence of the thing (esse rei) we 
require cognition of those predicates on which, as grounds of cognition, everything that 
belongs to the existence of the thing depends” (emphasis added). Kant clearly states that 
the presupposition of systematicity concerns the “essence (Wesen) of things” in A693/B721: 
“the regulative principle demands that systematic unity be presupposed absolutely as a unity 
of nature that is recognized not only empirically but also a priori, though still indeterminately, 
and hence as following from the essence (Wesen) of things.” For an extended discussion of 
the relation between real essences and reason, see Chapter 5. 
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and causality. P1, P2, P3, etc. are therefore all ‘powers’ in the formal sense, 
and yet we still do not know whether they are “various expressions of one 
and the same power” (A649/B677). This is a separate, empirical question 
that requires a different kind of unity: the idea of ‘fundamental power’ (FP).26 
If this is correct, we have gained an important insight. While the logical 
dimension may lead us to think that systematicity only applies to already 
given empirical concepts, this is not the case at the ‘basic’ level of 
experience. P1, P2, P3, etc. are direct applications of pure concepts of the 
understanding to appearances, but they are still not empirical concepts. 
Systematicity is required in order to form concepts of their unity (in this case, 
empirical concepts of “comparatively fundamental” powers that we 
progressively compare and unify; FP1, FP2, etc.). In fact, Kant says that when 
the logical law of genera does not obtain, “no concept of a genus, nor any 
other universal concept, indeed no understanding at all would obtain” 
either.27  
Now, the Variety argument postulates that formally similar 
appearances indeed differ from each other. Is this a mere counterfactual 
statement disconfirmed by experience? Or rather a genuine possibility that 
jeopardizes our epistemic situation without reason?  I contend that Kant 
argues for the latter option. For (1) as we just saw, pure understanding 
cannot determine how various appearances are. As far as the categories are 
concerned, it is entirely possible that nature presents us with a variety of 
appearances that defies our intellectual grasp. As a result, we would be 
given with a manifold of irreducible particular representations and it would not 
make sense for us to attempt a unification of them. If this cannot be done by 
the understanding a priori, it may be done empirically—the fact that the 
understanding finds similarities should suffice to eliminate the possibility of 
this scenario. But this cannot be right either. For (2) the similarities that the 
understanding may detect through comparison are merely contingent and 
 
26 On my reading, empirical concepts are therefore necessary to acquire empirical cognition 
of particular objects. Contra conceptualist readings, however, I maintain that particular 
objects can be given to us in intuition without empirical concepts. 
27 This is not to deny that systematicity can also be applied to concepts we have already 
formed. Its function would then be that of forming new empirical concepts. 
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cannot tell us whether various appearances are “really and in fact” similar, or 
similar “with respect to the manifold of existing essences.”28 As Kant 
repeatedly asserts, we cannot derive systematic unities by simply looking at 
the “contingent constitution of nature” (e.g., A651/B679; A645/B673).  
A priori and empirical considerations seem insufficient to rule out the 
possibility that appearances are really different from each other. This, 
however, would jeopardize the possibility for any cognizing subject to acquire 
empirical cognition. In the case of fundamental power, reason would be “free 
to admit that it is just as possible that all powers are different in kind” and we 
would have no “warrant” to “treat the manifoldness of the powers which 
nature gives to our cognition as merely a concealed unity” (A651/B679). In 
other words, we could not investigate nature according to principles of unity 
and we would be left with a manifold of irreducible particular cognitions.29 
If without reason our epistemic situation would be defective, what 
does reason do in order to correct this state? In a nutshell, Kant’s solution is 
the following. Reason is invoked in order to “presuppose” (voraussetzen) 
systematic unity among appearances, or “in the manifold of possible 
experience.” This is the transcendental step that gives any cognizing subject 
“warrant” to postulate logical unities and systematize appearances. For 
instance, reason can start unifying the manifold of powers according to a 
logical principle of unity only by presupposing that various appearances 
belong to the same fundamental power—to use Kant’s term, we can 
investigate nature only by presupposing “sameness of kind” in nature. 
Importantly, sameness of kind as well as the other principles of systematicity 
must be presupposed necessarily. Recall that the presupposition of this unity 
cannot be derived from the contingent similarities we encounter in 
 
28 In his lectures on logic, Kant explains that we cannot know the essences of things 
because we cannot have complete experience of them: “to have insight into the real essence 
exceeds human understanding. We cannot provide a complete ground for a single thing. 
This requires a universal, complete experience, and to obtain all possible experience 
concerning an object is impossible” (Vienna, 24:839–40). See Chapter 5 for a discussion of 
this problem. 
29 If this reconstruction is correct, Kant’s view in the First Critique seems to have several 
similarities with the transcendental deduction of the principle of purposiveness in the Critique 
of the Power of Judgment (see CPJ, 5:181–6). Comparing the two texts goes, however, well 
beyond the remit of this chapter. 
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experience. The presupposition of unity is, instead, a transcendental and 
necessary “law of reason” without which “no empirical concepts and hence 
no experience would be possible” (A654/B682). 
Before spelling out the details of reason’s contribution to empirical 
concept formation and truth, let me clarify one important point. The 
necessary presupposition of systematic unity may seem to lead Kant into 
metaphysical territories. But at a closer look, this is not the case. For one 
thing, the presupposition of systematic unity does not concern things in 
themselves, but appearances—as Kant says, by nature he means “only 
objects that are given to us” (ibid.). And second, systematic unity is only 
presupposed in order to ground the rationality of our logical classifications. 
As we saw, the understanding cannot determine the content of appearances 
nor rule out the possibility of the Variety Argument. Even less can reason do 
such things since it is only indirectly related to objects. In fact, Kant says that 
reason only presupposes systematic unity “indeterminately” (A693/B721). 
This means that the presupposition of systematic unity does not determine 
nature as systematic nor preestablishes what we are going to find in it (for 
instance, fundamental power). It is, instead, a necessary law that regulates 
our empirical investigation of nature and without which the latter could not 
take off the ground. 
 
4.2 Completing the conditions of truth 
That reason is a “touchstone of truth” was a rather puzzling claim after the 
introduction of logical systematicity. Indeed, its being a subjective principle 
which applies to concepts may incline us to think that systematic unity is only 
a methodological principle to extend our knowledge. The above reading of 
the Variety Argument, however, leads to a very different picture. First, the 
particular cognitions reason unifies are not (necessarily) already acquired 
empirical concepts. Rather, where categories are applied to appearances, 
reason’s systematicity is required in order to generate empirical concepts. 
Second, we saw that the logical dimension of systematicity is only possible 
on the basis of an objective, transcendental presupposition of systematicity. 
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Indeed, logical systematicity alone is insufficient to explain why reason is a 
condition of truth as the agreement of cognitions with objects. After 
considering systematicity as both a logical and transcendental principle, I 
should be able to finally explain how reason contributes to empirical truth. 
As we saw, reason cannot determine the objects of experience. It can, 
however, legitimately apply to the understanding and indirectly contribute to 
truth. Reason can therefore be a “touchstone of truth” for the understanding 
and assures its “coherent use” and “correctness” only by regulating the way 
the understanding relates to empirical objects (that is, the agreement of 
cognitions with objects that represents the relation of truth; see 2.1). But how 
exactly does reason indirectly complete the conditions of empirical truth 
provided by the understanding? To answer this question more precisely, we 
need to go back to Kant’s account of empirical concept formation (i.) and of 
the agreement of empirical cognitions with objects (ii.).  
(i.) It is indeed remarkable how well several passages of the Appendix 
transcendentally dovetail with the empiricism of the Jäsche Logic. As we 
saw, “comparison” (Vergleichung) is the general term Kant uses to indicate 
the operation through which empirical concepts arise and, specifically, the 
first of the three “logical actus” of concepts formation. Now, the Variety 
Argument postulates a scenario in which the very comparison (Vergleichung) 
of appearances cannot lead to any recognized similarity. If this scenario, as 
argued, genuinely applies to our epistemic situation without reason, the 
possibility of comparing objects of experience would be undermined not only 
in the extreme cases of absolute absence of similarities, but also and more 
fundamentally in the basic experience of our world. In other words, this 
means that the empiricist account Kant offers in the Jäsche Logic is now 
deemed incomplete.  
I argue that Kant in the Appendix technically complements his 
empiricist account of concept formation. No matter how many various 
appearances we compare, without the transcendental presuppositions of 
reason, we would have, Kant says, no “universal concept” and “no 
understanding at all would obtain, since it is the understanding that has to do 
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with such concepts” (A653/B681). By presupposing systematicity among 
appearances, reason assures that the understanding is coherently used with 
respect to empirical objects. In particular, reason postulates ideal unities 
according to which, as we saw in our discussion of the hypothetical use of 
reason, the understanding can compare various appearances and generate 
empirical hypotheses at any level of experience. If indeed the understanding 
manages to find contingent similarities through comparison of appearances 
(for instance, different powers of our mind are compared and found to be 
identical) we can provisionally infer the “universality of the rule” or the 
relevant empirical concept (in the case discussed, the empirical concepts of 
“comparatively fundamental” powers; FP1, FP2, etc.). The systematic unity of 
reason is therefore a necessary condition for the formation of empirical 
concepts.  
(ii.) Empirical truth also requires that empirical cognitions (what I take 
to be cognitions containing empirical concepts) agree with objects. As we 
saw, such agreement requires not only that an empirical cognition is 
objectively valid, but also that it is coherently connected according to the 
categories of the understanding—in other words, that we have effectively 
applied the categories of the understanding to the order of perceptions. But 
such criterion is more problematic than it seems. As noted by Hanna, it is not 
clear how the coherent connection of perceptions can sufficiently distinguish 
false from true cognitions. Although merely subjective representations, such 
as dreams and hallucinations, do not generally follow the rules of the 
understanding, there is no logical inconsistency in thinking the possibility of a 
well-ordered, yet purely subjective order of perceptions (Hanna 1993, 15). As 
a result, for Hanna, coherence is an ultimately insufficient criterion of truth 
and such insufficiency has dire consequences for Kant’s theory of truth as a 
whole (ibid., 15–17). I argue, however, that Kant does have internal 
resources to address this problem.  
As we saw, the Variety Argument postulates precisely a scenario in 
which the rule-governedness of appearances (according to the pure 
concepts of the understanding) is insufficient to ground empirical truths. The 
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effective application of the rules of the understanding to perceptions of 
powers, for example, does not ensure that such powers are not entirely 
different from each other and that empirical cognition of them is possible. In 
other words, the Variety Argument describes a situation in which empirical 
cognitions, even if coherently connected according to the rules of the 
understanding, still do not necessarily correspond to the objects of nature.30 
We simply do not know whether the conceptual relations we establish among 
appearances really map onto relations between existing essences. As a 
result, the Variety Argument shows that there is a further gap between the 
intellectual coherence of empirical cognitions and their truth.31 
I contend that the solution to the Variety Argument—that we must 
presuppose systematicity in possible experience, or that systematicity itself is 
objectively valid—is meant to progressively bridge this gap. Kant is not 
leaning towards a ‘coherentist’ interpretation of truth nor towards a 
metaphysical reading of the principles of reason. Rather, he is arguing that 
reason, by presupposing systematicity in nature, sets an indispensable 
standard for the use of the understanding in relation to empirical objects. The 
understanding ought not be satisfied with well-ordered particular cognitions 
based on contingent similarities but should aim to progressively unify them, 
refine them, and test them against experience—in a word, approximate them 
to true cognitions, or cognitions that agree with objects. This is why Kant 
says that without reason we would have “no sufficient mark of empirical 
truth”—as he specifies, “in regard to the latter [empirical truth] we simply 
have to presuppose the systematic unity of nature as objectively valid and 
necessary” (A651/B679). 
But what does it mean that systematicity is presupposed as objectively 
valid in regard to empirical truth? Kant fully explains this peculiar notion of 
objective validity at the end of the first part of the Appendix. That systematic 
 
30 Despite contingent similarities in experience, we could “admit that it is just as possible that 
all powers are different in kind” (A651/B679); see 4.1. 
31 Kant generally takes objective validity as a necessary, yet insufficient condition of truth 
(see e.g. A760/B788). A concept is objectively valid when it can be legitimately applied to an 
object; it is true when it also agrees with that object. For an excellent discussion, see 
Willaschek 2017, 106–7. 
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unity is objectively valid means that it can be applied to objects of nature 
indirectly and through the use of the understanding: 
 
Since every principle that establishes for the understanding a thoroughgoing unity 
of its use a priori is also valid, albeit only indirectly, for the object of experience, the 
principles of pure reason will also have objective reality in regard to this object, yet 
not so as to determine something in it, but only to indicate the procedure in 
accordance with which the empirical and determinate use of the understanding in 
experience can be brought into thoroughgoing agreement with itself, by bringing it 
as far as possible into connection with the principle of thoroughgoing unity (A665–
6/B693–4)  
 
Principles of reason, by applying to the understanding a priori, are also valid 
for the objects of experience to which the understanding directly relates—not 
as determinations of those objects, but as principles that necessarily regulate 
the understanding in its investigation of nature. In other words, reason does 
not preestablish the truth of cognitions but sets up the “procedure” according 
to which we progressively systematize particular cognitions and approximate 
them to empirical truth.32 This procedure is, of course, fallible and never fully 
completable, but necessary to find out whether our cognitions agree with 
objects. Presupposing sameness of kind, for instance, does not tell us 
whether there is such a thing as fundamental power, but legitimately 
prescribes to the understanding to progressively unify various cognitions of 
powers, refine them, and test them against experience. As Kant says, 
principles of systematicity ultimately originate from “the interest of reason in 
regard to a certain possible perfection of the cognition of the object” 
(A666/B694; emphases added). On my reconstruction, the “perfection of the 
cognition of the object” is nothing but the empirical truth that reason allows 
the understanding to approximate. 
 
 
32 Accordingly, Kant also says that reason’s principles are necessary for attaining the 
“complete concept of the object” (A510/B38) and approximating to “the highest possible 
degree of empirical unity” (A677/B705).  
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5. Conclusion 
If the above reconstruction has successfully shown that reason’s 
systematicity is compatible with Kant’s notion of truth and indeed completes 
it, then we have no reason for dismissing Kant’s explicit claims in the 
Appendix regarding reason as a necessary condition of empirical truth and, a 
fortiori, of empirical cognition, as suggested by methodological interpreters. 
Such a dismissal would not only be unfaithful to Kant’s text but would also 
leave us with an incomplete reconstruction of Kant’s notion of empirical truth. 
To sum up, I suggested the following points regarding the relation 
between systematic unity and empirical truth. Reason’s systematicity is a 
condition of empirical truth because it guarantees the coherent use of the 
understanding with respect to empirical objects. It does so by complementing 
the understanding with respect to two crucial aspects: (i.) it postulates ideas 
according to which the understanding can compare appearances and infer 
empirical concepts; and (ii.) it regulates the understanding in its investigation 
of nature so that we can approximate empirical cognitions to truth. 
That the objectivity of our empirical investigation of nature is grounded 
upon a rational presupposition may draw criticism from many quarters. If 
objectivity is, as it were, commanded by reason (as Kant says, “here reason 
does not beg but commands”; A653/B6891), the foundations of empirical 
knowledge may seem particularly shaky. Indeed, one might argue that this 
interpretation can re-open the door to skepticism. I argue, instead, that this 
implication represents a virtue of the proposed reading for it opens the 
possibility of an ongoing revisability of universal concepts: a thesis that 
should be welcomed from the point of view of empirical realism. Fundamental 
powers are possible as concepts only on the presupposition that sameness 
of kind is objectively valid. Importantly, however, this presupposition does not 
determine nature and further empirical research might subsequently lead us 
to dismiss the inferred concepts. For, as often happens in science, what we 
unified under a concept may turn out to be an actual variety of objects (in this 
case, ‘powers’) that does not conceal any hidden identity of kind. We would 
then try to conceptualize the same manifold (or part of it) under different 
concepts, but still in accordance with reason’s principles. 
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One might further object that if empirical cognitions have no definite 
truth value, then reason’s contribution to truth is eventually futile. In order to 
answer this objection, it is important to highlight the fact that systematicity is 
not only a presupposition but a transcendental one. It is true that by 
transcendentally presupposing the principles of reason we are not assigning 
any definitive truth value to determinate hypotheses. Reason’s principles, 
however, by presupposing systematic unity in nature, ground the very 
possibility for us to approximate hypotheses to empirical truths—even truths 
that will turn out to be inappropriate or false according to further empirical 
research. Recall that the degree of systematic unity is left completely 
undetermined at the transcendental level of reason. Empirical research 
progressively determines the undetermined objectivity presupposed by 
reason without, however, ever replacing it. Indeed, it is the non-empirical 
character of such principles to foster empirical research, by never 
predetermining its results and always demanding systematic unity in our 
cognition of appearances.33 
With this reconstruction, I hope to have clarified an aspect of reason 
that remains obscure even in transcendental interpretations of theoretical 
reason—an obscurity that actually supports the currently predominant 
methodological interpretations. I have tried to show that reason’s 
characterization as a ‘touchstone of truth’ can be squared with the theory of 
truth Kant grants and presupposes in his Critique. Reason provides us with 
two essential preconditions for the tenability of this theory at the empirical 
level (the possibility of formulating empirical concepts and approximating 
empirical cognitions to truth) and remarkably dovetails with the other criteria 
of truth and the empiricist account of concept formation that can be found in 
Kant’s corpus. Although barely acknowledged, reason’s contribution needs 
therefore to be included in any complete reconstruction of Kant’s theory of 
truth.
 








1. Introduction: the understanding and the empirical laws of 
nature 
Kant’s ‘Copernican revolution’ is presented in the Preface to the second 
edition of the Critique of Pure Reason as a “revolution in the way of thinking” 
(Bxii) on the basis of the examples of geometry and natural sciences. It 
consists in the “hypothesis” that we could get further in the problems of 
metaphysics if we reversed the traditional perspective on cognition.1 Contrary 
to the belief that our cognition must conform to the objects, Kant argues for 
the need to assume that the objects themselves must conform to our 
cognition (see Bxvi). In this way, the possibility of universal and necessary 
knowledge can be traced back to our forms of representations, namely the 
forms of intuition of space and time and the concepts of the understanding.  
According to this line of thought, it would be tempting to invest our 
forms of representations, and in particular those of the understanding, with 
an almost exhaustive foundational role, and reduce all truth regarding the 
objects of nature to their conformity to its concepts. Indeed, Kant seems to 
suggest this line of thought multiple times: e.g., when he defines the 
understanding as the “faculty of rules,” which is “in itself the legislation of 
nature” and whose principles “must provide appearances with their 
lawfulness” (A126).2 Although, as we will see, some interpreters of Kant try to 
support these bold claims, the problem of how empirical nature is related to 
the transcendental forms of the understanding is more puzzling than this 
view might suggest. In particular, commentators have long debated the 
status of empirical laws nature, namely the laws that govern nature in its 
 
1 Then “apodictically proved” in the course of the Critique “from the constitution of our 
representations of space and time and from the elementary concepts of the understanding” 
(Bxxii). 
2 See also Prolegomena, 4:320–2; and MFNS, 4:518–21. 
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given particularity and that we can only derive from our particular 
experience.3 
In fact, Kant’s characterization of the relation between the faculty of 
understanding and empirical laws of nature is twofold. On the one hand, 
empirical laws are said to be “only particular determinations of the pure laws 
of the understanding” and the understanding is said to be the very “source” of 
the manifold of them (A128). This origin is given a clear modal significance: it 
is under and in accordance with the laws of the understanding that empirical 
laws are made “first possible” (A128–A216/B263). The laws of the 
understanding make nature, as it were, “possible at all,”4 “without relation,” 
however, as Kant puts it in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, 
“to any determinate object of experience, and thus undetermined with 
respect to the nature of this or that thing in the sensible world” (MFNS, 
4:469). Now, on Kant’s account, what kind of possibility is the understanding 
the source of? Inasmuch as it provides the forms, or conceptual structures, 
according to which objects are to be represented, the understanding is the 
source of formal possibility.5 Particular laws “receive their formal possibility” 
from the understanding, or they are possible only through the latter as far “as 
their form is concerned” (A127).6 And since Kant maintains the traditional 
definition of truth as the agreement of cognition with the object, he also 
claims that with these principles we can inquire “only the formal conditions of 
empirical truth” (A191/B236), that is what makes an agreement with objects 
possible as such. 
 
3 Empirical laws of nature are to be distinguished from a priori transcendental laws of the 
understanding (as they are presented in the Transcendental Analytic) and from a priori 
metaphysical laws of nature (described in the MFNS). Empirical laws of nature are instead a 
posteriori laws, or laws derived from experience. They include laws of matter as such (e.g., 
Newton’s law of universal gravitation) and laws of different kinds of matter (e.g., laws of 
chemistry). For a detailed discussion of such distinctions, see Stang 2016, chapter 8. 
4 What the understanding does “is not to make the representation of the objects distinct, but 
rather to make the representation of an object possible at all” (A199/B244). 
5 For an instructive analysis of formal possibility, see Stang 2016, 200–14. 
6 See the first “postulate of empirical thinking in general”: “whatever agrees with the formal 
conditions of experience (in accordance with intuition and concepts) is possible” 
(A218/B265). Empirical laws are formally possible inasmuch as they agree with the laws of 
the understanding. 
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On the other hand, empirical laws, inasmuch as they deal with 
particular determinations of nature, cannot be completely derived from the 
understanding. If empirical laws are indeed empirical (and thereby involve 
empirically determined appearances that cannot be reduced to our forms of 
cognition), “experience,” Kant says, “must come into play” (B165) in order for 
us to become acquainted with them. In modal terms, it follows that the laws 
of the understanding constitute a necessary, though insufficient condition of 
possibility for particular laws. The possibility assured by the understanding 
can account for the conceptual form according to which empirical 
determinations are cognized, but not for the distinct content experience offers 
us. This point can be clarified through the following passage from the 
Metaphysical Foundations:  
 
Now to cognize something a priori means to cognize it from its mere possibility. But 
the possibility of determinate natural things cannot be cognized from their mere 
concepts […] Hence, in order to cognize the possibility of determinate natural 
things, and thus to cognize them a priori, it is still required that the intuition 
corresponding to the concept be given a priori, that is, that the concept be 
constructed. (MFNS, 4:470) 
 
A priori concepts must be complemented by a priori intuitions in order to 
know the possibility of particular natural things. Now, in the case of 
metaphysical laws of nature, which merely concern the concepts of “material 
thing” and “thinking thing” as such, a priori intuitions can be provided in the 
form of mathematical constructions of concepts (MFNS, 4:470–1).7 But when 
it comes to empirical a posteriori laws of nature, which involve determinate 
natural things, there seems to be no mathematical way of filling in our formal 
structures. That is the reason why, according to many interpreters, Kant 
holds that disciplines like chemistry are doomed to remain improper 
sciences.8 And yet Kant does not dismiss the possibility of empirical a 
 
7 Discussing the details of metaphysical laws of nature goes beyond the scope of this 
chapter.  
8 At least in the Metaphysical Foundations, Kant seems to hold this view: “chemistry can be 
nothing more than a systematic art or experimental doctrine, but never a proper science” 
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posteriori knowledge and, more specifically, deals with the problem of their 
necessity in many passages of his corpus. Indeed, the Kantian concept of 
law, and therefore also of empirical law, already includes its being necessary. 
Consider, for instance, the following Reflexion: 
 
Empirically one can certainly discover rules, but not laws—as Kepler in comparison 
with Newton—for to the latter belongs necessity, and hence that they are cognized 
a priori. Yet one always supposes that rules of nature are necessary—for on that 
account it is nature—and that they can be comprehended a priori; therefore one 
calls them laws by way of anticipation (anticipando). The understanding is the 
ground (Grund) of empirical laws, and thus of an empirical necessity, where the 
ground of lawlikeness (Gesetzmäßigkeit) can in fact be comprehended a priori: 
e.g., the law of causality, but not the ground of the determinate law. All 
metaphysical principles of nature are only grounds of lawlikeness. (Refl. 5414, 
18:176) 
 
In this passage, Kant distinguishes the ground of lawlikeness 
(Gesetzmäßigkeit) from the ground of determinate laws. The faculty of 
understanding with its transcendental laws, particularly the law of causality, is 
the ground of the former, but not, as Kant puts it clearly, of the latter. An 
obvious problem comes into play here. The understanding is the only faculty 
clearly identified as the source of particular laws, but its role is limited to 
being just the ground of lawlikeness. In order to become acquainted with 
particular determinations, the understanding must look to experience. 
Experience in turn offers nothing but rules, i.e., contingent regularities—not 
laws, to which necessity implicitly belongs. Kant, however, suggests the 
following direction of enquiry: we always suppose that the particular, 
determinate rules we discover in experience are laws, namely that they are 
necessary. We call them laws “anticipando.” That is, we anticipate that what 
is empirically encountered as rule is a necessary law. This solution is 
problematic, for it raises even more puzzling questions. How can it be 
legitimate to anticipate the necessity of laws that cannot be confirmed 
 
(MFNS, 470). He seems however to back off from endorsing such an idea; see Friedman 
1992. 
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empirically in their universality? If legitimate, what exactly do we need to 
make such anticipation? And finally, what is eventually the resulting modal 
status of empirical laws?  
Other textual evidence, spanning from the First to the Third Critique, 
adds some partially clarifying details to the same direction of enquiry. In the 
First Critique, Kant points out what we need to presuppose: 
 
Even laws of nature, if they are considered as principles of the empirical use of the 
understanding, at the same time carry with them an expression of necessity, thus 
at least the presumption of determination by grounds that are a priori and valid 
prior to all experience. (A159/B198; emphases added)  
 
In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant most clearly specifies that the 
understanding can never cognize the necessity of empirical laws, even 
though it requires that empirical rules form an “order of nature”:  
 
The understanding is of course in possession a priori of universal laws of nature, 
without which nature could not be an object of experience at all; but still it requires 
in addition a certain order of nature in its particular rules, which can only be known 
to it empirically and which from its point of view are contingent. These rules, 
without which there would be no progress from the general analogy of a possible 
experience in general to the particular, it must think as laws (i.e., as necessary), 
because otherwise they would not constitute an order of nature, even though it 
does not and never can cognize (erkennt) their necessity. (CPJ, 5:184; emphases 
added) 
 
Recapitulating the main points of the above passages: one must anticipate 
empirical rules of nature—or “think” them—as laws, for otherwise they would 
not form an “order of nature,” by presupposing that they are determined by “a 
priori grounds,” although the understanding can never actually cognize their 
necessity. It seems then that the very notion of nature attached to empirical 
laws compels us to regard them as proper laws, and not as mere empirical 
regularities. The expression itself ‘empirical laws of nature’ (empirische 
Gesetze der Natur) thus reveals an intrinsic ambiguity already present at the 
linguistic level. For, to use the classical distinction between types of genitive, 
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it can be interpreted both as a ‘subjective genitive,’ according to which nature 
is, as it were, the legislative subject, and as an ‘objective genitive,’ according 
to which instead empirical rules are regarded as laws in order to form an 
order of nature. The Kantian locution therefore contains a twofold—
metaphysical and epistemological—meaning that, as I will show, has raised 
several interpretative challenges in the literature. 
 
2. The trade-off between cognizability and necessity in 
interpretations of empirical laws 
Various interpretations have been developed in order to account for the 
necessity of empirical laws in Kant’s philosophy. They differ in many crucial 
aspects: disagreement in fact reigns over which faculty is the true source of 
necessity; how necessity of empirical laws obtains; and, most importantly, 
what is a law of nature for Kant. In this section, I will briefly assess virtues 
and flaws of three major interpretations of empirical laws: (1) the so-called 
‘Best system’ interpretations; (2) Friedman’s account (or the ‘Derivation 
account’); and (3) the ‘essentialist’ account (or the ‘Necessitation Account’).9 
For the sake of convenience, 1 and 2 will be treated together in the first part 
devoted to epistemological accounts of laws; 3 will be discussed separately 
as a metaphysical interpretation. I will argue that these accounts present us 
with a trade-off between necessity and cognizability of empirical laws of 
nature, that inadequately captures the full articulation of Kant’s position. 
 
2.1 Epistemological accounts of empirical laws 
Although different from each other, the so-called ‘Best system’ interpretations 
and Friedman’s account of empirical laws can be clustered in the same 
category of epistemological reading of necessity. In both readings, necessity 
obtains when empirical rules are inserted in epistemic constructions: 
respectively, the system of reason and the laws of the understanding. 
 
9 To follow Messina’s classification, see Messina 2017. 
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‘Best system’ interpreters10 generally agree that the true source of 
empirical laws is neither the understanding nor experience, but the faculty of 
reason.11 In particular, the necessity of empirical laws of nature is said to 
result from their being embedded within a system through the unifying 
function exercised by reason’s systematicity. In the Anglophone literature, 
this line of interpretation was first proposed by Buchdahl. His account of laws 
highlights the positive function of systematicity and suggests that a kind of 
“analogical” necessity can be attached to empirical rules when embedded 
within a system (Buchdahl 1969, 517–8). Although the details of his account 
remain quite vague, he deeply influenced two important ‘Best System’ 
interpreters: Kitcher and Guyer. 
Kitcher elaborates a detailed account of how systematicity is 
supposed to necessitate empirical laws of nature. Kitcher’s view is intended 
to offer a middle ground between two extreme views: on the one hand, a 
purely metaphysical account of laws, according to which laws “express 
objective natural necessities” (Kitcher 1986, 201); on the other hand, a 
“Mach-Duhem conception,” according to which science’s aim is just to 
conveniently systematize empirical regularities (ibid., 203). He argues that a 
belief in an empirical generalization, when taken in isolation, does not 
constitute knowledge of a law, since induction cannot prove any kind of 
necessity. But the very same belief can acquire necessity if the 
generalization plays a “particular role” in an ideal systematization of beliefs 
(ibid., 210). As he puts it: “laws are statements that play a particular role in 
the system that would emerge from an ideally extended inquiry” (ibid., 215). 
What is the exact “particular role” statements are supposed to play? This is 
not entirely clear, but presumably, statements are supposed to unify lower 
regularities in a meaningful way. In other words, regularities are considered 
to be laws because of the ‘connecting’ role they play in the construction of 
 
10 Major proponents include Buchdahl 1969, Brittan 1978, Kitcher 1986, and Guyer 1990. 
11 Or reflective judgment as it is presented in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. Reason 
and reflective judgment are problematically interpreted as overlapping faculties in several 
interpretations of empirical laws of nature. In this chapter, I do not address the problem of 
the relation between these two faculties, and I focus on reason and Kant’s solution in the 
First Critique. 
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the system itself.12 An “ideally extended enquiry” is the hierarchic system of 
laws based on empirical data and guided by the methodological rules that is 
described in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic and in the 
introductions to the Critique of the Power of Judgment. Necessary laws are 
therefore, strictly speaking, only the systematized regularities that belong to 
the ultimate, complete science, even though all statements about regularities 
that persist in our progressive systematization should be regarded as lawful. 
This interpretation is clearly advanced as an epistemological thesis. 
However, as noted by Kreines, it entails problematic conclusions about 
Kant’s account of “what it is to be a law of nature” (Kreines 2008, 530; see 
also Messina 2017, 136). At the metaphysical level, Kitcher has to maintain 
in a rather Humean fashion that laws are essentially regularities or 
generalizations.13 Laws are nothing but the “generalizations that would fit into 
the best system of empirical knowledge” (Kreines 2008, 530). One might 
here object that, for Kitcher, systematicity is actually constitutive of the 
necessity of regularities, i.e., it actively necessitates them as laws. But even 
granted such necessitation, necessity would still remain an ideal 
epistemological result rather than a “presumption of determination by 
grounds that are a priori and valid prior to all experience” (A159/B198) What 
we would end up with is, as it were, a mere ‘epistemological’ necessity, that 
is a kind of necessitation completely detached from the presupposition of 
grounds. In other words, nothing would assure us that what works in an 
epistemological system does reflect an underlying order of nature; or, 
similarly, that nature is necessarily ordered in accordance with the laws that 
obtain in our system. To sum up, for Kitcher, the epistemological dimension 
is made constitutive of, or determines, the metaphysical dimension of laws of 
nature: we do have knowledge of laws, but their necessity is only 
epistemologically superimposed upon nature, thus failing to do justice to 
Kant’s claim that we have to presume determination by a priori grounds. 
 
12 See also Messina 2017, 135. 
13 One of Kant’s main points against Hume is that regularity does not suffice for necessity. 
See Prolegomena, 4:258. 
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By contrast with Kitcher, Guyer claims that the inclusion of an 
empirical hypothesis in a hierarchical system has “some explanatory value 
and can lend the hypothesis at least an approximation of necessity” (Guyer 
1990, 238). Specific empirical laws are subsumed and, so to say, explained 
by generic higher-order laws. However, they do not become absolutely 
necessary once embedded within a system, because the “system as a whole 
may be only contingently true relative to possible alternative systems” (ibid.). 
As a result, Guyer seems to escape the charge leveled against Kitcher 
regarding the constitutive modal power of systematicity: what systematicity 
can actually provide us with is just an approximation of necessity, not 
absolute necessity. However, I do not think such an account can actually 
amend the flaws in Kitcher’s view. First, such hierarchic system of laws 
would still remain, at the metaphysical level, a system of mere regularities 
and there would be little difference between Kant’s and Hume’s accounts of 
necessity. Secondly, following Stang, Guyer’s proposal leaves us without a 
precise account of how the necessity of the highest-level laws—the laws that 
lend hypotheses an approximation of necessity—really obtains (see Stang 
2016, 232). And yet without such an account it is difficult to see how highest-
level empirical laws can possibly explain lower-level laws. 
A different account has been developed by Friedman in order to 
ground the shaky foundations of necessity and give empirical laws a solid 
anchoring in the a priori forms of cognition. Regularities, Friedman argues, 
even when systematized, can never acquire an a priori status that satisfies 
the requirements of necessity and universality that Kant seems to demand 
for laws in general, and therefore also for empirical laws of nature. Friedman 
thus claims that the only possible source of a priori necessity of empirical 
laws must be the understanding itself with its a priori principles, in particular 
the principle of causality. Friedman’s interpretative strategy hence consists in 
highlighting the foundational role of pure understanding.14  
Friedman points out that in order to have necessary laws, universal 
connections among kinds are required. Given that inductive procedures can 
 
14 See, for example, A195–6/B240–2 for textual support. 
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“never ground the strictly universal judgment that all events of type A are 
followed by events of type B” (Friedman 1992, 163), we must resort to the 
principles of the understanding, and in particular to the Second Analogy, to 
have such a grounding. Regularities are initially contingent, but once they 
have been subsumed under the principles of the understanding, they acquire 
necessary status. Empirical laws are therefore a combination of a priori 
principles and the inductively observed regularities to which those principles 
are applied.  
Friedman distinguishes two steps in the process of derivation 
according to the distinction of empirical laws in: (i.) laws of matter as such—
in particular, its highest law: the inverse-square law of gravitation; and (ii.) 
laws of different kinds of matter (e.g., chemical laws). Friedman’s derivation 
of necessity goes roughly as follows: once the transcendental principles are 
specified into metaphysical principles of pure natural science thanks to the 
addition of the empirical concept of matter,15 we need to apply the resulting 
principles to the initially merely empirical, or inductive regularities codified in 
Kepler’s laws. Once this is done, Newton’s law of universal gravitation, 
according to Friedman, results “uniquely and deductively” (ibid., 178). 
Friedman then extends such grounding to all the manifold of empirical 
judgments concerning subspecies of matter. Since this manifold is infinite, 
we can imagine such a grounding for the totality of empirical laws only as the 
regulative ideal of an unreachable complete science. This is where reason 
finally enters the picture on Friedman’s account. In this case, reason’s 
systematicity serves as a methodological principle that guides the 
subsumption of all empirical laws into a complete classificatory system. Only 
when such a classificatory system is completed will the totality of empirical 
laws receive a complete transcendental foundation. Reason has therefore a 
very different role from the one it plays in ‘Best system’ interpretations. As 
Friedman puts it, it is not supposed “to provide a kind of necessity that the 
understanding itself cannot provide, but rather to systematize the potentially 
 
15 A step that, according to Friedman, has the effect of restricting the principles to nonliving 
material substances and transforming the analogies of experience into the Newtonian laws 
of motion (Friedman 1992, 182–5). 
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infinite multiplicity of empirical laws under more and more general empirical 
laws so as to approximate to the a priori necessity issuing from the 
understanding and from the understanding alone” (ibid. 190). 
A full discussion of the grounding of necessity of the law of gravitation 
would require an extended digression on the Metaphysical Foundations of 
Natural Science and the status of physics at Kant’s time. Here I want just to 
point out a possible flaw in the idea of mere application of metaphysical 
principles to inductive regularities, such as Kepler’s laws. Friedman seems to 
take for granted the possibility of identifying such regularities. In the 
Appendix to Transcendental Dialectic, however, Kant tells a less 
straightforward story about how such regularities are identified. 
Regularities—and Kant takes Kepler’s laws as the main example—are in fact 
said to be clustered on the basis of reason’s principles of systematic unity: 
manifoldness, affinity and unity. It is only “under the guidance of those 
principles,” Kant explains, that “we come to a unity of genera in the forms of 
these paths (the course of the planets), but thereby also further to unity in the 
cause of all the laws of this motion (gravitation)” (A663/B691). By contrast 
with Friedman’s account, the identification of epistemically relevant 
regularities, and therefore also the very possibility of applying transcendental 
principles to them, seems to have a different source than the understanding, 
namely reason. 
More problematic, though, is the extension of this kind of grounding to 
the infinite manifold of empirical laws. Friedman is careful in trying to 
distinguish his account from a mere a priori derivation, but to say that the 
understanding is the only ground of the necessity of all the infinite manifold of 
empirical laws is to say that particular laws are formally necessary. As we 
saw, however, Kant explicitly denies that the understanding is the ground of 
determinate laws, and, as noted by Kreines, the fact that the understanding 
can never cognize their necessity points towards an inevitable epistemic limit 
rather than a mere quantitative problem of ‘extension.’16 Moreover, even 
 
16 “Kant’s epistemological commitments justify the claim that he in fact makes here: the limit 
is in principle and ineliminable; our lack of knowledge stems not from the state of science at 
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conceding that empirical laws can be derived from other laws—the laws of 
the understanding—, it is still unclear what really necessitates specific 
processes in nature. As Engelhard puts it, “laws are abstract entities, hence it 
seems impossible that they can act on concrete spatio-temporal things. 
Since the laws are not entities in space and time, they cannot be causes. But 
then, how can they necessitate the ongoings in nature?” (Engelhard 2018, 
28). 
Like ‘Best system’ interpretations, Friedman’s account of empirical 
laws has a clear epistemological status. Empirical laws are defined as laws 
whose knowledge can be derived from the a priori principles of the 
understanding. According to both views, regularities undergo a modal 
transformation as soon as they are included in epistemic constructions, and 
necessity is conceived as the epistemic result of such inclusion. Although 
successful in assuring (progressive) knowledge of empirical laws, both views 
provide a kind of necessity that might not faithfully depict Kant’s position. In 
‘Best system’ interpretations, the counterpart of a constitutive epistemic 
necessity is a substantially Humean account of laws. Friedman tries to solve 
this flaw by reinforcing the a priori source of empirical laws. However, as we 
saw, his derivation of empirical laws from the understanding does not 
convincingly explain how determinate processes in nature are necessitated. 
Broadly speaking, both accounts privilege our epistemic access to empirical 
laws over a well-grounded origination of necessity. 
 
2.2 Essentialist accounts of empirical laws 
In this section, I argue that the more recently developed ‘essentialist’ 
accounts of empirical laws solve several flaws in previous interpretations in 
explaining the necessity of empirical laws, although at the high cost of 
introducing a serious threat to the possibility of empirical cognition. In order 
to critically evaluate this position, I need to clarify the modal status of 
particular laws of nature according to essentialists. 
 
some particular time but from our limited access to a priori intuition, or from ‘the limits of our 
faculties of cognition’” (Kreines 2008, 541). 
 149 
Despite many differences among supporters in the details of this 
account,17 they all share the same tenet regarding the origin of necessitation 
of laws. By contrast with other accounts, the essentialist does not try to 
reduce necessity to a product of our epistemic faculties. Instead, she holds 
that the necessity of empirical laws is grounded in the essences or natures of 
things: laws are grounded in the essential properties that belong to the real 
essences of kinds of things. On this view, to formulate a necessary law of 
nature “is to identify a kind on whose nature some regularity depends” 
(Kreines 2008, 528). Only if the essence of the kind is the underlying ground 
of the law, can a mere ‘rule’ apply to all possible instances, necessarily. As 
noted by Messina, the essentialist thus adopts a “bottom-up” model of laws, 
which reverses Friedman’s derivation account (Messina 2017, 137). In the 
latter, transcendental laws of the understanding imply the necessity and 
existence of empirical laws of nature, as well as necessary connections 
among kinds. According to the essentialist view by contrast, real essences of 
kinds ground the very necessity of the causal connections injected by the 
transcendental laws. 
I take this account to better explain the kind of necessity we are 
looking for in the case of empirical laws of nature. The necessity it provides is 
neither based on mere regularities nor imposed by our subjective faculties of 
cognition, but on a kind of nomic necessity, grounded in the reality of things. 
The essential differences among kinds are not reduced to a mixture of a 
priori principles and experience, but clearly identified as a distinct source of 
necessity. Moreover, as Watkins has shown, this reading makes the case for 
a substantial continuity in Kant’s view on laws from the Critical to the pre-
Critical texts, where Kant clearly endorses an essentialist view on laws.18 
That’s for the metaphysical side of the problem. The epistemological side of 
this view turns out to be more problematic than it may seem. Of course, even 
essentialists do not reduce Kant’s position to mere metaphysical realism. To 
 
17 Major representatives of this view include Watkins 2005, Kreines 2008, Stang 2016 and 
Messina 2017. 
18 See especially Watkins 2005 for a detailed historical reconstruction of the problem. See 
also Stang 2016. 
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say that the necessity of laws is grounded in the essences of things is 
obviously not the same as to say that we can actually know those laws. On 
the contrary, the essentialist account poses extended limitations on our 
epistemic faculty, trying to preserve the necessity of empirical laws against 
an inflated account of knowledge. Paraphrasing a famous Kantian 
expression, essentialists have to limit knowledge to make room for 
necessity.19 
The clearest and most influential account of our epistemic limits 
regarding empirical laws is the one proposed by Kreines.20 According to his 
reconstruction, there are necessary laws, but we are prevented from knowing 
them. Knowledge of necessity in fact requires a priori knowledge, which in 
turn requires a priori intuition. But as we saw in the Metaphysical 
Foundations, such a priori intuition is not available for empirical laws of 
nature. As a result, their necessity cannot be knowable by us. The only 
exception is represented by the laws of mechanics since they concern a 
single kind (matter) that stands in close connection with our pure intuition of 
space (see Kreines 2008, 540–3). The remaining infinite manifold of laws 
constitutes in its necessity an inaccessible realm for our knowledge, so that 
we can never be sure whether we have identified a law of nature instead of a 
mere regularity. As Stang puts it: 
 
Even if it is a law that p and we know that p, we will typically not know what it is 
about the relevant natural kind in virtue of which p obtains. We will lack insight into 
the necessity of this law. (Stang 2016, 258) 
 
Except for the laws of mechanics, the essentialist account has therefore to 
either deny the possibility of empirical knowledge of laws or to resort to other 
sources—namely, reason and systematicity—to allow for some form of 
empirical cognition. For Kreines, reason’s systematicity, that is the ideal of 
systematic unity through which we order and classify regularities, serves to 
 
19 This characterization applies particularly to Kreines 2008, Stang 2016, and Messina 2017. 
It is unclear whether Watkins 2005 agrees with them regarding the unknowability of empirical 
laws. 
20 Similar considerations can also be found in Watkins 2005, Stang 2016, and Messina 2017. 
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“think as laws the empirically known rules” (Kreines 2008, 537). And the only 
reason we do so is that otherwise we would make “no progress in our 
investigation of the particularities of nature” (ibid.). These rational sources, 
however, do not change the modal status of the regularities we encounter in 
experience. Empirical enquiry can only “approximate to knowledge of the sort 
of universality that it seeks” (ibid., 538). But, as I will argue, this solution 
opens up new problems that essentialists do not fully acknowledge. As noted 
by Breitenbach, if reason’s systematicity is an unreachable ideal that never 
really brings us to laws of nature, it is doubtful that empirical cognition of laws 
and empirical progress are possible at all (see Breitenbach 2018, 117). In 
other words, it is unclear how regarding mere regularities as laws would help 
us acquire and improve cognition of them. 
Before expanding such critique and proposing a solution, let me end 
this section with a brief overview on the various interpretations I have so far 
analysed. No matter which interpretation we opt for, we will have to face a 
trade-off between necessity and cognizability of empirical laws. Following 
epistemological interpretations, we can keep knowledge of laws, but forego 
any solid grounding of necessity. By contrast the essentialist view identifies 
the kind of necessity we need for empirical laws, but at the cost of sacrificing 
the cognizability of laws. This trade-off, however, seems to find no place in 
Kant’s philosophy. Kant never portrays his idea of necessity in Humean 
fashion (indeed his opposition to Hume underlies his treatment of causality in 
the Critique), nor does he speak of empirical laws as mere regularities that 
we have no hope to approximate to necessity. Is there a way to maintain a 
grounded metaphysical necessitation of laws without undermining the very 
purposiveness of empirical enquiry, namely an enquiry in which both 
empirical cognition and progress have their place? I argue that a more in-
depth analysis of Kant’s notion of reason is the key to reconcile the 




3. Purposiveness of science: reconciling necessity and 
cognizability of empirical laws 
Essentialist interpreters deny any kind of epistemic access to empirical laws 
as such and replace it with a mere assumption for the sake of progress in 
science.21 However well supported, this claim must be questioned, for it 
implicitly undermines the very purpose of scientific enquiry. On Kreines’ 
account, the only empirical laws that we are able to formulate with necessity 
are the laws of mechanics because of their very special status (i.e., only in 
their case we do have a priori intuitions that complement our concepts). All 
other empirical laws are regarded as laws, but they remain strictly speaking 
mere generalizations. It is fairly evident that the essentialist account has 
delivered less than expected. It is true that we have finally reached a clear 
understanding of the origin of necessity, but as regards our empirical enquiry 
and the basic presumption of necessity under which we can carry out the 
enquiry itself, we have not gone one single step further. What we have ended 
up with is a mere ensemble of regularities that are inexplicably said to 
approximate a kind of necessity that, however, lies beyond the boundaries of 
cognition. But how can we even admit such an approximation, and therefore 
an actual progress in our scientific enquiry, if we do not know whether these 
rules actually reflect nature, and the enquiry itself is made possible only on 
the basis of an assumption made for the sake of convenience? 
The problem is well rooted in Kant’s ambiguities regarding the 
cognizability of empirical laws. Although he explicitly denies fully-fledged 
knowledge of the necessity of empirical laws to the understanding, he never 
claims that we cannot aim to cognize empirical laws.22 Instead, he seems to 
allow for a form of cognizability of the real essences in which empirical laws 
 
21 Stang does recognize that the assumption that there are laws constitutes not just a 
heuristic assumption, but a very condition of possibility for empirical enquiry (see Stang 
2016, 241 and 259). However, on his account, the latter represents an additional problem 
that can be independently addressed, whereas I will argue that the essentialist account of 
laws is strictly dependent on certain assumptions provided by the faculty of reason. 
22 See Willaschek and Watkins 2017 for Kant’s technical conception of ‘knowledge.’ For 
Kant, knowledge “is a kind of assent to a judgment that requires consciousness of a 
sufficient epistemic ground” (Willaschek and Watkins 2017, 83). Since we lack sufficient 
epistemic ground with respect to judgments concerning empirical laws, we cannot, strictly 
speaking, ‘know’ empirical laws of nature.  
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are grounded. Take for instance this passage from his lectures on 
metaphysics: 
 
The real essence is not the essence of the concept, but rather of the thing 
(sondern der Sache). E.g., the predicate of impenetrability belongs to the existence 
of body. Now I observe through experience much that belongs to its existence; 
e.g., extension in space, resistance against other bodies, etc. Now the inner 
ground of all this is the nature of the thing. We can infer the inner principle only 
from the properties known to us; therefore the real essence of things is inscrutable 
to us, although we cognize many essential aspects. We become acquainted with 
the powers of things bit by bit in experience. (ML2, 28:553; emphases added) 
 
The real essence is defined as the essence of the thing. This is nothing more 
than an analytical definition: the word ‘real’ comes from the Latin res, 
meaning ‘thing.’23 Now, since Kant illustrates the real essence using the 
“existence of body” as an example, he also has to restrict his definition from 
things in general to existing things; the real essence of existing things is 
properly called “nature.”24 But what is remarkable about this passage is the 
way Kant talks about the cognizability of the “nature of the thing”: even 
though real essences of things remain “inscrutable to us,” we may “cognize 
many essential aspects” of them. Note that Kant is mentioning essential 
aspects—not regularities we happen to classify together (i.e., accidental 
generalizations); from these essential aspects, and only from these, we can 
infer natures of things. Experience progressively (“bit by bit”) reveals to us 
the natures of things.   
Even if this passage seems to allow for the possibility of cognizing 
aspects of real essences, our doubts have now been increased rather than 
diminished. For how can we legitimately cognize essential aspects of an 
inscrutable essence in experience? How can we know that those aspects are 
 
23 Kant for example writes: “each thing is reality. Thingness, so to speak, rests merely on 
reality” (ML2, 28:560). 
24 In the Metaphysical Foundations, Kant adds that, given his definition of real essence, “one 
can attribute only an essence to geometrical figures, but not a nature (since in their concept 
nothing is thought that would express an existence.” (MFNS, 4:467 fn.) As Stang shows, 
however, real essences and natures are synonyms if we focus on existing things (see Stang 
2016, 240). See also Massimi 2017 on this distinction. 
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indeed essential, and not accidental generalizations? In other words, if the 
necessity of empirical laws lies in the essences of different kinds, how can 
we get to know essential aspects of different kinds in a reliable way? And 
how can we presume their necessity even though we can never fully grasp 
their essences? 
Answering these questions, I contend, requires complementing the 
essentialist account of empirical laws of nature with an in-depth analysis of 
the epistemic resources that theoretical reason offers us. In the rest of this 
chapter, I will show that reason’s systematicity plays a crucial role in 
reconciling the necessitation of empirical laws with a progressive, albeit 
fallible, cognition of them. In particular, it allows us to respond to two 
epistemic quandaries that the standard essentialist account fails to address. 
The first epistemic quandary is the following: what entitles us to regard 
rules as laws in order to further the empirical investigation of nature? This is 
a fundamental worry for an essentialist, although it is largely neglected in the 
existing literature. If we cannot have knowledge of empirical laws, it is 
unclear why we should regard rules as laws and attempt to acquire cognition 
of laws. After all, we would have no way to tell that we are acquiring relevant 
empirical cognition, nor would we have a clear goal for investigation. In fact, 
a skeptical position that simply denies that there is such a thing as empirical 
cognition of laws would seem more consistent with the epistemic constraints 
of essentialism. In order to answer this challenge, an essentialist should 
make room for some form of epistemic access to essences, but it is unclear 
how this access would be compatible with Kant’s own restrictions about the 
knowability of empirical laws.   
The second, closely related epistemic quandary concerns the very 
notion of approximation and progress in empirical investigation. For even if 
we grant some form of epistemic access to essences, it is still unclear how 
our investigation can approximate to necessity. If the real essence is 
ultimately inaccessible to us, it seems to follow that our inquiry will not only 
never reach it (something which is consistent with Kant’s account) but will 
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also fail to get any closer to it. Yet this is precisely what the Kantian notion of 
approximation requires of empirical investigation.  
Both epistemic quandaries, or challenges, seem to jeopardize the 
possibility for human cognizers to acquire empirical knowledge of laws and 
approximate to necessary laws. But I contend that Kant’s account of reason 
has internal resources to address these challenges. In the Dialectic, Kant 
famously reconstructs reason’s natural tendency to answer metaphysical 
questions and go beyond the boundaries of possible cognition. But the 
Dialectic also contains a positive doctrine that transforms reason’s natural 
tendency of reason into an indispensable epistemic resource for empirical 
investigation. In the following section, I show, first, how it is possible to apply 
Kant’s considerations on reason to the problem of empirical laws of nature. 
And second, I argue that reading this problem through the lenses of the 
Dialectic allows us to reconcile the metaphysical question of the 
necessitation of laws with a robust sense of empirical cognition and progress. 
In other words, I provide an interpretative framework that accommodates two 
apparently incompatible tenets of Kant’s philosophy of nature, namely that 
we cannot know empirical laws, but that we can improve our cognition of 
them.25  
I will proceed as follows. First, I will present reason’s general function 
of guiding the understanding and making its use purposive. I will then apply 
Kant’s arguments to the present debate concerning the cognizability of real 
essences. This application, in turn, will allow us to answer the above-
mentioned epistemic challenges to the essentialist account. In particular, I 
will show that thinking of real essences as ideas of reason gives us epistemic 
 
25 It is true that, following Willaschek and Watkins 2017, we can technically have cognition of 
something without knowing it, and vice versa. Knowing something means having sufficient 
epistemic ground to assert that it is true—as such, it has clear epistemic value. In their 
standard meaning, cognitions are instead mere “conceptual determinations of a sensibly 
given object” (Willaschek and Watkins 2017, 83)—as such they do not necessarily have 
epistemic value. However, it is far from obvious how mere cognitions can be insightful or can 
be improved if we cannot possibly know the object. In fact, Kant does mention a more 
restricted notion of cognition as “having insight into” (perspicere) which I take to be more 
relevant to the present discussion than the standard, non-epistemic meaning of ‘cognition’; 
see, e.g., Jäsche, 9:65. For an interesting distinction between fully-fledged ‘knowledge’ and 
epistemically valuable ‘cognition’ of empirical laws, see Breitenbach 2018. 
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access to what Kant calls “comparatively” inner properties, i.e., properties 
that have ontological and epistemic priority over mere regularities (or 
accidental generalizations). And second, that we can make sense of 
empirical progress in science only if we conceive of essences as 
unreachable totalities of empirical conditions rather than unknowable things 
in themselves. As a result, empirical laws transcend our cognition in degree 
rather in kind, and are in principle object of progressive, yet fallible 
knowledge. 
 
4. The prescriptive value of the systematicity of reason in general 
I wish to start my discussion with a preliminary account of the most general 
level at which reason, and in particular, reason’s idea of systematicity, is 
relevant to the empirical investigation of nature. In the Appendix to the 
Transcendental Dialectic, Kant writes: 
 
Reason never relates directly to an object, but solely to the understanding and by 
means of it to reason’s own empirical use, hence it does not create any concepts 
(of objects) but only orders them and gives them that unity which they can have in 
their greatest possible extension, i.e., in relation to the totality of series; the 
understanding does not look to this totality at all, but only to the connection through 
which series of conditions always come about according to concepts. Thus reason 
really has as object only the understanding and its purposive application, and just 
as the understanding unites the manifold into an object through concepts, so 
reason on its side unites the manifold of concepts through ideas by positing a 
certain collective unity as the goal of the understanding’s actions, which are 
otherwise concerned only with distributive unity. (A643–4/B671–2; emphases 
added) 
 
Reason’s ‘object’ (in the broad sense) is the understanding itself, and reason 
finds its proper empirical use by applying itself to it. As Kant puts it, reason’s 
function is not to create concepts of objects, but to guide the understanding 
and make its use “purposive.” Since Kant is here referring to the empirical 
investigation of nature, reason serves to give a purpose or goal to the 
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understanding’s actions while investigating nature. But what is this purpose 
or goal? And what does it imply for the necessity of empirical laws of nature? 
The text of the Appendix is reminiscent of the Dialectic’s terminology. 
The epistemic goal that reason sets up for the understanding is the “totality of 
series.” “Totality of series” (or “absolute totality of the series of conditions,” 
see, e.g., A327/B384) is a technical term that Kant presents and discusses in 
the course of the Dialectic. Roughly speaking, reason is not satisfied with the 
connections between particular conditions that the understanding has to do 
with (e.g., particular causes, spatial parts, contingent objects, etc.; see, e.g., 
Willaschek 2018, 74). All such particular conditions are not satisfactory for 
reason because each of them, in turn, depends on further conditions in order 
to be possible—as such they fail to offer ultimate answers to our 
investigation. On Kant’s account, reason thus naturally demands something 
that is ultimately explanatory and not itself conditioned: the unconditioned, or 
the absolute totality of conditions. 
Kant spells out this epistemic goal in terms of systematicity or 
systematic unity of cognition. If we get to know the totality of conditions, the 
series of conditions connected by the understanding no longer constitute a 
chaotic aggregate, but a unified system of cognitions in which the “whole” 
precedes its “parts” (A645/B673). In fact, for Kant, systematic unity is what 
defines science proper or science in the strict sense (see A832/B860; MFNS, 
4:468), namely, a body of cognition that is not merely the result of induction 
but is apodictically certain and, as such, deserves the full title of ‘knowledge.’ 
If such scientific ideal is realized, a key modal change with respect to our 
cognition of empirical laws of nature occurs. A proper science is not a mere 
“contingent aggregate” of regularities, but a “system interconnected in 
accordance with necessary laws” (A645/B673). In other words, necessary 
laws of nature are the ultimate mark of a complete science, namely a science 
for which reason’s demand for the “unconditioned” or “totality of conditions” 
has been completely fulfilled. 
But how can such system form once we take into account the 
limitations of our cognition? As Kant argues in the course of the Dialectic, the 
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absolute totality of conditions lies beyond the possibility of experience and, 
as such, can never be cognized. Kant’s argument hinges upon the 
constitutive limitation of cognition to ‘empirically conditioned’ conditions, or 
conditions that are given in space and time: “with all possible perceptions, 
you always remain caught up among conditions, whether in space or in time, 
and you never get to the unconditioned” (A483/B511). Since we can only 
experience objects under the conditions of space and time, we simply can 
never obtain something that is absolutely independent of such conditions 
(see A494/B522). In other words, our spatiotemporal experience can never 
give us something like a view from nowhere on nature. While this limitation 
clearly explains why we cannot get to unconditioned conditions, or conditions 
that abstract from the spatiotemporal conditions under which we necessarily 
experience objects, it is less clear what it implies when the totality of 
conditions is represented by an infinite series of empirical conditions (the 
infinite series of spatial parts or past moments of the world, for example). 
Even in this case, Kant argues, the totality of conditions remains beyond our 
cognitive capacities, for even if each particular condition forming the series 
can be perceived, their “absolute whole”—as an infinite complete series—
cannot be given to us in our limited experience (see A484/B512).26 
If a systematic unity of cognition can never be achieved, it also follows 
that we are never able to obtain a complete corpus of knowledge 
“interconnected in accordance with necessary laws” (A645/B673). So far, 
Kant’s Dialectic seems to confirm the skeptical scenarios that result from the 
standard essentialist account of empirical laws. But there is more. For Kant, 
the same rational resources that lead us to postulate unreachable totalities of 
conditions acquire an indispensable value with respect to empirical 
investigation. Although we cannot claim knowledge of the absolute totality of 
conditions, the latter becomes an idea that regulates the understanding and 
its acquisition of cognition. 
 
26 “Appearances require to be explained only insofar as their conditions of explanation are 
given in perception, but everything that can ever be given in it, taken together in an absolute 
whole, is not itself any perception. But it is really this whole for which an explanation is being 
demanded in the transcendental problems of reason” (A483/B511). See also Willaschek 
2018 and Watkins 2019, especially chapter 10. 
 159 
 
The absolute totality of the series of these conditions in the derivation of their 
members is an idea which of course can never come about fully in the empirical 
use of reason, but nevertheless serves as a rule for the way we ought to proceed 
in regard to them: namely that in the explanation of given appearances (in a 
regress or ascent), we ought to proceed as if the series were in itself infinite, i.e., 
proceed in indefinitum. (A685/B713) 
 
As an idea of reason, the absolute totality of conditions has an eminently 
prescriptive value. Its function is to tell the understanding how we ought to 
proceed with respect to the series of conditions: namely, to always look for 
further empirical conditions and never take the series as completely or 
absolutely given in experience. Indeed, since such complete series of 
conditions cannot be given to us, Kant warns against using this idea to “think 
the totality in the object as real”; rather, we should use it as “a problem for 
the understanding, thus for the subject in initiating and continuing, in 
accordance with the completeness of the idea, the regress in the series of 
conditions for a given conditioned” (A508/B536). In other words, reason 
prescribes systematic unity (or the totality of conditions from which such unity 
results) as the goal of the actions of the understanding. Such goal, however, 
should not be used to ground true claims about real objects.  
The prescriptive value of ideas allows a preliminary reply to the first 
epistemic challenge I mentioned earlier: what entitles us to regard rules as 
laws? Or, more generally, to postulate that nature is systematic? The 
systematicity of nature seems to be an ad hoc assumption that we 
subjectively stipulate in order to justify our procedures. For example, we may 
stipulate that a well-embedded rule—e.g., that gold dissolves in aqua regia—
is really a law of nature. But if we cannot obtain knowledge of laws, this 
seems indeed an arbitrary and unjustifiable stipulation. As prescriptively valid 
rules, ideas of reason do not face such objection. Assuming systematic unity 
of nature is valid not because it sufficiently grounds knowledge of true laws of 
nature, but because it directs our understanding to systematize relations 
among given conditions and discover potentially lawful rules (such as, ‘gold 
dissolves in aqua regia’). As a result, we ought to proceed in accordance with 
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the ideas of reason, regardless of whether discovered regularities are indeed 
laws of nature. In other words, reason gives a “purpose” to empirical 
investigation by allowing us to look for systematic relations in nature. 
This is not, however, a sufficient answer to the above-mentioned 
challenge.27 It is still not clear what the systematic unity of reason entails for 
our search of empirical laws and what sense of empirical cognition it affords. 
Without enabling some form of cognition (or giving us some access to 
essences, to use the essentialist vocabulary), the prescriptive value of 
reason would not be particularly helpful—it would only prescribe us to 
constantly look for further systematic relations among regularities. We need 
to look more closely at how ideas of reason can be applied to essences, and 
what this implies for the cognizability of empirical laws of nature. 
 
5. Real essences qua ideas of reason  
I now wish to apply Kant’s general points about reason and its ideas to the 
specific problem of the cognizability of real essences. Although Kant does 
not particularly elaborate on such application, he offers several clues in the 
Appendix and other texts that suggest that this is not only a plausible, but an 
essential part of his doctrine of empirical investigation. I contend that, 
although real essences cannot be known, they can be thought of as ‘ideas of 
reason’ in Kant’s technical sense of the term. As ideas of reason, real 
essences direct our investigation of empirical laws of nature and provide us 
with a robust sense of empirical cognition. 
As we saw, reason’s idea of systematicity has an eminently 
prescriptive value. Properly speaking, reason’s concepts, or ideas, are not 
concepts of objects—the absolute totality of conditions can never be given to 
us in experience and, therefore, we are not allowed to take them as concepts 




27 Contra the ‘standard’ essentialist view; cf. Kreines 2008, 536–7. 
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One cannot properly say that this idea is the concept of an object, but only that of 
the thoroughgoing unity of these concepts, insofar as the idea serves the 
understanding as a rule. Such concepts of reason are not created by nature, rather 
we question nature according to these ideas, and we take our cognition to be 
defective as long as it is not adequate to them. (A645/B673; emphases added)  
 
In this and other passages, Kant emphasizes the a priori origin of ideas. 
Since no empirical object can be given to us that matches our rational 
concepts, ideas cannot be derived from experience. Rather, ideas are a priori 
concepts of reason according to which we first investigate nature. In other 
words, ideas are to be thought of as standards of empirical cognition. Among 
the various ideal standards Kant discusses in the course of the Appendix, 
Kant includes ideas of particular elements and powers, such as “pure earth,” 
“pure water,” “pure air,” and “fundamental power,” to exemplify how reason 
proceeds towards the acquisition of a “system interconnected in accordance 
with necessary laws” (ibid.). In Kant’s words: 
 
Admittedly, it is hard to find pure earth, pure water, pure air, etc. Nevertheless, 
concepts of them are required (though as far as their complete purity is concerned, 
have their origin only in reason) in order appropriately to determine the share that 
each of these natural causes has in appearance; thus one reduces all materials to 
earths (mere weight, as it were), to salts and combustibles (as force), and finally to 
water and air as vehicles (machines, as it were, by means of which the 
aforementioned operate), in order to explain the chemical effects of materials in 
accordance with the idea of a mechanism. For even though it is not actually 
expressed this way, it is still very easy to discover the influence of reason on the 
classifications of students of nature. (A645–6/B673–4; see also A649/B677) 
 
Kant’s examples of ideas of empirical elements have long attracted attention 
since, despite their fundamental role in determining—to use Kant’s words— 
“the share of natural causes” and “explaining the effects of materials,” they 
seem to have no clear status in the Critique. In particular, if we combine the a 
priori origin of ideas with the empirical nature of these substances, we seem 
to end up with a sort of (rather implausible) innatism. It may seem that, 
according to Kant, we are born with a bunch of particular ideas according to 
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which we investigate nature. But I think Kant’s position can be clearly 
differentiated from innatism.28 I take Kant to be saying that we necessarily 
investigate nature through rational concepts that have no empirical origin 
with respect to their “purity.” Such concepts can be obtained if we apply 
reason’s demand for the totality of conditions to particular sets of given 
appearances. Take the example of “pure water”: we do not need to be 
equipped with this idea from birth, rather reason produces this idea by 
thinking the complete totality of particular instances of water. In other words, 
by applying the idea of absolute totality to particular appearances, we derive 
a pure concept that have no empirical counterpart.29 
This peculiar a priori status, however, still does not clarify the function 
of ideas with respect to the empirical laws of nature. How would ideas of 
particular substances or powers contribute to the formation of a system of 
empirical laws? I argue that ideas of reason allow us to think real essences 
as ideal limits of inquiry. More specifically, I contend that although real 
essences cannot be known as objects, they play—qua ideas—a fundamental 
epistemic role in empirical investigation. In order to substantiate these 
claims, I need to go back to Kant’s treatment of real essences in his lectures 
on logic and metaphysics. 
As we saw, according to the broadly ‘essentialist’ account of laws 
presented in this chapter, the real necessity of empirical laws must be 
grounded in essences or natures of things that are beyond the boundaries of 
empirical cognition. Kant, however, famously distinguishes between the 
‘unknowable’ real essence of an empirical object and its epistemically 
 
28 Kant explicitly distances himself from the “exaggerated expression” of Plato’s theory of 
innate ideas, see A318/B374–5. Moreover, Kant frequently denies that there are innate 
concepts (see, e.g., Discovery, 8:221; Mrongovius, 29:763). For a critical discussion of 
innatism in Kant, see Vanzo 2018. 
29 This line of interpretation is supported by Kant’s description of the genesis of the 
psychological idea in the second part of the Appendix. Such idea—as the “concept of a 
simple, self-sufficient intelligence”— results from “thinking (the empirical unity of all thought) 
unconditionally and originally” (A682/B710). In short, reason produces the idea of the soul in 
order to systematize a specific set of appearances, namely inner appearances (see Kraus 
2018, 82, for a detailed discussion of this passage). Although particular ideas (such as ideas 
of chemical elements) clearly differ from the ‘official’ idea of the soul, I suggest that they 
result from analogous attempts to systematize sets or subsets of appearances. Of course, 
this is only the sketch of a full reconstruction. Unfortunately, I do not have the space to 
discuss it in more detail here. 
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accessible logical essence. The logical essence of an empirical object is the 
“subjective basic concept” of the thing (Blomberg, 24:116). It contains the 
predicates or marks that we use to distinguish the thing from all the others 
(Jäsche, 9:143). As such, the logical essence is changeable and incomplete. 
For example:  
 
The concept that water is a fluid element, without odor or taste, 14 times lighter 
than quicksilver, etc., is the logical essence of water [;] for if I have mastered 
physical cognitions about something, then I think of all this as soon as I mention 
the word water. From this, of course, I cannot at all derive all the remaining 
properties which are determined for water, and which belong to it or can belong to 
it, and perhaps are not yet all discovered, although we do not always think them in 
this connection [;] consequently it is not the real essence. (Blomberg, 24:118) 
 
By contrast with the merely subjective logical essence, the real essence is 
defined by Kant as “the first inner ground of all that belongs to the possibility 
of a thing” (Mrongovius, 29:820). This definition poses the following 
interpretative challenge. If the real essence of an instance x is the ground of 
the possibility of x, one may think that such ground is other than x itself (for 
example, God or some distinct entity). Following Stang, however, this does 
not seem to be the case—a clear counterexample being the fact that, for 
Kant, the real essence of matter includes the power of attraction.30 The real 
essence of x is rather the “inner character of x that explains its manifest 
character and its relation to other things, so the real essence is not some 
entity distinct from x” (Stang 2016, 235). To give Stang’s definition: 
 
Where K is a kind (the appropriate target of a real definition) and x is a possible 
instance of that kind, the real essence of K is the complex of properties possessed 
by x that ground x’s being an instance of kind K. (Stang 2016, 235–6) 
 
According to this definition (well-supported by textual evidence),31 the real 
essence of a sample of water, for example, is not something other than such 
 
30 See, e.g., Blomberg, 24:117. 
31 For example, in the above-mentioned passage from the Blomberg Logic (24:118) Kant 
says that the logical essence is not the real essence precisely because it does not contain 
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sample. It is rather the complex of inner or essential properties possessed by 
this sample that makes it case that it is a sample of water.32 The real essence 
of an instance x of a kind K can be expressed as follows:  
 
x possesses [P1+ P2 + P3 + …]33 
 
As we know, the real essence, and therefore the complex of properties that 
composes it, cannot be known. From the fact that the real essence cannot be 
known, however, it does not follow that this concept does not play any 
epistemic role. In fact, the logical essence can hardly represent a goal for 
scientific investigation. When investigating nature, we cannot be satisfied 
with subjective concepts that only allow us to distinguish a thing from the 
others and may have no objective counterpart. The goal of scientific 
investigation is rather to infer fundamental properties from the manifest ones, 
and therefore to approximate our logical essences to real essences. As Kant 
puts it: 
 
He who wants to find the real essence must be acquainted with all the marks that 
belong to the thing constantly. Then he must search further for the ground of these, 
 
“all remaining properties.” Kant explicitly says that the totality of properties constitutes the 
essence of a thing (see, e.g., Vienna, 24:919); and “complex” of properties or essential 
properties is a Kantian term (see, e.g., Mrongovius, 29:820). One may wonder if this 
definition is compatible with the idea that the real essence is a “first inner ground.” Kant, 
however, seems to equate these two definitions in several passages (see, e.g., Dohna, 
4:760; Vienna, 24: 919–20; Mrongovius, 29:820). I therefore agree with Stang 2016 that, for 
Kant, “the first inner ground of all that belongs to the possibility of a thing” is the “complex” of 
essential properties possessed by that thing. For a similar interpretative strategy, see also 
Langton 2018. 
32 Following Baumgarten, Kant distinguishes between properties that are part of the real 
essence as grounds (essential properties; essentialia) and properties that only follow from 
the real essence as consequences (attributes; attributa); see, e.g., ML2, 28:552–3; 
Mrongovius, 29:820). Properly speaking, the real essence only contains essential properties.  
33 Kant’s definition of real essence as a complex of essential properties seemingly differs 
from the contemporary ‘Putnamian-Kripkean’ reading of essentialism. According to this 
reading, for example, the real essence of water is H2O—one would not say that the real 
essence of water is the combination of essential properties (say, H2O, being a liquid, having 
viscosity, etc.). It goes beyond the scope of this chapter to determine whether Kant’s 
essentialism is compatible with contemporary views. Let me note, however, that Kant’s 
definition of real essence does not imply a ‘descriptivist’ view according to which the real 
essence is nothing by the sum of readily observable qualities. Quite the contrary, the 
essential properties that compose the real essence can be progressively determined only 
through ongoing, scientific investigation. 
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and must endeavor to investigate them, and this is the real essence, then. 
(Blomberg, 24:118) 
 
I contend that we here find a particular case of reason’s demand for the 
totality of conditions. Our questions about the grounds of empirical laws 
would be answered only if acquainted with all the properties that belong to 
the thing constantly (P1, P2, P3, etc.), but such acquaintance goes beyond 
the possibility of our experience. The complex of (potentially infinite) 
properties thus represents the particular “totality” or “series” that reason 
attempts to complete:  
 
totality of conditions: [P1 + P2 + P3 + …] 
 
I can now fully apply the reconstruction of reason and its ideas in the 
previous section to the present case. Although the totality of properties that 
make up the real essence cannot be known, the idea of such totality serves 
as a rule for the empirical investigation of nature. As we saw, ideas prescribe 
us to look for further empirical conditions and to never take the series of 
conditions as completely given. I suggest that, in the case of ideas of 
particular essences, such as the ideas of chemical elements or of 
fundamental power, reason tells the understanding to constantly search for 
and revise inner properties of empirical objects “as if the series were in itself 
infinite” (A685/B713). In other words, real essences—qua ideas of complete 
series of properties—give direction to the empirical investigation of nature by 
providing indispensable standards that we attempt to approximate. 
 
6. Epistemic access to comparatively inner properties 
The suggested account of real essences should give us a better sense of 
what empirical cognition amounts to in this context. As we just saw, ideas of 
real essences are the prescriptive rules that allow us to constantly enrich and 
revise the logical essences of empirical objects. But there is another, often 
neglected distinction that can help us clarify such constant enrichment and 
revision: the distinction between absolutely and comparatively inner 
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properties. This distinction has been not particularly highlighted in the 
literature, but as Warren has pointed out, it plays a more important role than 
generally acknowledged. Here I want to suggest that it plays a key role in 
understanding the kind of epistemic access we have to the essences that 
ground empirical laws. 
I showed that the real essence is the complex of inner properties of an 
empirical object, and that such complex is demanded by reason as the 
absolute totality of a given set of conditions. Now, although such absolute 
whole is not an object of experience, and therefore knowledge, Kant does 
allow for epistemic access to wholes of conditions as long as they are 
“comparative” (rather than absolute), namely, if they represent empirical 
totalities, or totalities in comparison to particular conditions.34 More to the 
point, Kant argues that inner properties can be cognized if they are 
“comparatively inner.” As pointed out by Warren, Kant does not propose an 
“unqualified rejection of the rationalist claim that we are able to characterize 
an object through its inner properties, i.e., that inner properties figure in 
knowledge” (Warren 2001, 46). Rather, he argues that inner (i.e., essential) 
properties of objects can be known if they are given to us in experience, and 
therefore in terms of external relations: in Kant’s words, “I have therefore 
nothing that is absolutely, but only comparatively internal, which itself in turn 
consists of outer relations” (A277/B333; see also A285/B341). We find the 
same distinction applied to the concept of essence in the lectures on 
metaphysics. Although we cannot know the real essence completely, we can 
call something a real essence “comparatively”: a comparatively real essence 
is what human beings can undertake to show of a complete real essence 
“through experience.”35 
I argue that ideas of real essences are crucial to empirical cognition 
inasmuch as they give us epistemic access to comparatively inner properties 
(the properties that make up comparatively real essences). By acting as 
 
34 “The whole in an empirical signification, is always only comparative” (A483/B511). 
35 “But what human being wants to undertake to show the whole real essence of things 
which are given through experience? We can call something the real essence comparatively, 
or we can stop with the investigation of the real essence in a certain respect, and with that 
be content” (Mrongovius, 29:821). 
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rules, they provide the standards according to which we infer comparatively 
fundamental properties from the manifest ones we encounter in experience, 
and progressively approximate the real essences of given appearances. For 
one thing, Kant explicitly specifies that ideas of reason “concern not merely 
the things, but even more the mere properties and powers of things” 
(A662/B690). For example, ideas of reason allow us to infer that the orbits of 
planets are elliptical (ibid.). Moreover, the comparative/absolute distinction 
figures in the example Kant discusses most extensively in the Appendix, 
namely the idea of fundamental power—what I take to be the idea of the 
totality of series with respect to the various appearances of powers.36 This 
idea does not provide us with cognition of the fundamental power as a real 
object. However, it prescribes us not to be satisfied with the variety of powers 
we encounter in experience and to look instead for their fundamental unity: 
 
The more appearances of this power and that power are found to be identical, the 
more probable it becomes that they are nothing but various expressions of one and 
the same power, which can be called (comparatively) their fundamental power. 
One proceeds in just the same way with the rest of the powers. These 
comparatively fundamental powers must once again be compared with one 
another, so as to discover their unanimity and thereby bring them close to a single 
radical, i.e., absolutely fundamental, power. But this unity of reason is merely 
hypothetical. (A649/B677) 
 
I take this passage to mean that the idea of fundamental power allows us to 
look for comparatively fundamental powers in experience. The idea is almost 
empty because it does not specify which fundamental powers really obtain in 
nature, nor does it entail that there is such a thing as an absolutely 
fundamental power in nature.37 At the same time, however, it provides us 
with a precise and epistemically fruitful standard for the discovery and 
constant revision of empirical powers in nature. 
 
36 Note that Kant uses the terms ‘properties’ and ‘powers’ in a similar way when talking about 
essences.  
37 For an analysis of the emptiness of ideas of reason with a particular focus on the three 
transcendental ideas, see Zuckert 2017. 
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If this reconstruction is correct, we can finally offer an answer to the 
first epistemic challenge raised above, namely how we can make sense of 
empirical cognition without being able to fully realize the ideal of systematicity 
of nature. Real essences should be regarded as ideas that afford us 
epistemic access to inner properties (or powers) that further our empirical 
cognition of essences. Crucially, comparatively inner properties (or powers) 
can figure in knowledge (in a broad sense, i.e., epistemically valuable 
empirical cognition). They can be part of knowledge because they are 
themselves empirical or given to us under the conditions of space and time. 
But at the same time, they are more ‘fundamental’ than mere regularities or 
accidental generalizations because they are assumed and investigated in 
accordance with rational ideas. In other words, the standards or criteria 
offered by reason allow us to look for what conditions the particulars that are 
given to us. Such conditions have, to use Warren’s terminology, “ontological” 
and “epistemic” priority over the conditioned appearances we start with 
(Warren 2001, 51–2). Take comparatively fundamental power: such power 
has a clear ontological priority over the powers it unifies inasmuch as it 
conditions them (or produces them as effects) rather than being conditioned 
by them. As Kant puts it with respect to properties, although comparatively 
inner properties are only empirical relations, “there are among these some 
self-sufficient and persistent ones, through which a determinate object is 
given to us” (A285/B341).  
Ontologically prior conditions possess key epistemic value. For to 
cognize comparatively inner properties means to be able to explain the 
conditioned particulars as their effects.38 As Kant puts it with respect to 
chemical ideas, we reduce different appearances to pure water, pure earth, 
and pure air to “explain the chemical effects of materials in accordance with 
the idea of a mechanism” (A646/B674). Kant is not saying—implausibly—
that, e.g., the idea of pure water is in itself explanatory, or that we can use an 
 
38 Being able to explain something as an effect or “according to its grounds” is what defines 
the particular type of rational cognition that Kant briefly mentions in his lectures on logic, 
namely “having insight (perspicere)”; see Dohna, 24:731, and Jäsche, 9:65. 
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idea to directly explain natural phenomena.39 Rather, I take him to be saying 
that in accordance with such an idea, we can discover “higher” empirical 
conditions (i.e., properties) that we can use to explain various appearances 
of water (A564/B592). More generally, ideas allow us to infer hypotheses 
about empirical properties which, if true, would best explain the mechanical 
effects we see.40 
This reconstruction allows to steer a middle course between the 
skepticism that seems to result from the essentialist account of laws and 
metaphysical knowledge of essences. Kant’s position is not that we have no 
insight whatsoever into the essences of things and their laws. Nor is he 
saying that we do have epistemic access to essences as such. Real 
essences should be regarded as mere ideas that do not afford us knowledge 
of them as objects. As rules, however, they allow us to assume 
comparatively inner properties (or powers) that, although empirically 
conditioned, are ontologically and epistemically more robust than mere 
regularities. Consequently, ideas play a crucial role in making our empirical 
cognition converge towards systematic unity, namely a “system 
interconnected in accordance with necessary laws” (A645/B673). As such, 
this interpretation accommodates two apparently incompatible intuitions that 
underlie Kant’s philosophy of nature, namely that we cannot know laws of 
nature, but that we can improve our cognition of them. 
 
7. Asymptotic approximation to necessity 
As anticipated, there is a second challenge that may undermine the project of 
approximation to empirical laws of nature. While the prescriptive role of 
reason and the distinction between absolutely and comparatively inner 
properties should have given us a better understanding of the possibility of 
empirical cognition, it is still unclear how such cognition can actually 
 
39 Kant explicitly rejects the idea that ideas have a direct explanatory role with respect to 
appearances. See my discussion of this problem in Chapter 1 (in particular, 4.1). 
40 In contemporary terms, one might say that reason’s ideas ground practices of IBE 
(inference to the best explanation) with respect to the properties that constitute real 
essences and thereby ground empirical laws. 
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represent an improvement towards knowledge of necessary empirical laws. 
Since the absolute totality of conditions can never be obtained, how can our 
cognition get any closer to such necessity? To put it briefly, if essences lie 
beyond our cognition, it seems to follow that any attempt to approximate to 
necessary empirical laws is bound to fail. Indeed, many commentators take 
real essences as unknowable things in themselves. But I argue that this is a 
dubious equation when talking about real essences of empirical objects. I will 
show that this is not Kant’s view and that the fundamental epistemic limitation 
that forbids full knowledge of laws lies elsewhere. In particular, I suggest a 
possible interpretative solution according to which empirical laws transcend 
our cognition in degree rather in kind, and are in principle object of 
progressive, yet fallible knowledge. 
The connection between scientific essentialism and things in 
themselves can be found already in Russell and Sellars.41 Hanna particularly 
highlights this point by saying that: 
 
A microphysical ‘real essence’ is nothing but a certain kind of Kantian thing-in-
itself-a modern scientific version of the noumenon. The ‘really real’ physical 
microstructures of the scientific essentialist are not, and never can be, either 
perceivable by the human senses or accurately describable by means of empirical 
concepts. Essentialist physical micro-entities and micro-properties may exist in 
space and time, but only in space and time in themselves, not in Kantian space 
and time, which are ‘pure forms of sensibility,’ that is, structures strictly and 
exclusively applicable to macroscopic objects and their properties. The scientific 
essentialist is thus a defender of what Kant calls ‘transcendental realism.’ (Hanna 
1998, 512–3) 
 
For Hanna scientific real essences are to be thought as particular kinds of 
things in themselves that can never be known or described by human 
concepts. Kreines and Messina have retained this view in their essentialist 
accounts of laws (see, e.g., Kreines 2008; Messina 2017, 139). While these 
accounts rightly emphasize the limited epistemic access of our cognition to 
 
41 See, in particular, Russell 2001 and Sellars 1968. 
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essences and corresponding laws, they also have the major drawback of 
making the very project of approximating knowledge of necessity 
unattainable. If real essences are not in space and time, then our progress in 
experience can never get closer to it, nor do we have any criterion to tell that 
we have improved our cognition of them. In other words, to improve our 
cognition of necessary laws of nature would become a senseless project. 
One might be tempted to relax these epistemic limitations and 
concede that knowledge of real essences as things in themselves is indeed 
possible at the end of inquiry. This reading, however, seems incompatible 
with Kant’s own epistemic restrictions. For Kant, things in themselves strictly 
cannot be objects of cognition. And admitting a progressive discovery of real 
essences as things in themselves would make the systematic unity of 
cognition something in principle completable by our understanding. But for 
Kant, the systematic unity of cognition is constitutively unattainable for us: no 
matter how much we advance our empirical investigation, we can only 
“asymptotically” improve the systematization of our cognition (e.g., 
A663/B691). 
To sum up, taking real essences as things in themselves fails to do 
justice to Kant’s conception of asymptotic approximation to necessity. Such 
epistemic ideal implies that, although our cognition can be improved (we can 
‘reduce the distance’ between our present cognition and perfectly 
systematized knowledge), it can never become complete. If we take real 
essences as unknowable things in themselves, there seems to be no real 
approximation; if we take them as knowable things in themselves, there 
seems to be no real asymptote as the investigation of nature will eventually 
be complete. I wish to suggest that a solution to this quandary can be found if 
we better define the relation between the notions of real essence and thing-
in-itself. 
First, it is important to remind that what concerns us here is the origin 
of the necessity of empirical laws of nature. The grounds of such necessity, 
as we saw, are the real essences of empirical objects. Following Stang, I 
have also suggested that real essences are not to be thought as something 
 172 
other than the empirical objects themselves, but rather as the complex of 
properties that makes it the case for an instance of a kind to be possible as 
such. Now, I want to point out that, if this definition is correct, there is an 
asymmetry between the concept of real essence and the concept of thing-in-
itself of an empirical object. Although we cannot know real essences as such, 
the properties that compose them can be given in space and time as objects 
of possible experience.42 The same, however, cannot be said of the 
properties, if any, of things-in-themselves. Although my point here is not to 
offer an interpretation of things in themselves—a notoriously thorny issue to 
deal with, I think it is safe to assume that Kant does not allow for any form of 
cognizability of them through experience, no matter how partial or 
incomplete. For Kant, things in themselves are “object of a non-sensible 
intuition”—what Kant also calls “intellectual intuition” of which human 
cognizers do not even understand the possibility (B307). And similarly, the 
thing-in-itself is said to be epistemically independent of any possible 
experience:  
 
The true correlate of sensibility, i.e., the thing in itself, is not and cannot be 
cognized through them [sensible representations], but is also never asked after in 
experience. (A30/B45) 
 
In short, while the real essence is the complex of properties possessed by an 
empirical object, the thing in itself would contain, if any, properties that 
cannot be given in space and time. As such, these two concepts cannot be 
merely equated. This is not in any way to deny that, for Kant, empirical 
objects are also grounded in thing in themselves, or that the “entire series” of 
properties that compose the real essences “could be grounded in some 
intelligible being” (A562/B590). My much less controversial point is that the 
grounding relation between a real essence of a kind and an instance of that 
 
42 It is empirical investigation that determines which properties are ‘essential’ and compose 
the real essence of something. Such determination is, however, always revisable and never 
complete. For this reason, I doubt that, for Kant, we can know with certainty that a law 
grounded on an essential property is ‘necessary a posteriori.’ Empirical cognition can, at 
most, aim at empirical certainty (see MFNS, 4:468). 
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kind is orthogonal to the grounding relation between a thing in itself and an 
appearance.43   
Importantly, there is specific textual evidence suggesting this 
interpretation. In his lectures on logic and metaphysics, Kant clearly locates 
the rationale of the inaccessibility to fully-fledged knowledge of real essences 
in our cognition being incomplete rather than in not being able to know 
essences at all. Take, as examples, the following passages: 
 
To have insight into the real essence exceeds human understanding. We cannot 
provide a complete ground for a single thing. This requires a universal, complete 
experience, and to obtain all possible experience concerning an object is 
impossible; we cannot explain anything in nature a priori and without any 
experience, because the understanding cannot speculate about that with which it is 
not acquainted […] When we abstract the marks of our concept, we have the 
logical essence. But if we investigate the innermost ground of a body, then I will 
cognize its nature, i.e., its real essence. (Vienna, 24:839–40; emphasis added) 
 
We can never have complete insight into the real essence, e.g., we can never 
experience all the marks of water no matter how far physics advances. (Dohna, 
24:728) 
 
It is impossible to find the complete inner real ground of all determinations [...] We 
often hear the complaint [that] the essences of things are unknown, [that] we are 
acquainted with only the surface. That is entirely right, but is valid only for the real 
essence. We can cognize much that belongs therein, but not everything. This real 
essence is nature. (Mrongovius, 29:820–1; emphasis added) 
 
Kant’s explanation of the unknowability of essences departs from that given 
for things in themselves. Kant is not saying that essential properties are not 
object of experience or that we lack the epistemic resources to attempt to 
cognize them. Rather, he points at the constitutive limitedness or 
perspectival nature of our empirical knowledge. The problem is that we 
cannot have complete experience of all the properties that constitute an 
 
43 For a critical discussion of these two kinds of grounding relations, see Langton 2018. 
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essence, or the properties that belong to a thing constantly.44 In other words, 
the limit is not represented by the fact that we cannot, in principle, know the 
inner properties of empirical substances, but that we can never intuit the 
wholeness of such properties neither in space nor in time. Our experience of 
empirical objects depends on our perspective as finite beings: we can only 
attempt to enlarge and refine the situated cognition we have.  
This epistemic limit is compatible with Kant’s notion of asymptotic 
approximation. Although real essences remain constitutively unknowable in 
their completeness—there is no such a thing as the end of empirical 
inquiry—, it still makes good sense to say that our finite cognition of 
essences can be improved. In turn, this improvement grounds an 
approximation to the necessity of empirical laws. We can say, for example, 
that the fact that water is H2O or that gold dissolves in aqua regia are not 
mere regularities, but robust laws, grounded in comparatively inner 
properties. At the same time, the incompleteness of our experience drives 
the constant revision and enlargement of the properties that compose real 
essences. 
Accordingly, ideas of real essences (of empirical objects) should be 
regarded as concepts of unreachable totalities of empirical properties rather 
than of unknowable things in themselves. We can further ask whether Kant 
offers any resources to illustrate such distinction in greater detail. 
Unfortunately, if, on the one hand, Kant links essences to reason’s demand 
for the totality of conditions (see, e.g., A694/B722), we do not find any 
systematic treatment of this problem. I want to briefly suggest, however, that 
the Dialectic contains the resources to clarify in what sense real essences 
are to be regarded as ideas. 
 
44 The temporal limitedness of our access to essences have at least two important 
implications. First, it implies that our acquaintance with them changes over time. At the time 
of Priestley, for example, we knew that viscosity was a property of water, but we did not 
know that water is made of two hydrogen atoms bonded to an oxygen atom. Second, I take 
such limitedness to point towards the genuine possibility that essential properties 
themselves might change in the future. For an analysis of this problem from a Humean 
perspective, see Beebee 2011. 
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In the Dialectic, Kant distinguishes ideas that have to do with 
transcendent objects (or things in themselves) from ideas that have to do 
with complete series of empirical objects. Psychological and theological 
ideas belong to the former class of ideas. In their case, we are thinking 
objects that are unknown to us, “but not on that account impossible” 
(A478/B506): for instance, we are thinking a simple thinking substance (soul) 
or whether there is an absolutely necessary cause of all things (God). 
Cosmological ideas, instead, concern empirically given objects and the way 
we can cognize their complete series or totality.45 As Kant puts it: 
 
The cosmological ideas alone have the peculiarity that they can presuppose their 
object, and the empirical synthesis required for its concept, as given; and the 
question that arises from them has to do only with the progression of this 
synthesis, insofar as it is to contain an absolute totality, which, however, is no 
longer empirical, since it cannot be given in any experience. (A479/B507; see also 
A416/B443) 
 
Since, on my reading, ideas of real essences similarly concern absolute 
totalities of empirical properties, I propose to include them in the same class 
of ideas. By contrast with the official four cosmological ideas, ideas of real 
essences are applied to particular sets or subsets of appearances (matter as 
such, or particular kinds of matter, e.g., chemical elements or powers) and 
therefore they are not entirely independent of sensible data.46 But if such 
ideas do not have to do with transcendent objects or things in themselves, a 
meaningful sense of approximation can be vindicated. Kant continues:  
 
45 See Allison 2004, 359–60. Kant’s distinction between mathematical and dynamical 
cosmological ideas of reason somewhat complicates things because the latter, as Kant later 
specifies, involve non-sensible objects (A528–32/B556–60). As already mentioned in 
Chapter 1 (fn. 6), it is unclear to me whether this distinction implies that all cosmological 
ideas can be seen as concerning totality of empirical conditions or whether Kant is 
retroactively restricting his claims about cosmological ideas (e.g., A479/B507 quoted below) 
to mathematical ideas only. An in-depth analysis of such distinction goes beyond the scope 
of this thesis. 
46 This may be the reason why Kant only briefly discusses this type of ideas in the Dialectic. 
The Dialectic concerns “pure concepts of reason” (e.g., A321/B378), or ideas that are 
entirely a priori, whereas I take ideas of real essences to be examples of the broader 
category of “concepts of pure reason” (e.g., A311/B378). As Willaschek notes, the latter “are 
concepts that arise from the real use of reason,” that is from the general use of reason in 
relation to objects (Willaschek 2018, 168 fn.). 
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Now since we are here talking about a thing only as an object of a possible 
experience and not as a thing in itself, the answer to the transcendent 
cosmological question cannot lie anywhere outside the idea, for it does not have to 
do with any object in itself; and in regard to possible experience, the question asks 
not about what can be given in concreto in any experience, but rather about what 
lies in the idea which the empirical synthesis is merely supposed to approximate. 
(A479/B507; emphases added) 
 
There is a clear sense of approximation to an idea that deals with empirical 
conditions. Our empirical synthesis can be indefinitely enriched and revised 
to get closer to the totality or complete series of empirical conditions. From 
this, it does not follow that our investigation can be completed. The absolute 
totality is as a whole no longer empirical since it cannot be given to us in any 
situated experience. Kant fleshes out this thought when he clarifies the kind 
of transcendence attached to these ideas (which Kant also calls world-
concepts): 
 
These ideas are all transcendent and, even though they do not overstep the object, 
namely appearances, in kind, but have to do only with the sensible world (not with 
noumena), they nevertheless carry the synthesis to a degree that transcends all 
possible experience; thus in my opinion one can quite appropriately call them 
collectively world-concepts. (A420/B447) 
 
Cosmological ideas, or world-concepts, are transcendent inasmuch as they 
overstep the possibility of experience not in kind, but in degree. This sense of 
transcendence aptly describes the type of ‘unknowability’ that characterizes 
ideas of real essences. We cannot completely know them because we 
cannot get acquainted with all their spatiotemporal properties (or powers). At 
the same time, we can attempt to acquire cognition of them and indefinitely 
extend such investigation in space and time. As a result, empirical laws, 
which are grounded in our cognition of real essences, can be said to 
transcend our knowledge in degree rather in kind, and are in principle object 
of progressive, yet fallible knowledge. 
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8. Conclusion: no insight into the “inner in things”? 
I want to conclude by suggesting that the claim that empirical laws are object 
of progressive, yet fallible knowledge should not sound surprising. Kant 
oftentimes remarks that his philosophy licenses (or at least, is supposed to 
license) a well-grounded notion of empirical realism (see, e.g., A371). 
Further, Kant’s corpus contains explicit denials of the thesis that we cannot 
know the “inner in things.” These denials should not lead us to think that Kant 
retains a metaphysical view about essences even in his Critical period. 
Rather, as I have shown in this chapter, Kant rethinks essences in a way that 
is compatible with the epistemic restrictions of his mature philosophy, and yet 
affords empirical cognition of them—namely, as ideas of reason. I want to 
focus, in particular, on a passage (from the Remark to the Amphiboly of the 
Concepts of Reflection) that recapitulates some key points of this chapter 
and most clearly dismisses the strong kind of epistemic ignorance that 
seems to follow from the ‘essentialist’ account of laws. 
In this passage, Kant discusses the possibility of knowing the inner 
properties of matter (as a phenomenon, or empirical substance). Kant 
specifies that “comparatively inner properties” are not just the kind of 
properties that we can cognize, but also the only meaningful properties that 
we need to investigate. As Kant puts it, “what the things may be in 
themselves I do not know, and also do not need to know, since a thing can 
never become before me except in appearance” (A276–7/B332–3; emphasis 
added). “The absolutely internal in matter”—namely, what matter may be in 
itself, abstracting from experience— is “a mere fancy” in empirical 
investigation (ibid.).47 But if this is correct, then the skeptical worries that 
seem to result from an essentialist position collapse. As Kant continues: 
 
If the complaints “That we have no insight into the inner in things” are to mean that 
we do not understand through pure reason what the things that appear to us might 
 
47 This is not to deny that, for Kant, there is a transcendental ground of the appearances of 
matter, but this is “a mere something, about which we would not understand what it is even if 
someone could tell us” (A277/B333). In other words, determining this ground does not 
concern us in empirical investigation.  
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be in themselves, then they are entirely improper and irrational; for they would 
have us be able to cognize things, thus intuit them, even without senses, 
consequently they would have it that we have a faculty of cognition entirely distinct 
from the human not merely in degree but even in intuition and kind, and thus that 
we ought to be not humans but beings that we cannot even say are possible, let 
alone how they are constituted. Observation and analysis of the appearances 
penetrate into what is inner in nature, and one cannot know how far this will go in 
time. (A277–8/B333–4; emphases added) 
 
It is “improper and irrational” to complain that we cannot know what 
appearances may be in themselves and, thereby, that we cannot have 
insight into the “inner in things.” These complaints would require of us the 
ability or faculty to cognize objects without sensible intuition. But this faculty 
of cognition (i.e., intellectual intuition) would differ from ours “not merely in 
degree but even in intuition and kind.” Indeed, we would be complaining 
about not having a faculty of cognition that cannot belong to human beings at 
all, and of which we do not know even if it is possible.48 We can instead 
acquire cognition of the empirical world without leaving our finite perspective 
as human beings. As we saw, essences should not be thought as 
unknowable things in themselves, but as unreachable totalities of conditions 
that transcend our cognition in degree. It would therefore be a non sequitur to 
say that, since we cannot know how things are in themselves, we cannot 
improve our empirical cognition of them (or insight into them). As Kant says, 
empirical investigation can penetrate into the properties and powers of real 
essences (or “we become acquainted with the powers of things bit by bit in 
experience”; ML2, 28:553) and extend indefinitely in space and time.  
What this passage (from the Analytic) does not mention is that, 
according to my reconstruction, the investigation of empirical laws of nature 
is guided by the faculty that demands the totality of conditions for given 
appearances, namely reason and its ideas. I have argued that reading the 
problem of the necessity of empirical laws through the lenses of the Dialectic 
 
48 I do not have space in this chapter to evaluate the claim that it does not make sense to 
complain about something that we do not know if it is possible. On the (real) possibility of 
intellectual intuition, see also Zuckert 2020. 
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allows us to make sense of empirical cognition and progress within the 
context of an ‘essentialist’ account of empirical laws. Reason does not 
determine the necessity of empirical laws. Rather, it is the fundamental 
epistemic faculty that allows us to acquire and improve cognition of laws that 
are grounded in the essences of things. As such, the proposed interpretation 
reconciles the epistemological and metaphysical side of empirical laws of 







































I wish to conclude this long journey through Kant’s theory of reason by giving 
a summary of the key points of my interpretation and briefly highlighting 
some of the questions that still need to be answered. As we saw, Kant 
considers the doctrine of the systematicity of reason as an important 
scholium to his philosophical system, whose details have only been sketched 
in the Critique. Although I cannot claim to have solved all the puzzles of this 
part of the Critique, I hope that the unified approach presented in these 
chapters suggests some promising insights towards the full explanation and 
development of Kant’s doctrine of systematicity as well as of his general 
account of scientific investigation. 
I have proposed an interpretation of systematicity that aims at 
reconciling two key aspects of Kant’s theory of reason, namely that the 
doctrine of systematicity is a critically legitimate part of the Critique; and that 
it is indispensably necessary for acquiring empirical cognition. Current 
interpretations fall short of vindicating these two aspects of Kant’s theory of 
reason. Interpretations that emphasize the legitimate nature of the 
systematicity of reason tend to regard it as an afterthought to his 
philosophical system—namely, as some form of heuristics we may use to 
expand our cognition. Interpretations that highlight the indispensable 
necessity of reason runs the opposite risk of advancing a transcendent 
interpretation of its use—namely, a use of reason that oversteps the limits of 
possible cognition. But as I showed, it is possible to do justice to both tenets 
of Kant’s theory of reason without reducing the doctrine of systematicity to 
some form of heuristics nor venturing into the territories of transcendent 
metaphysics. 
In the first part of this thesis, I showed that the concepts of reason 
(i.e., ideas) must be interpreted as having eminently prescriptive value, and 
that such prescriptive value is not incompatible with their necessary function 
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in empirical investigation. In particular, I suggested that in order to 
legitimately use ideas, we need to take them not as concepts of objects, but 
rather as rules for the empirical use of the understanding. As rules for the 
empirical use of the understanding, ideas acquire indirect objective validity. 
That is, they can be legitimately applied to empirical objects through the 
actions of the understanding. In particular, they allow the understanding to 
maximize the unity and extension of empirical research. In other words, the 
objective validity of ideas does not consist in an actual or potential relation to 
objects, but in the function of progressive systematisation of objects of 
experience they afford. 
If this reading is correct, ideas do not rely on claims about 
transcendent objects for their validity. Relying on claims about objects of 
which we do not know the possibility is unsatisfactory, for it can at most 
ground the belief that ideas are objectively valid, but it fails to show that ideas 
are objectively valid. This does not necessarily mean that any use of reason 
in direct relation to objects (such as ‘doctrinal belief’) should be banned from 
reason. As we saw, reason is naturally misled into the illusion that its 
principles determine things in themselves. While under such illusion, 
however, reason can avoid taking its principles to be true and thereby 
escape from metaphysical errors. My more restricted claim is, rather, that 
ideas of reason can be legitimately used in empirical investigation only if they 
do not depend on descriptive relations to objects in order to be valid. 
More specifically, in Chapter 1 I presented an overview of my 
reconstruction of the general features of the regulative use of reason. I 
defended the following claims: that the regulative use of the ideas of reason 
does not rely on ‘transcendental illusion’ but replaces it as the proper use of 
ideas; that such proper use of ideas consists in their use as meta-rules for 
bottom-up empirical research; that the prescriptive nature of ideas is 
compatible with their being objective in the relation to the empirical world. In 
Chapter 2, I clarified the objective validity of ideas while reconstructing the 
regulative use of a specific idea, the theological idea. I showed that the 
transcendental deduction of ideas offers us detailed instructions on how to 
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critically understand the postulation of the idea of God. In particular, I argued 
that the idea of God obtains objective validity as a schema for the complete 
determination of objects of experience; and that the content of this idea must 
be understood in analogical rather than descriptive terms, namely as 
establishing only a relation to something that remains unknown in itself. 
In the second part of the thesis, I developed my account of the 
necessity of reason in relation to empirical cognition. I showed that the 
systematicity of reason plays a fundamental role not only as a logical (i.e., in 
relation to concepts), but also as a transcendental principle (i.e., in relation to 
experience). Importantly, to say that systematicity is a transcendental 
principle of reason does not plausibly mean that it is a condition of the very 
possibility of experience, or experience as such (like the categories of the 
understanding), but that is a necessary and indispensable condition of 
experience as giving rise to proper empirical cognition. Reason provides 
fundamental prescriptive conditions for both the formation of concepts and 
their application to the objects of experience. In other words, it tells us how 
we ought to acquire empirical cognition. More specifically, I focused on three 
different, yet closely related aspects of scientific investigation: (1) unity of 
cognition, (2) empirical truth, and (3) necessity of laws.  
(1) In Chapter 3, I argued that theoretical reason offers us the 
conceptual space in which it is possible to pursue scientific cognition. The 
space of theoretical reason does not prescribe the content of phenomena. 
Rather, it provides scientists with a template of maximal systematicity of 
knowledge which grounds the possibility of different, compatible 
perspectives—either aimed at unity or at disunity of scientific cognition. (2) In 
Chapter 4, I showed that reason’s characterization as a ‘touchstone of truth’ 
can be squared with the theory of truth Kant grants and presupposes in his 
Critique: truth as the agreement of cognition with its object. Reason provides 
us with two essential preconditions for the tenability of this theory at the 
empirical level (the possibility of formulating empirical concepts and 
approximating empirical cognitions to truth) and remarkably dovetails with the 
other criteria of truth that can be found in Kant’s corpus. (3) In Chapter 5, I 
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argued that reading the problem of the necessity of empirical laws through 
the lenses of the Dialectic allows us to make sense of empirical cognition and 
progress within the context of an ‘essentialist’ account of empirical laws. 
Reason does not determine the necessity of empirical laws. Rather, it is the 
fundamental epistemic faculty that allows us to acquire and improve 
cognition of laws that are grounded in the essences of things. As a result, 
empirical laws are in principle object of progressive, yet fallible knowledge. 
But if this reconstruction is correct, it also teaches us an important 
lesson on Kant’s understanding of the role of metaphysics in empirical 
investigation. As I emphasized in the course of my thesis, Kant does not 
simply dismiss the metaphysical resources of our mind. Rather, he deeply 
rethinks them in accordance with the perspectival nature of our knowledge, 
i.e., its being situated in individual human cognitive faculties. As we have 
seen, the idea of systematicity originates from the same demand of reason 
that leads us to transcendent metaphysics—the demand for the 
unconditioned. Such demand can never be fulfilled given the perspectival 
nature of our knowledge. But this does not mean that reason has no place in 
cognition. When limited by the nature of our knowledge, reason’s demand for 
the unconditioned disposes of its baseless transcendent aspirations and 
becomes a drive for cognition that allows the subject to advance in its 
empirical investigation. 
The limitation to the human perspective is a defining aspect of the 
positive use of reason that often goes underappreciated in the attempts to 
reconstruct this use. By emphasizing such perspectival limitation, my 
interpretation has shown that Kant operates a radical transformation of the 
function of the rational sources of our mind. Their function is not to attempt a 
determination of things in themselves but is rather to guide the investigation 
of finite beings within the world. In other words, the immanent function of 
reason is essentially orientational. In particular, by guiding the way the 
understanding relates to the world, reason does not merely help it formulate 
additional hypotheses that complete a system of cognitions already given to 
us. Much more radically, it makes possible any coherent use of the 
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understanding that goes beyond a mere production of given experience. As 
such, reason is an indispensable component of any empirical cognition that 
is not a mere aggregate of particular and unrelated cognitions. 
I take Kant’s reflections on reason’s systematicity to be a precious 
resource also for contemporary debates in philosophy of science, in 
particular concerning the perspectivism of scientific cognition. According to 
contemporary perspectivism, multiple approaches and theories are nothing 
but different perspectives from which we investigate phenomena. Given our 
epistemic limitations—the point of view we occupy—science is perspectival 
through and through, from the gathering and interpretation of data to 
scientific theorizing proper. In Chapter 3, I suggested that an interesting 
variation on perspectivism can be found in Kant’s doctrine of theoretical 
reason. While standard perspectivism focuses on the plurality of 
observational points of view, Kant’s ‘perspectivism’ emphasizes the common 
space within which different perspectives can be taken up. Reason provides 
the ideal conceptual space within which we are able to systematise disparate 
and particular empirical cognitions into scientific knowledge. The complete 
systematic unity of cognition is not, to be sure, how scientific knowledge 
looks like according to Kant. The space of reason is, however, the place 
where finite cognizers can orient their empirical investigations and attempt to 
progressively approximate to systematic unity. 
Whilst I proposed a unified account of Kant’s doctrine of systematicity, 
this does not mean that my reconstruction is complete nor that it is not 
disputable in many of its details. Several questions remain unanswered in the 
present work. I want to conclude by briefly mentioning some of the most 
pressing ones. First, while Kant clearly intends to propose a general reading 
of the regulative use of the ideas of reason in the course of the Dialectic 
(most evidently in the Introduction and in the Appendix), it is not entirely clear 
how such use can be applied to each kind of ideas (cosmological, 
psychological, and theological) and whether there are significant differences 
among them. Although I supported my reading with several examples of 
particular applications of the regulative use of reason, Kant’s complex 
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taxonomy of ideas would require a much more extensive and systematic 
discussion than I managed to conduct in this thesis. I have also not 
completely clarified how the ‘official’ transcendental ideas of reason are 
related to the particular (or empirical) ideas of reason (such as ‘pure water,’ 
‘pure earth,’ ‘pure air’), nor have I explained the relation between ideas of 
reason and the principles of reason Kant discusses in the first part of the 
Appendix (homogeneity, specification, continuity). 
Second, I suggested that the doctrine of systematicity is an important 
part of what Kant calls ‘empirical realism.’ However, Kant’s empirical realism 
is strongly dependent on assumptions that are characteristic of his mature 
philosophical position, namely ‘transcendental idealism.’ As a result, to say 
that the doctrine of systematicity contributes to empirical realism leaves it 
open what kind of realism (if any) such doctrine licenses. Fully answering this 
question requires a much more detailed investigation into the foundations of 
Kant’s philosophical project in the Critique. The problem of realism is 
pressing not only from an exegetical, but also from a contemporary point of 
view. If we accept that our epistemic limitations fundamentally condition the 
possibility of scientific knowledge, how can we still maintain that scientific 
theories really map onto entities and processes of a mind-independent 
world? In other words, how can we reconcile the perspectival nature of our 
knowledge with some form of realism in science? While Kant’s doctrine of 
systematicity offers promising starting points for discussion, there is still 
much interpretative work to be done in order to answer these questions in a 
contemporary setting. 
Finally, the proposed interpretation is by no means a complete 
reconstruction of Kant’s general account of scientific investigation. In my 
thesis, I only discussed one aspect of Kant’s account, namely his notion of 
systematicity in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant’s account is, however, 
much more complex and it is developed in several other works, such as the 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, the Prolegomena, and the 
Critique of the Power of Judgment. Not only is the doctrine of systematicity 
just a part of this account, but Kant’s answer to how we can investigate 
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nature and obtain empirical cognition seems to undergo a significant change 
from the First to the Third Critique. In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, 
Kant notoriously reassigns systematicity to reflective judgment and its 
principle of purposiveness. In this text, reflective judgement is revealed as 
the faculty that allows us to presuppose that nature is purposive for our 
cognitive faculties so that we can meaningfully order it into laws. Despite the 
significance of such reassignment within his philosophical project, Kant does 
not offer any explanation for it. Scholars starkly diverge in interpreting the 
kind of relation existing between these two texts. While I believe that key 
insights of my reconstruction suggest some form of continuity between the 
solutions presented in the two texts (see, especially, Chapters 1, 4, and 5), a 
careful analysis of the development of Kant’s views lies well beyond the 
scope of the present work. Uncovering the reasons that led Kant to make this 
change as well as completing Kant’s doctrine of systematicity with the other 
parts of his philosophy of nature would however be necessary steps to 
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